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Abstract
This PhD dissertation is a study of how social networks and clubs form in different
contexts.
Chapter 1 investigates the incentives of individuals to make introductions (the act of
creating a link for two neighbours) in a social network. The chapter assumes that players
are endowed with different ability levels and have a network among them. Given an ability
endowment and a network, players undergo a matching process where one can only be
matched with one of his neighbours or stay alone, and one always prefers a more capable
matching partner to a less capable one to staying alone. A strict ability ranking would yield
a unique stable matching for all network structures. Our research question is: If a player
can create a link for a pair of his neighbours, when would he want to do so? Two results
are derived to address this question. First, the matching of a player would be unchanged
if he makes an introduction for two neighbours, at least one of whom is less capable than
him. Second, an introduction could benefit the introducer when both neighbours involved
are more capable than him, and there exists an even-length alternating path from one of the
neighbours to him. The chapter also examines the stability of networks based on no profitable
introductions and characterizes Pareto efficient networks.
Chapter 2 studies a general model of investment in relationships. Existing research on
network formation proceeds under strong assumptions on how a link between two agents
can be produced: typically link investments are assumed to be unweighted and links are
formed either reciprocally or unilaterally. This chapter proposes a more general approach
by allowing weighted link investment and employing a constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) link formation function. This formulation has two advantages other than permitting a
more flexible sponsorship of links. First, it nests the two commonly employed bilateral and
unilateral link formation assumptions as special cases and thus enables robustness checks on
existing works. Second, it introduces a variation in link investment substitutability and hence
enables the analysis of how different link formation technologies affect network formation.
We illustrate this approach through two applications: a game of pure network formation and
a game of network formation with assorted activities.
Chapter 3, which is co-authored with Prof Sanjeev Goyal and Dr Marcin Dziubinski,
explores club joining activities of individuals and member admission activities of clubs.
We assume that links between clubs are formed when they share common members. The
productivity of a club is determined by its number of members and how connected it is to
other clubs. Individuals wish to join clubs with high productivity and clubs admit members
with the aim to raise productivity. We study the efficient and the stable club membership
structures and find that both efficiency and stability implies the segregation of individuals
(and clubs) into two groups with very different levels of club joining (and member admission)
activeness and welfare. Our results provide a simple explanation for the phenomena of the
“power elite” and interlocking board of directors.
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Chapter 1
When to Make an Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Introductions can be a major channel of social network formation. It is common for
two strangers to build a link as a result of someone who knows both of them making an
introduction. For example, a scholar can refer one young researcher to another for a joint
project, and a couple may come to know each other thanks to the introduction from a mutual
friend.
In certain circumstances, individuals can rely heavily on introductions for the formation
of a new relationship. One such case is when a person is looking for a collaborator to perform
a task together that calls for trust. Introductions from a common friend would serve as a
reliable source of new connections for this purpose.
Note also that a number of studies on network formation assume that some proportion
of a player’s links are built through meeting friends of friends.1 This meeting process would
not happen if the friend is not willing to introduce the player to his friends.
Despite the importance of introductions, as far as we know, there have not been any
studies on the strategic reasoning behind this behaviour. Most existing literature on network
formation analyses the creation, maintaining, and deletion of a link by examining the
incentives of players sitting on the two sides of the link.2 The influence a third party can
have on a relationship (facilitating a link with an introduction, for example) is not taken into
account.
1 For example, see Granovetter (1973) and Jackson and Rogers (2007).
2 For an overview of network formation research, see Goyal (2007), Jackson (2010), and more recently
Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2016).
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The aim of this chapter is to provide a first understanding of how agents choose when
and for whom to make an introduction, and how introductions affect network stability and
efficiency.
We study the following model. Consider a set of players who are endowed with different
ability levels and are connected in a network. The players undergo a one-to-one matching
process where everyone tries to find a partner from his neighbours. A high-ability partner
is preferred to a low-ability one. Having a partner is preferred to not having one. It can be
shown that given any strict ability ranking and network structure, the above process admits a
unique stable matching. We now ask ourselves: If a player can alter the network structure by
making an introduction for a pair of his unlinked neighbours, would he do so?
We answer the question with two findings. First, an introducer’s matching outcome
would not change if at least one of the players being introduced has lower ability than the
introducer. Second, when both players are more capable than the introducer, the matching
of the introducer will be affected only if there is an alternating path (a path with pairs of
players on it who are alternatively matched with each other and not matched with each other)
from one of the players being introduced to the introducer. The parity of the alternating path
length determines the direction of the influence: an even one leads to an improvement while
an odd one leads to an impairment.
With the above understanding, we characterize networks that are introduction robust
(networks where no player wants to introduce any pairs of his neighbours). We also charac-
terize Pareto efficient networks and show that introduction robustness and Pareto efficiency
do not imply each other.
Our model of introduction has two key ingredients. First, players are born with het-
erogeneous characteristics and have aligned preferences over them. Second, players do not
interact with all neighbours in the network, but just one. There is thus, in some sense, a
competition for quality neighbours in our model.
There are a few economic and social scenarios that feature this kind of competition.
We provide two examples. The first is one where starting entrepreneurs are looking for
co-founders of business. Some of the entrepreneurs must be viewed as better than others due
to stronger technical or business background. And they cannot engage in multiple projects at
one time because establishing a new firm requires devotion. A capable partner is a scarce
resource. The entrepreneurs will want to decide whether or not to make an introduction
wisely. The second example concerns the pursuits for attention and popularity that are
common among adolescents. Youngsters can vary in their attractiveness and often want to
have an exclusive best friend relationship with someone who is popular. An introduction
for two friends can affect the best friend relationships in the network. The adolescents thus
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will want to make introductions in some cases but not others. Our results shed light on the
understanding of introductions in these contexts.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 explains the model
setup. Section 3 illustrates how we obtain the unique stable matching in a network. Section
4 shows the effects of a new link and explains players’ incentives to make an introduction.
Section 5 characterizes introduction robust networks and Pareto efficient networks. Section 6
concludes with a discussion of far-sighted introduction decisions. Proofs that are not given
in the main text can be found in the Appendix.
1.2 The Model
Consider a set of players N = {1,2, ...,n}. Each player i ∈ N is endowed with an ability
level ai ∈R+. Th endowments for all players are represented with a vector a= {a1,a2, ...,an}.
We assume that there is a strict ordering of ability levels: ai ̸= a j for all i ∈ N, j ̸= i.
The players are situated in a network g= {gi j}i, j∈N . The variable gi j ∈ {0,1} represents
an undirected relationship between i and j: gi j = 1 indicates a link between i and j while
gi j = 0 indicates no link between them. Since relationships are undirected, we have gi j = g ji
for all i, j ∈ N. Let G denote the set of all possible networks for the n players.
We now define a few notions based on a network g. First, player i and player j are
neighbours to each other if gi j = 1. We use Ni(g) = { j ∈ N : gi j = 1} to denote the set
of neighbours i has in g. Second, a path in a network g is a sequence of distinct players
{i0, i2, ..., ik} where every two consecutive players have a link between them: gim−1im = 1 for
m = 1,2, ...,k. Finally, if gi j = 0, we use g+ i j to represent the network that is network g
with an additional link between i and j.
Given an ability endowment a and a network structure g, players undergo a one-to-one
matching process where each player partners with one of his neighbours or remains single.
The outcome of the process is a matching: µg : N →N where µg(i) = j only if j ∈Ni(g)∪{i}
and µg( j) = i. If µg(i) = i, player i remains single in the matching µg.
We assume that players have the following aligned preference for matching. First, they
always prefer to be matched to a partner with higher ability. Second, they always prefer to be
matched than to remain single. In other words, let wi( j) be the payoff for player i if he is
matched with player j. We assume that for all players m ∈ N, i ̸= m and j ̸= m:
wm(i)> wm( j), if and only if ai > a j (1.1)
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and
wm(i)> wm(m) (1.2)
A matching under a network is stable if (i) no player wants to abandon his current
partner and stay single, and (ii) no pair of linked players want to form a new match (and
leave their current partners if they have one). Formally,
Definition 1.1. A matching µg is stable under a network g if
(i) it is not blocked by any player i: @i ∈ N with
wi(i)> wi(µg(i))
(ii) it is not blocked by any pair of linked players (i, j): @(i, j) ∈ N2 with
wi( j)> wi(µg(i))
w j(i)> w j(µg( j))
j ∈ Ni(g)
Note that with our assumption that players always prefer to be matched, the first
condition of a stable matching is satisfied for all possible matchings that can happen in a
network.
We show in Section 1.3 that for any network structure g, the matching process admits a
unique stable matching µ∗g . We use the payoffs from this matching to define the utility of
players from a network: ui(g) = wi(µ∗g (i)) for all i ∈ N.
We then consider the question of whether a player wants to make an introduction for a
pair of his unlinked neighbours. Given a network g, a player m ∈ N who has two unlined
neighbours i, j ∈ Nm(g) with gi j = 0 can make an introduction for i and j and change the
network structure from g to g+ i j. If um(g+ i j) > um(g), player m wants to make the
introduction. If um(g+ i j)< um(g), player m does not want to make the introduction. In the
tie-breaking case, we assume that m would make the introduction if he is generous.
A network is introduction robust if no player wants to make an introduction for any
pairs of his unlinked neighbours.
Definition 1.2. A network g ∈ G is introduction robust if
(i) there does not exist m∈N and i, j ∈Nm(g) with gi j = 0 such that um(g+ i j)> um(g),
and
(ii) if players are generous, there does not exist m ∈ N and i, j ∈ Nm(g) with gi j = 0
such that um(g+ i j) = um(g).
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We also examine Pareto efficiency of networks. A network g is Pareto efficient if there
does not exist another network g′ where the utilities of players under g′ are at least as large
as those under g, with some strictly greater.
Definition 1.3. A network g ∈ G is Pareto efficient if there does not exists g′ ∈ G such that
ui(g′)≥ ui(g) for all i ∈ N and there exists i ∈ N such that ui(g′)> ui(g).
1.3 The Unique Stable Matching
We derive the unique stable matching µ∗g under network g in this section.
First, note that if g is the complete network where all pairs of players are linked: gi j = 1
for all i ∈ N, j ̸= i, then the network structure imposes no restrictions on the matching of
players. A unique stable matching under the complete network can be easily obtained.
Remark 1.1. When players are situated in a complete network, the matching process admits
a unique stable matching where the player with highest ability is matched to the player with
the second-highest ability, the player with the third-highest ability is matched to the player
with the forth-highest ability,.... If n is an even number, all players get matched. If n is an
odd number, the player with the lowest ability is the only one unmatched.
For a network g that is not necessarily complete, there is also a unique stable matching
that can be derived with a simple algorithm.
Lemma 1.1. For all g ∈ G, the matching process admits a unique stable matching µ∗g which
can be derived with the following algorithm:
(i) With a given network, let the player with the highest ability be matched with his most
capable neighbour.
(ii) Delete the pair of players who get matched in step (i) and their links from the
original network and arrive at a reduced network.
(iii) Go back to step (i) until the remaining network is empty or consists only of players
with no links.
(iv) All those get matched in step (i) will be matched in µ∗g , and all other players will
remain single in µ∗g .
1.4 The Influence of a New Link
This section discusses how a new link between two players, say i and j, affects the
matching of other players. We ask ourselves the following questions and answer them one by
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one. First, if there is a new link between i and j, will µ∗g+i j and µ∗g be different? Second, if
different, whose matching will be affected? Finally, for a player whose matching is changed,
will he obtain a higher or lower payoff?
We begin with the first question. We define a link between i and j as useful under g if i
and j are matched in the unique stable matching µ∗g .
We show that µ∗g+i j is different from µ∗g if and only if the new link between i and j
is useful under g+ i j. It is easy to see that µ∗g+i j and µ∗g are different if the link between i
and j is useful because the two players who cannot be matched in µ∗g are now matched in
µ∗g+i j. We verify that µ∗g+i j and µ∗g are different only if the link is useful by going through
the algorithm used to derive µ∗g+i j and finding that all steps lead to the same actions as those
taken to derive µ∗g if the new link is not useful.
Also, note that for a link between i and j to be useful under g+ i j, the two players that
are not matched under g get matched under g+ i j. This requires that they prefer each other
to their original match in µ∗g :
ai > aµ∗g ( j) if µ
∗
g ( j) ̸= j
a j > aµ∗g (i) if µ
∗
g (i) ̸= i
We thus arrive at Lemma 1.2 that characterizes when a new link between i and j has an
effect on the matching outcomes of players.
Lemma 1.2. Consider a network g ∈ G and two players i, j ∈ N where gi j = 0. There exists
a player m ∈ N such that µ∗g+i j(m) ̸= µ∗g (m) if and only if the link between i and j is useful
under g+ i j:
ai > aµ∗g ( j) if µ
∗
g ( j) ̸= j
a j > aµ∗g (i) if µ
∗
g (i) ̸= i
We now discuss whose matching will be affected by a useful new link. Recall the
algorithm we employ to derive the unique stable matching under a network. When it is
executed, a sequence of steps are taken. And we can observe that given any network structure,
the sequence is unique. Based on this unique sequence, we define player i as a leading player
of player j under network g if i exists from the algorithm used to derive µ∗g earlier than j.
We show that with a new link between i and j, leading players of i and j under g will
not be affected by the link.
Lemma 1.3. Consider a network g ∈ G and two players i, j ∈ N where gi j = 0. If player
m ∈ N is a leading player of i and j under g, then µ∗g+i j(m) = µ∗g (m).
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With the help of Lemma 1.2 and Lemma 1.3, we show that an introducer’s matching
will not be affected if at least one of the players he makes an introduction for is not as capable
as him.
Proposition 1.1. For all m ∈ N and g ∈ G, if i, j ∈ Nm(g) and am > min{ai,a j}, then
µ∗g+i j(m) = µ∗g (m).
The proof for this proposition follows from Lemmas 1.2 and 1.3. When there is a new
link between i and j, it either does not facilitate a matching for i and j under g+ i j (the link
is not useful under g+ i j) so it does not influence the matching of any players, or it makes i
and j match under g+ i j. In the second case, player m must have been matched to a player
who has higher ability than both i and j and have exited from the matching algorithm earlier
than i and j (m is a leading player of i and j under g). If not, then m and the more capable
player between i and j would match, contradicting the matching between i and j under g+ i j.
This proposition shows that if a player is generous, he would always make introductions
for neighbours that are not as capable as him.
Going back to the effects of a new link on players, we make a further observation on
who will be affected by a new link with the notion of alternating paths. An alternating path
under network g is a path where pairs of players on the path are alternative matched to each
other and not matched to each other in µ∗g : a path {i0, i1, ..., ik} in g is an alternating path if
µ∗g (i0) = i1, µ∗g (i1) ̸= i2, µ∗g (i2) = i3,µ∗g (i3) ̸= i4....
We show that all the players that are affected by a new link between i and j must sit on
an alternating path that starts from i or j.
Lemma 1.4. Consider a network g∈G and two players i, j ∈N where gi j = 0. If µ∗g+i j(m) ̸=
µ∗g (m), then there is an alternating path {i0, i1, ..., ik = m} in network g where i0 ∈ {i, j}.
The intuition behind Lemma 1.4 is the following. If the matching of a player m is
affected by a new link between i and j, ignoring the case where m is not matched under g
or g+ i j, m must have broken his original match under g and formed a new match under
g+ i j. The player whom m breaks a match with is originally matched with m under g, and
the player whom m forms a new match with is not matched with m under g. We can already
see that m sits on a short alternating path in g that consists of his original match under g,
himself, and his new partner under g+ i j.
The two players that match with m under g and g+ i j respectively are also affected
by the new link between i and j. So they are also parts of an alternating path that contains
themselves, m and another player. By repeating this reasoning, we can extend the alternating
path with affected players on it. This extension must end with a source of affections, which
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is the matching between i and j facilitated by their new link. So players affected by a new
link between i and j must sit on an alternating path that starts from i or j.
We illustrate the alternating path pattern of affected players with an example in Figure
1.1. In Figure 1.1, a label on a node represents the ability ranking of a player. Figure 1.1 (a)
shows the unique stable matching under a network g, where the matchings are indicated with
red lines. Figure 1.1 (b) shows the new unique stable matching under the network with an
additional link between players 1 and 2. Compare Figure 1.1 (a) and 1.1 (b), we can easily
find the set of players whose matchings are influenced by the new link, which is illustrated in
Figure 1.1 (c) where the affected players are painted red. We can see that there are two red
paths starting from player 1 and player 2 respectively that connect the affected players. The
solid red links are useful under the original network g and the dashed red links are not useful
under g. These two paths are the alternating paths mentioned in Lemma 1.4.
Finally, we illustrate the direction of influence a new link between i and j can have on
an affected player. This depends on the parity of the alternating path length from i or j to the
affected player.
Proposition 1.2. Consider a network g ∈ G and two players i, j ∈ N where gi j = 0. If
um(g+ i j)> um(g+ i j), then then there is an alternating path {i0, i1, ..., ik = m} in network
g where i0 ∈ {i, j} and k is an even number. If um(g+ i j)< um(g+ i j), then then there is an
alternating path {i0, i1, ..., ik = m} in network g where i0 ∈ {i, j} and k is an odd number.
Proposition 1.2 shows how the parity of the alternating path length determines if an
affected player experience positive or negative influence from a new link. An even-length
path leads to an improvement and an odd-length path leads to an impairment.
To see why this happens, first note that the original partners of i and j under g must
be worse off given the new link between i and j. They lose their original partners and need
to match with some other neighbours. They can only be worse off because otherwise they
would deviate from the matching with i and j under g. The length of the alternating paths
from i and j to these two players are odd. Then observe that the players who are newly
matched to the original partners of i and j must be better off, because otherwise they would
stay with their original partners. The length of the alternating paths from i and j to these two
players are even. We can extend this reasoning further and see that affected players on an
alternating path take turns to lose an original preferable match and gain a new preferable
match. So the parity of the alternating path pins down the direction of the influence for a new
link.
Proposition 1.2 also informs us about a player’s incentive to make an introduction for
two players i and j that are both more capable than him. If the player is generous, he will
make an introduction as long as there does not exist an alternating path from i or j to him
8
(a) The unique stable matching µ∗g
(b) The unique stable matching µ∗g+12
(c) Players affected by a new link between 1 and 2
Figure 1.1 Alternating paths and players affected by a new link
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that is of odd-length. If the player is not generous, he will make the introduction only if there
is an alternating path from i or j to him that is of even-length.
This characterization based on alternating paths and their lengths has two implications.
First, it shows that players can benefit from an introduction for other players. This would not
be expected at first sight of the model. Since players in our model are competing for good
partners, it seems an introduction for two neighbours can only intensify two competitions a
player is involved with and reduce the utility of the player. Nonetheless, if the two neighbours
are matched with the new link, they withdraw from competitions for other players who
the introducer might want to partner with. In this way, an introducer can benefit from an
introduction.
Second, since affected players are alternatively better off and worse off given their
positions on the two alternating paths, around half of them would have their matchings
improved with an introduction and half of them would have their matchings impaired. This
shows that the chances of an introducer benefiting from an introduction is not low.
1.5 Introduction Robustness and Pareto Efficiency
With the understanding developed in the previous section on how an introduction affects
the matchings of players, we now characterize conditions for a network to be introduction
robust and to be Pareto efficient.
The conditions for a network to be introduction robust follow directly from Propositions
1.1 and 1.2.
Proposition 1.3. When players are generous, if a network g ∈ G is introduction robust, then
for all m ∈ N and i, j ∈ Nm(g) with gi j = 0: ai > am, a j > am, and there is an alternating
path {i0, i1, ..., ik = m} in network g where i0 ∈ {i, j} and k is an odd number.
When players are not generous, a network g ∈ G is introduction robust if for all m ∈ N,
there does not exist i, j ∈ Nm(g) with gi j = 0 such that ai > am, a j > am, and there is an
alternating path {i0, i1, ..., ik = m} in network g where i0 ∈ {i, j} and k is an even number.
When players are generous, all introductions that do not reduce the utility of an intro-
ducer will be made. So a network is introduction robust only if all possible introductions
that can be made lead to a worse matching for the introducer which we characterize with
the odd-length alternating path. When players are not generous, a player will make an
introduction when it enhances his utility. So a network is introduction robust if there is no
introduction that can be made and leads to a better matching for the introducer, which we
characterize with the even-length alternating path.
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Figure 1.2 An introduction robust network that is not Pareto efficient
Regarding Pareto efficiency, we show that a network g is Pareto efficient if and only if
at most one player is not matched in the unique stable matching under g.
Proposition 1.4. A network g ∈ G is Pareto efficient if and only if
|{m ∈ N : µ∗g (m) = m}| ≤ 1
The proof for this proposition is simple. If there are two players i and j that are not
matched in µ∗g , then it must be that gi j = 0. Also, all players that are matched in µ∗g are
leading players of i and j in g. Adding a link between i and j would not affect the matching
of other players (since they are leading players of i and j) and would facilitate a matching
between i and j and increase their utilities. When no more than one player remains single in
µ∗g , it is can be shown that there is no Pareto improvements that can be made for the matching
of players. Improving the matching of one player must lead to the impairment of matching
of another player.
We now show that introduction robustness and Pareto efficiency do not imply each other.
Proposition 1.5. Regardless of whether players are generous or not, there exists a network
g ∈ G that is introduction robust but not Pareto efficient and a network g′ ∈ G that is Pareto
efficient but not introduction robust.
The proposition can be shown with examples. First, an empty network where gi j = 0
for all i, j ∈ N is obviously introduction robust but not Pareto efficient. When players are not
generous, we also show that a connected network can be introduction robust but not Pareto
efficient. See Figure 1.2 for an example. There are four players in the network with labels
indicating their ability ranks. The unique stable matching in the network features a single
match between players 1 and 3. When players are not generous, this network is introduction
robust since player 3 would not benefit from introducing players 1 and 2, and player 1 would
not benefit from introducing players 3 and 4. This network is not Pareto efficient since an
additional link between players 3 and 4 would lead to a Pareto improvement.
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(a) the network
(b) player 5 benefits from an introduction
Figure 1.3 A Pareto efficient network that is not introduction robust
Now we show a Pareto efficient network is not necessarily introduction robust. We
illustrate this with the example in Figure 1.3. In the five-player network in Figure 1.3 (a),
the unique stable matching features a match between players 1 and 4 and a match between
players 2 and 3. This network is Pareto efficient as only one player is not matched. However,
it is not introduction robust since player 5 has an incentive to introduce player 1 and player 2.
The network with the introduction is depicted in Figure 1.3 (b). We can see now player 5 is
matched with player 3 which is utility enhancing for him.
We have illustrated an absence of alignment between introduction robustness and Pareto
efficiency.
1.6 Conclusion
This chapter studies introductions, which is a major way to bridge people.
In our model, links in the network serve as a contact book for players who wish to
find a partner. Obviously, all players will want to amplify their contact books so that their
chances of getting a better partner will increase. However, if links can only be formed via
introductions, will a player do a favour for his neighbours by making the introduction?
First, we show that a player’s own matching will not be influenced when he makes an
introduction where at least one of the two being introduced is weaker than him. We next
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(a)
(b)
Figure 1.4 Far-sightedness and introductions
characterize when a player will get a better match or worse match by making an introduction
for a pair of players both more capable than him. Given this, we understand when a (myopic)
player wants to make an introduction for a particular pair of players.
We then move to define a network as introduction robust when no (myopic) player wants
to make an introduction.
Nonetheless, the introduction robustness notion defined in this chapter is short-sighted.
We know that players choose between staying in the current network g and making an
introduction by comparing their utility before and after the introduction. In this chapter,
when we specify a player’s utility after an introduction for i and j, we define it as the payoff
from the unique stable matching under network g+ i j. However, this may not be the most
appropriate evaluation. For a far-sighted player, he knows that following his introduction for
i and j, the network changes and other players can make further introductions. It is wiser to
evaluate his utility after the introduction as the utility from a network with all introductions
that will emerge after his introduction.
We illustrate this with an example in Figure 1.4. Look at the network depicted in Figure
1.4 (a). When players are not generous, no one has an incentive to make an introduction.
However, we can see in Figure 1.4 (b) that if player 5 makes an introduction for player 1
and player 6, then player 6 will want to introduce player 1 and player 2 as this enables him
to match with player 3 instead of player 5. With this introduction made by player 6, player
5 is now matched with player 4 which makes him better off. Hence, with future possible
introductions taken into account, player 5 will want to make an introduction for player 1 and
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6. This consideration may lead us to more sophisticated stability notions like far-sighted
introduction robustness.
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Appendix 1.A Proofs
Proof for Remark 1.1
The remark is a special case of Lemma 1.1.
Proof for Lemma 1.1
We prove that the matching µ∗g is the unique stable matching under g.
To begin with, we show µ∗g is stable. We already know that µ∗g will not be blocked by
any single player since players prefer to be matched than to stay alone. So we only need to
show that µ∗g is not blocked by any pairs of players.
Suppose the pair (i,j) blocks the matching µ∗g , then according to Condition 1.1, it must
be that:
a j > aµ∗g (i)
ai > aµ∗g ( j)
j ∈ Ni(g)
Suppose ai > a j, in the algorithm that leads to µ∗g , i may get picked by someone, picks
someone, or stays alone. If i is picked up, then it must be:
aµ∗g (i) > ai > a j
A contradiction.
If i picks someone, since j is not picked by i, it indicates that either j is not as capable as
i’s match in µ∗g :
aµ∗g (i) > a j
or j is already picked by a more capable player:
aµ∗g ( j) > ai
A contradiction.
Suppose i is left alone in µ∗g with j being his neighbour, it must be j is already picked by
a more capable player:
aµ∗g ( j) > ai
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A contradiction. So µ∗g can not be dominated by any pair of players. Therefore, µ∗g is a stable
matching.
Now, we prove that µ∗g is the unique stable matching. Suppose there is new matching µ ′g
that is stable, then define the set N′ = {i ∈ N | µ ′g(i) ̸= µg(i)} ̸= /0 as the set of players who
get a different matching partner under µ∗g and µ ′g. Let player j be the most capable players in
this set, i.e.
j = argmax
i∈N′
ai
Also, suppose that:
µ∗g ( j) = m
µ ′g( j) = n
µ ′g(m) = k
i.e. let j’s original match be m, new match be n, and let m’s original match be k. It is obvious
that m, n and k belong to N′ as well. I will prove that the pair (j, m) blocks the matching µ ′g,
hence proving that there are no other stable matching other then µ∗g .
Since j = argmaxi∈N′ ai, it is obvious that a j > ak, which makes m want to deviate
from his match under µ ′g to j. Also, it can be shown that am > an. Suppose not, then in the
matching algorithm, it must be that n has been picked by another player, say l, before it can
be picked by j. Hence, al > a j, and l ∈ N′ since player l is not matched with n at µ ′g. This
contradicts with j = argmaxi∈N′ ai.
Given a j > ak and am > an, (j,m) blocks the matching µ ′g. Therefore, µ ′g is not stable. A
contradiction.
Hence µ∗g is the unique stable matching.
Proof for Lemma1.3
Without loss of generality, assume ai > a j. We first show that i is a leading player of j
under g. Suppose not, then since a j < ai, for j to be the leading player instead, it must be that
aµ∗g ( j) > ai
But since the link between i and j is useful, we need that
ai > aµ∗g ( j)
A contradiction. So i is a leading player of j under g.
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Now we apply the unique stable matching algorithm to g and g+ i j, the steps before i’s
matching will be identical for both cases, hence the leading players of i under g will also be
leading players of i under g+ i j, and their matchings are not influenced.
Proof for Proposition 1.1
Suppose ai > a j, since at least one of i and j is less capable than m, a j < am. Also, i, j
and m are connected to each other under g+ i j.
If the introduction is not useful, then obviously µ∗g (m) = µ∗g+i j(m).
If the introduction is useful, since a j < am, it indicates that i will prefer m to j, but i and
j are matched, indicating m has exited from the algorithm earlier than i. Hence m is a leading
player of i under g+ i j. According to Lemma 1.3, m’s matching is not affected.
Hence, a player’s matching will not be affected by making an introduction when a less
capable player is involved.
Proof for Lemma 1.4
If there is a useful new link between i and j, the set of affected players A = {m ∈ N :
µ∗g (m) ̸= µ∗g+i j(m)} can be characterized with the following process.
Define Ak+1 = Ak ∪{m ∈ N : µ∗g (m) ∈ Ak}∪{m ∈ N : µ∗g+i j(m) ∈ Ak}. This function
specifies an augmentation process for a player set.
We starts with the set A0 = {i, j} and apply the above augmentation iteratively to the
set A0 and obtain A1,A2, .... There will be a point where the augmentation stops where
A j+1 = A j. We prove that A j = A.
First, we show that A j ⊂ A. Since the link between i and j is useful, we know A0 ⊂ A.
Moreover, observe that if Ak ⊂ A, then Ak+1 ⊂ A, because if a player is affected, then his
original and new partners are affected as well. Deduce iteratively, we have A j ⊂ A.
Then, we show that A⊂ A j. Suppose there exists m0 ∈ A such that m0 /∈ A j. Then since
m0 ∈ A, he is either better off or worse off as ai ̸= a j,∀i, j ∈ N. Suppose m0 is better off, m0
must have a new partner m1 = µ∗g+i j(m0) that he prefer to his original match. There are two
possible situations that make m1 ̸= µ∗g (m0) match to m0 under g+ i j.
First, both m0 and m1 are better off because there is a new link between them. Second,
m1 is worse off because m2 = µ∗g (m1) finds a better match under g+ i j and left m1.
If the second situation is the case, then m2 is better off and we can do the same induction
to m2 again. This reasoning will not stop unless m2k is better off under the first situation. The
reasoning cannot proceed endlessly because we have a finite set of players. So it must be that
there is a new link between m2k and m2k+1 for some k, indicating m2k and m2k+1 are i and j
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respectively. But then we have m2k ∈ A0, m2k−1 ∈ A1, m2k−2 ∈ A2, .... Hence m0 ∈ A2k. And
since Ak ⊂ A j for k=1, 2, .... We have m0 ∈ A j, a contradiction.
For m0 to be worse off, it can be proved in a similar fashion that m0 ∈ A j and hence a
contradiction. So A⊂ A j.
As A j ⊂ A and A⊂ A j, we get A j = A.
We now explore the pattern for the set of players generated by the above process. It is
immediate for us to see that A1\A0 consists of the original partners of i and j, A2\A1 consists
of the new partners of players in A1\A0, A3\A2 consists of the original partners of players in
A2\A1,.... The set Ak develop itself is by tracing alternatively the original and new partners
of players newly added to the set. Since the links between original partners are useful under
g and the links between new partners are not useful under g, this means that the process
provides us with the set of affected players by drawing two alternating paths under g starting
from i and j with a useful link.
Hence the set of affected players A= {m∈N : µ∗g (m) ̸= µ∗g+i j(m)} lie on two alternating
paths under g, starting from i and j respectively with a useful link.
Proof for Proposition 1.2
We know that the augmenting process we use to obtain the set of affected players can
end in two ways. We show that Proposition 1.2 is true under both circumstances.
First, consider the case where the process stops because the newly added players do
not have an original match under g or a new match under g+ i j. Suppose player m0 lies
on the alternating path starting from i and m0 does not have an original match, indicating
that m0 is added to the set of affected players because the new partner of m0 is in the set of
affected players. So, m0 is better off because he moves from no partner to having a partner.
Obviously, the length of the augmenting path from i to m0 is an even number as analysed in
the proof of Lemma 1.4. Hence the case for m0 is aligned with Proposition 1.2.
Now, for player m1 = µ∗g+i j(m0), we know the length of the alternating path from i to
him is an odd number.We know for m0 and m1, at least one of them is worse off. Since m0
is better off, m1 must be worse off. Hence the case for m1 also agrees with Proposition 1.2.
Similarly, for m2 = µ∗g (m1), from i to whom the length of the augmenting is an odd number,
he must be better off.
Keep reasoning in this manner, we can see that Proposition 1.2 is true for all the affected
members standing on the alternating path from i (j) to m0.
Suppose player n0 lies on the alternating path starting from j and n0 does not have a
new partner, indicating that n0 is added to the set of affected players because the original
partner of n0 is in the set of affected players. So, n0 is worse off because he moves from
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having a partner to no partner. Obviously, the length of the augmenting path from j to n0
is an odd number as analysed. Hence the case for n0 agrees with Proposition 1.2. Again,
for n1 = µg(n0), from j to whom the length of the augmenting is an even number, he must
be better off, because at least one of n0 and n1 is better off. Do the inductions again for
n2,n3, ..., we can see that Proposition 1.2 is true for all the affected members standing on the
alternating path from i(j) to n0.
So we have shown that Proposition 1.2 is true when the augmenting process ends
because the newly added players do not have an original or new partner.
For the other circumstance, we can see that the two alternating paths starting from i and
j actually coincide with each other. Also, it is immediate for us to see that the length of the
path from i to j will be an odd number. As a result, for an affected player that stands on this
path, if the length of the path from him to i is an even number, then the length of the path
from him to j is an odd number. So no matter he is better off or worse off, Proposition 1.2 is
true.
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Chapter 2
Link Investment Substitutability and
Network Formation
2.1 Introduction
The study of network formation has been an active research area for the past two decades.
Economists are interested in this topic because we do observe individuals, firms, and nations
making an effort to manage their relationships, and the resulting network can have substantial
social and economic implications.1
Theoretical investigations on the topic build upon assumptions on how two agents can
form a link between them, and how a network affects the utility of players. Existing works,
while making various modelling choices on network utility specifications, typically adopt
one of the following two link formation assumptions: bilateral link formation or unilateral
link formation.
The two link formation setups both assume that agents make binary decisions on whether
to invest in a relationship, and they differ in the requirement for the creation of a link: the
bilateral one calls for mutual investments whereas the unilateral one demands effort from
only one side. More specifically, let ai j ∈ {0,1} be the choice i makes on whether to invest
in a link with j and gi j be the relationship status between i and j, the bilateral link formation
assumption assumes that gi j =min{ai j,a ji} whereas the unilateral link formation assumption
assumes gi j = max{ai j,a ji}.
The above assumptions are restrictive in two senses. First, they do not allow different
intensities of link investment and link strength. Second, they imply either an extremely
reciprocal way of link formation or a completely unilateral one. In practice, agents can
1 See Goyal (2007) and Jackson (2010) for a review.
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decide on how much-time or money-to devote to a relationship and links can be sponsored in
a bilateral but unequal manner. For example, Kovanen et al. (2010) show with a mobile phone
dataset that communication networks are weighted and efforts to maintain contacts can be
unbalanced, Vaquera and Kao (2008) show with the Add Health data that friendships among
adolescents have different intensities and are not always reciprocated, and we can observe
from our own research experience that contributions towards a joint project are sometimes
unequal.2
We relax the above restrictions by allowing continuous link investment choice ai j ∈R+
and modelling link formation with the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function:
gi j =
h(ai j,a ji) = (12a
β
i j +
1
2a
β
ji)
1
β for weighted link formation
1{h(ai j,a ji)≥ 1}= 1{(12aβi j + 12aβji)
1
β ≥ 1} for unweighted link formation
where 1 is the indicator function and β is a parameter that can take any real value.
This specification permits a more flexible way for players to form links and allows us to
analyze equality of link investments, which is a feature of network structures that receives
little attention from existing literature.
Our link formation assumption has two other related advantages.
First, the CES function nests the bilateral and unilateral link formation function as its
special cases when β approaches negative and positive infinity respectively. This generaliza-
tion enables us to analyze to what extent results from existing works are robust to deviations
from the bilateral or unilateral link formation assumption they build upon.3
Second, the parameter β captures the substitutability of link investments in forming
a connection. For a greater β , there is a smaller drop in the marginal enhancement of
(12a
β
i j+
1
2a
β
ji)
1
β as ai j rises alone, which indicates that it is less costly to have disproportionate
ai j and a ji, i.e. we have a higher degree of link investment substitutability. So, by imposing
different values of β , we can examine the role of this substitutability in network formation
processes.4
2 See the following papers for a further reference on the presence and implications of weighted and unequally
sponsored links: Granovetter (1973), Newman (2001), Yook et al. (2001), Garlaschelli and Loffredo (2004),
and Squartini et al. (2013).
3 Olaizola and Valenciano (2015) offer another approach of unifying bilateral and unilateral link formation.
They assume binary link investment and set different link strength for the three possible cases of no
investment, one-sided investment, and mutual investment. By imposing the same link strength to the cases
of no investment and one-sided investment (one-sided investment and mutual investment), their specification
nests the bilateral (unilateral) link formation assumption.
4 Elliott (2015) provides a reference on how link investment substitutability can affect the outcome and
efficiency of network formation activities. He analyzes and compares how players form trade networks
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We believe that variation in link investment substitutability is notable. It results from
a difference in the nature of activities that accompany a link. For example, in the case of
communication networks, the degree of substitutability rises as we move from face-to-face
contacts to phone calls and then to email correspondences since they demand less and less
joint devotion. For a friendship network, link investment substitutability can be higher for
those who frequent expensive restaurants together than those who chat in cafes, because
the former involves a monetary cost that can be paid flexibly. For the research network,
theoretical collaborations may require mutual understanding on all details of a model and
hence feature a low degree of link investment substitutability while empirical or experimental
projects can work the other way round.
We apply the CES formulation to well-known models that lie in two broad classes of
problems: pure network formation games and network formation with assorted activities
games.5 We select the connections model analyzed by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) that
features pure network formation and extend its bilateral link formation assumption with the
unweighted CES link formation specification.6 We pick the law of the few model studied
by Galeotti and Goyal (2010) that models a simultaneous choice of network formation and
another activity and replace its unilateral link formation assumption with the weighted CES
link formation specification.
We now summarize the modelling and results from the two applications.
In the application to the connections model, each player is endowed with one unit of
intrinsic value that can be shared through a network. Direct and indirect connections facilitate
exchanges of the benefit, but there is a loss in exchange efficiency for any additional player
that stands in between the exchange. Players form links in an unweighted CES manner with
costly relationship investment to maximize the gathering of worth.
We first characterize the efficient network structure under the setup: Proposition 2.1
shows that it must be the complete network, the star, or the empty network depending on
the value of β and other parameters of the model. We then propose the solution concept of
weighted pairwise stability as an adaptation of the notion of pairwise stability for a wider
range of link investment and link formation possibilities. Proposition 2.2 illustrates that
the position (measured by closeness to other nodes) of two connected players in a stable
under the perfect complements link formation protocol (β →−∞) and the perfect substitute link formation
protocol (β = 1).
5 See Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2016) for a recent survey on network formation games. Papers that study
network formation with assorted activities include Baetz (2015), Hiller (2017), and König et al. (2014).
6 The connections model is also discussed in Bala and Goyal (2000) as one of the cases they study. They
analyze the setup with the unilateral link formation assumption which is a limiting case of our CES extension
when β →+∞. Feri (2007), Hojman and Szeidl (2008) and Bloch and Dutta (2009) work on extensions of
the connections model.
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network can be more unbalanced with a higher level of β . This implies a greater likelihood
for the star to be weighted pairwise stable for higher β . Finally, we look at the relationship
between efficiency and stability by comparing the set of parameter values that make a network
efficient with the set of parameter values that make it weighted pairwise stable. Proposition
2.3 demonstrates that the two sets are generally different but there is a tendency for the two
sets to overlap more as we move closer to β = 1 (when investments are perfect substitutes).
We infer from this that there is a tension between efficiency and stability but it is alleviated
as link investments become more substitutable.
The above results show that the efficient network characterization in Jackson and
Wolinsky (1996) (which features the complete network, the star, and the empty network) can
be generalized to setups with weighted link investment and CES link formation technology.
More importantly, we point out that although the tension between efficiency and stability
illustrated in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) is common, it is less prominent when we move
away from the bilateral link formation assumption (β →−∞).7
In the application to the law of the few model, players aim to collect information and
there are two ways for them to do so: to search on their own or to invest in relationships that
are created with the weighted CES technology and get a proportion of information searched
by those they relate to.8 Players get utility from information and pay costs for searching and
link investments.9
We provide the Nash equilibrium and strict Nash equilibrium solution of the game in
Proposition 2.4 and 2.5 for different ranges of β . We find that when β is smaller than a cutoff
value that is between 0 and 1, all players search for some information and links are sponsored
bilaterally. The equilibrium network structure can be combinations of isolated, regular and
bipartite components which do not put connected players in very different network positions.
When β is greater than 1, players specialize in searching or in building connections and
all links are formed unilaterally. Equilibrium network structures, e.g. the star, feature
distinct network position for connected players. When β is between the cutoff value and 1,
equilibrium can be a mixture of the two forms summarized above.
The above characterization points to a general trend of moving towards a dispersion of
searching, inequality in link investment, and a less regular network structure when β rises.
7 The change in tension we characterize here is consistent with the finding in Bala and Goyal (2000) which
shows that with the unilateral link formation assumption (β →+∞), efficient networks are often in equilib-
rium.
8 The object players try to obtain need not be restricted to information, it can be any public good that is shared
with neighbours, e.g. influence.
9 Kinateder and Merlino (2017) and Sethi and Yildiz (2016) study similar models where agents form networks
and acquire information from neighbours. The local public good provision setup of the law of the few model
was first analyzed by Bramoulle and Kranton (2007) in a fixed network.
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Proposition 2.6 provides further support for this finding by showing that there is a smooth
growth in cross-player searching and link investment difference as β increases.
Proposition 2.7 looks at the welfare distribution of players and shows that a larger β
indicates an advantage of being a searcher because it makes it easier for the searcher to attract
link investments from others.
Note that our characterization of equilibrium when β > 1 is analogous to that obtained
in Galeotti and Goyal (2010), so it suggests that their results are robust to weighted link
formation and a wider range of link formation technology. When link investments are more
complementary (β < 1), we make predictions different from Galeotti and Goyal (2010).
Our work falls into the strand of literature on weighted network formation. In that field,
Rogers (2008) studies a directed weighted network formation problem where agents allocate
their link investment budget strategically to maximize their Bonacich centrality. Our paper
studies undirected network formation is closer to the papers by Bloch and Dutta (2009) and
Baumann (2017).
Bloch and Dutta (2009) analyze a weighted version of the connections model. They
assume that agents have a fixed budget and link strength is an additively separable and convex
function of individual investments (when β = 1, the CES formulation satisfies their link
formation assumption). They show that both the stable network and the efficient network are
the star network. In our application of the CES formulation to the connections model, we
maintain the model’s original assumption of unweighted link and constant link formation cost.
Our characterization when β = 1 shows that the star is stable and efficient for a wide range of
situations, which is in accordance with the result of Bloch and Dutta (2009). We differ from
Bloch and Dutta (2009) as we are interested in understanding the network formation process
with a broader scope of link formation technology along the dimension of link investment
substitutability and how variation in that dimension affects the choice of players. This is not
discussed in their paper.
Baumann (2017) looks at a weighted network formation model where players maximize
their aggregate link strength (including self-loops) with a fixed budget. She assumes a link
formation function that features constant returns to scale, zero production with unilateral
effort, and complementarity of link investments (the CES specification when β ≤ 0 satisfy
these conditions). She shows that in equilibrium, links can be sponsored in equal or unequal
manners and the network can consist of regular and bipartite components. We study a
different weighted network formation model, which is the law of the few model, in our
second application. Yet, we have a similar characterization of equilibrium network that
features equal or unequal links and regular or bipartite component when β ≤ 0. Other than
allowing substitutability in investments (β > 0) and modelling a different scenario, we differ
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from Baumann (2017) in the motivation of research. First, the application to the law of the
few allows us to study not only network formation but also activities alongside. Second, we
study how the degree of unequalness in link investment, the distribution of action intensity,
and the network structure change as link investment substitutability change. This is not
discussed in Baumann (2017).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we give a detailed
discussion of the CES link formation assumption. We explain the model and results for the
connections model and law of the few model with the CES specification in Section 3 and 4
respectively. Section 5 concludes. All proofs can be found in the Appendix.
2.2 The CES Link Formation Assumption
For a set of players N = {1, ...,n}, let ai j ∈ R+ be the link investment from player i to j.
We assume that a link gi j between i and j is produced with inputs ai j and a ji and a symmetric
CES link formation technology:
gi j =
h(ai j,a ji) = (12a
β
i j +
1
2a
β
ji)
1
β for weighted link formation
1{h(ai j,a ji)≥ 1}= 1{(12aβi j + 12aβji)
1
β ≥ 1} for unweighted link formation
where 1 is the indicator function and β is a parameter that can take any real value.
The specification can be employed to model both weighted and unweighted link for-
mation. The weighted formulation assumes a CES production function directly. For the
unweighted version, we assume that the sustainment of a link takes a level of overall effort
aggregated by the CES function and two players can contribute in different ways to satisfy
the requirement.
The CES function was first introduced in Arrow et al. (1961) as a way to generalize
the Leontiff production function (of which the elasticity of substitution is 0) and the Cobb
Douglas production function (of which the elasticity of substitution is 1) and is widely
employed in macroeconomic literatures. The standard two factor CES function is:
hˆ(ai j,a ji) = γ(αa
β
i j +(1−α)aβji)
1
β
where γ > 0, α ∈ (0,1), and β ≤ 1. Here we normalize γ to 1 since we will later introduce
a link formation cost variable. We assume links are undirected, i.e. hˆ(ai j,a ji) = hˆ(a ji,ai j),
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ai j
a ji
β →+∞
β →−∞
β = 1β = 2
β = 0
φ
φ
Figure 2.1 Isoquants for h(ai j,a ji) = φ under different values of β
which requires α = (1−α) = 1/2. So we arrive at:
h(ai j,a ji) = (
1
2
aβi j +
1
2
aβji)
1
β
that only has one parameter β , which we allow to take values greater than 1 to achieve the
goal of including the unilateral link formation function as a special case of our formulation.
The CES assumption encompasses a wide range of specific link formation protocols.
We have:
(i) lim
β→−∞
h(ai j,a ji) = min{ai j,a ji}: the bilateral link formation assumption is a special
case of our formulation.
(ii) h(ai j,a ji) |β=1= 12(ai j+a ji): this depicts the case where link investments are perfect
substitutes and can be used to model scenarios where only the sum of investments matter for
the formation of a link, e.g. rail and bridge construction. It can also be adopted to incorporate
the possibility of side payments.
(iii) lim
β→0
h(ai j,a ji) =
√ai ja ji: this Cobb-Douglas case can be a convenient functional
form to work with when link investments are strategic complements.
(iv) lim
β→+∞
h(ai j,a ji) = max{ai j,a ji}: the unilateral link formation assumption is a
special case of our formulation.
27
The parameter β captures the substitutability of link investments in forming a connection.
When β < 1, the second-order mixed derivative of h is positive:
∂h(ai j,a ji)
∂ai j∂a ji
|β<1 > 0
so as one player increases his investments in a link, the other player will find it easier to create
or strengthen their link with her investments. Link investments are strategic complements
when β < 1.
When β > 1, the second-order mixed derivative of h is negative:
∂h(ai j,a ji)
∂ai j∂a ji
|β>1 < 0
so as one player increases his investments in a link, the link investments from another player
has less effect on the creation or strengthening of their link. Link investments are strategic
substitutes when β > 1.
More specifically, as illustrated in Arrow et al. (1961), 11−β is the elasticity of substitution
between ai j and a ji, so a greater β indicates a greater link investment substitutability.
Figure 2.1 pictures the isoquants of h for five different values of β and provides a
graphical illustration of how β is related to link investment substitutability.
2.3 Application I: The Connections Model
The connections model was first studied in the seminal work of Jackson and Wolinsky
(1996). In that paper, they introduce the solution concept of pairwise stability to predict
what kinds of networks will be stable, and then examine the relationship between efficient
networks-the networks that maximize the aggregate utility of players-and stable networks.
The connections model is one of the two stylized models Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) carry
out the above analysis on. They show that there is a strong tension between efficiency and
stability.
Their findings are based on the bilateral link formation assumption. In this section, we
extend their analysis by allowing weighted link investments and adopting a more flexible
CES link formation specification. We propose and employ the solution concept of weighted
pairwise stability and show that the efficiency-stability tension is alleviated as link investments
become perfect substitutes.
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2.3.1 The Model
There is a set of players N = {1, ...,n}. Each player i∈N chooses how much investment
to make to other players, which can be summarized by a vector ai = {ai1, ...,ain} where
ai j ∈ Ai j. The investment decisions of all agents a = {ai j}i, j∈N is an investment profile, and
we denote the space of investment profiles with A = ∏
i, j∈N
Ai j.
An unweighted and undirected network g = {gi j}i, j∈N , where gi j = g ji ∈ {0,1} for all
i, j ∈ N, specifies whether there is a link between any two players. We use G = {g | gi j =
g ji ∈ {0,1}} to denote the set of networks n players can have.
Any investment profile creates an unweighted and undirected network. We use g(a) to
denote the network created with investment profile a.
The utility of a player is determined by the investment profile (and the network created
with it). Before specifying the form of the utility function (ui(a))i∈N , we first define the
efficiency and stability concept we adopt.
A network is efficient if it is created with an investment profile that maximizes the
aggregate utility of players:
Definition 2.1. A network g ∈ G is efficient if g = g(a∗) where
a∗ = argmax
a∈A ∑i∈N
ui(a)
We propose the solution concept of weighted pairwise stability which adapts the notion
of pairwise stability for weighted link investments. A network is weighted pairwise stable
if it can be created with an investment profile where (i) no player wants to adjust his level
of investment for a link he has, and (ii) no pair of unlinked players can coordinate their
investments to each other for a mutually beneficial link. Formally, let a−i j,kl,... denote an
investment profile a excluding the investment choices from i to j, k to l,....
Definition 2.2. A network g ∈ G is weighted pariwise stable if there exists an investment
profile a ∈ A such that g = g(a) and for all pairs of players (i, j) ∈ N2:
(i) if gi j = 1, then for all a′i j ∈ Ai j and a′ji ∈ A ji,
ui(a)≥ ui(a′i j,a−i j)
u j(a)≥ u j(a′ji,a− ji)
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(ii) if gi j = 0, then there does not exist a′i j ∈ Ai j and a′ji ∈ A ji such that
ui(a′i j,a
′
ji,a−i j, ji)≥ ui(a)
u j(a′i j,a
′
ji,a−i j, ji)≥ u j(a)
with at least one inequality being strict.
We now discuss the relationship between the notion of weighted pairwise stability
and the notion of pairwise stability. The solution concept of pairwise stability can be
employed for network formation models with the bilateral link formation assumptions. In
our terminology, a network formation model with the bilateral link formation assumption is
one where link investment choices are binary: ∀i, j ∈ N : Ai j = {0,1}, a link is created with
mutual investments: ∀i, j ∈N : gi j =min{ai j,a ji}, and an investment profile affects the utility
of players only via the network it creates and the cost it incurs: ∀a,a′ ∈ A with g(a) = g(a′):
ui(a′) ≥ ui(a) if and only if ai ≥ a′i. Note that a network g ∈ G and an investment profile
a ∈ A are both n×n matrices and G⊂ A, so (ui(g))i∈N is well defined. Let g− i j denote the
network with the deletion of a link between i and j from g and g+ i j denote the network
with the addition of a link between i and j to g.
Definition 2.3 (Jackson and Wolinsky (1996)). A network g ∈ G is pariwise stable if for all
pairs of players (i, j) ∈ N2:
(i) if gi j = 1, then
ui(g)≥ ui(g− i j)
u j(g)≥ u j(g− ji)
(ii) if gi j = 0, then it cannot be
ui(g+ i j)≥ ui(g)
u j(g+ i j)≥ u j(g)
with at least one inequality being strict.
We show that for a network formation model with the bilateral link formation assumption,
the notions of weighted pairwise stability and pairwise stability are equivalent.
Remark 2.1. Consider a network formation model with the bilateral link formation as-
sumption. A network g ∈ G is weighted pairwise stable if and only if it is pairwise stable.
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We now specify the assumptions for the weighted connections model we examine in
this section. For all i, j ∈ N, we set Ai j = R+ so that players can choose the level of an link
investment,
gi j(a) =
0 when i = j1{h(ai j,a ji)≥ 1}= 1{(12aβi j + 12aβji) 1β ≥ 1} otherwise
so links are formed according to the CES link formation specification, and
ui(a) = ∑
j∈N
δ di j(g(a))− c∑
j∈N
ai j
where δ ∈ (0,1) is a discount factor, c > 0 is the cost of link investment, and di j(g) is the
distance between i and j in network g. To be specific, the distance between i and j in g is the
number of links in the shortest path between i and j in g. A path between i and j in g is a
sequence of distinct players i = v0,v1, ...,vm = j such that gvk−1vk = 1 for all k = 1, ...,m. We
set dii(g) = 0 for all i ∈ N and di j(g) = ∞ when there is no path between i and j under g.
The rationale behind the utility function is the following. We assume that each player
possesses a unit of non-rivalrous intrinsic value that is shared through the network. There is
a decay in the sharing efficiency if two players are far away from each other. This decay is
captured by parameter δ . The utility a network provides to a player is the sum of value he
obtains, and he pays a constant cost c for each unit of link investments he makes.
In our analysis, we will encounter three specific networks: the complete network, the
star network and the empty network. The complete network is a network where all players
are linked to each other: ∀i ∈ N, j ̸= i : gi j = 1. The star network is a network where all links
are between one centre player and the rest of the players whom we call periphery players:
∃m ∈ N such that gm j = 1 for all j ̸= m and gi j = 0 for all i ̸= m, j ̸= m. The empty network
is a network with no links: ∀i, j ∈ N : gi j = 0.
2.3.2 Results
We first solve for efficient networks.
Proposition 2.1. Consider the weighted connections model. The efficient network is:
(i) the complete network when 0≤ c≤ 12
1
max{β ,1}−1(δ −δ 2),
(ii) the star network when 12
1
max{β ,1}−1(δ −δ 2)≤ c≤ 12
1
max{β ,1}−1(δ + n−22 δ
2), and
(iii) the empty network when 12
1
max{β ,1}−1(δ + n−22 δ
2)≤ c.
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The above efficient network characterization is similar to the one obtained in Jackson
and Wolinsky (1996). When β < 1 so that link investments are strategic complements, the
term 12
1
max{β ,1}−1 = 1 and the two characterizations are identical. This is because when β < 1,
the most efficient way for two players to sponsor a link would be for them to both make one
unit of link investment to each other, making the cost of a link 2c, which is the same as the
cost of a link assumed in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).
When β > 1 so that link investments are strategic substitutes, the value of β plays a role
in the efficient characterization. Now, the most efficient way for two players to sponsor a
link would be for one of them to bear all the cost while the other does not invest, making
the cost of a link 2
1
β c which drops in β . A greater β essentially reduces the cost of a link
because it supports the unilateral sponsorship of links more. A denser network is hence more
likely to be efficient. We can see from our characterization that given the discount factor,
when β rises, the complete network is preferred to the star network for a greater range of
link investment cost c and the star network is preferred over the empty network for a greater
range of cost c.
We now move to characterize the weighted stable networks.
We start by analysing the incentive for a player to build, maintain, or sever a link. To do
so, we define and derive the marginal connection benefit and the marginal investment cost of
a link for a player.
The marginal benefit from connection player i obtains by linking with player j in
network g is the difference in the amount of intrinsic value i obtains through the network
with and without a link to j:
MB(i← j,g) =

∑
k∈N
δ dik(g+i j)− ∑
k∈N
δ dik(g) if gi j = 0
∑
k∈N
δ dik(g)− ∑
k∈N
δ dik(g−i j) if gi j = 1
The marginal cost of investment player i pays for a link with player j under an investment
profile a is simply the cost of investment ai j:
MC(i→ j,a) = cai j
We can see that the evaluation of marginal connection benefit MB(i← j,g) is not as
straight forward as that of the marginal investment cost MC(i→ j,a). To assess MB(i← j,g),
we need to know how i’s distances to others change with an addition or deletion of link with
j.
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When a link with j is added (deleted), i not only reduces (increases) his distance to j to
1 (at least 2) but also reduces (increases) distances to other players who j is relatively closer
to. This effect can be captured with information on i’s, j’s and i’s neighbours’ distances to
other players in network g. Let di(g) = {di1(g), ...,din(g)} be the distance vector of player i
in network g. We make the following observation on how adding or severing a link between
two players affect their distance vectors.
Lemma 2.1. For players i ∈ N, j ̸= i and k ̸= i:
(i)
dik(g+ i j) =
d jk(g)+1 when dik(g)> d jk(g)dik(g) otherwise
(ii)
dik(g− i j) =
 minl:l ̸= j,gil=1 dlk(g)+1 when dik(g)> d jk(g)dik(g) otherwise
The intuition behind Lemma 2.1 is simple. If i gets a new link with j, i’s distance to
other nodes may shorten as there is now a new path from i to other players via j. Whether
the new path is at least as short as all the original ones depends on if dik(g)> d jk(g). If it is,
the new distance will be d jk(g)+1; if not, the distance remains dik(g). Similarily, if i cuts
his link with j, i’s distance to other nodes may lengthen as he looses a path to other players
via j. Whether this is the case depends on if the original shortest path between i and another
node passes through j, indicated by whether dik(g)< d jk(g). If it is, the new distance will be
the shortest path from i to the other node without passing j, which is min
l:l ̸= j,gil=1
dlk(g)+1; if
not, the distance remains dik(g).
With Lemma 2.1, we can rewrite the marginal connection benefit i obtains from a link
with j in network g as:
MB(i← j,g) =

∑
k∈N:dik(g)>d jk(g)
(
δ d jk(g)+1−δ dik(g)
)
if gi j = 0
∑
k∈N:dik(g)>d jk(g)
(
δ dik(g)−δ
min
l∈N:l ̸= j,gil (g)=1
dlk(g)+1
)
if gi j = 1
We can see that MB(i← j,g) is determined by how many players j has relatively closer
access to than i does, and how much closer j is compared to i.
Going back to the question of whether i wants to build or sever a link with j, it can
be answered by comparing MB(i← j,g) and MC(i→ j,a). Since MC(i→ j,a) = cai j, the
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comparison can be made between MB(i← j,g)/c and ai j. If MB(i← j,g)/c≥ ai j, i would
want to build or sustain the link with j. If MB(i← j,g)/c < ai j, i would not want to have a
link with j.
We know that a link between i and j is created and sustained if h(ai j,a ji)≥ 1. So, there
is a way of link sponsorship where both i and j are willing to maintain the link if
h(
MB(i← j,g)
c
,
MB( j ← i,g)
c
)≥ 1
and there is no way of link sponsorship where both i and j find creating a link beneficial (one
finds if strictly beneficial) if
h(
MB(i← j,g)
c
,
MB( j ← i,g)
c
)≤ 1
The conditions for a network g to be weighted pairwise stable can thus be reformulated
as:
Proposition 2.2. Consider the weighted connections model. A network g ∈ G is weighted
pairwise stable if and only if for all pairs of players (i, j) ∈ N2:
(i) if gi j = 1, then
h(
MB(i← j,g)
c
,
MB( j ← i,g)
c
)≥ 1
(ii) if gi j = 0, then
h(
MB(i← j,g)
c
,
MB( j ← i,g)
c
)≤ 1
where
MB(i← j,g) =

∑
k∈N:dik(g)>d jk(g)
(
δ d jk(g)+1−δ dik(g)
)
if gi j = 0
∑
k∈N:dik(g)>d jk(g)
(
δ dik(g)−δ
min
l∈N:l ̸= j,gil (g)=1
dlk(g)+1
)
if gi j = 1
Note that with different levels of β , the shape of the h function changes. Therefore, the
level of link investment substitutability influences players’ decision on when to keep and
form links and hence affect the stability of networks. We illustrate this below.
It can be shown the for the CES function h, when β1 ≥ β2,
h(
MB(i← j,g)
c
,
MB( j ← i,g)
c
)|β=β1 ≥ h(
MB(i← j,g)
c
,
MB( j ← i,g)
c
)|β=β2
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So in a network g, if player i and player j want to maintain or form a link with β = β2,
they would also want to do so with β = β1. A greater link investment substitutability
increases the chances for two players to have a link between them. Figure 2.2 provides a
simple graphic illustration for this effect.
MB(i← j,g)
c
MB( j←i,g)
c
gi j = 1
gi j = 0
1
1
(a) when β = 0
MB(i← j,g)
c
MB( j←i,g)
c
gi j = 1
gi j = 0
1
1
(b) when β = 2
Figure 2.2 Link investment substitutability and gi j
The blue curves in Figure 2.2(a) and Figure 2.2(b) plot the combinations of MB(i← j,g)c
and MB( j←i,g)c such that h(
MB(i← j,g)
c ,
MB( j←i,g)
c ) = 1 when β = 0 and β = 2 respectively.
When the marginal connection benefits i and j provide to each other lie in the grey area, i and
j would maintain their link if gi j = 1 and create a link if gi j = 0. By comparing Figure 2.2(a)
and Figure 2.2(b), we can see a greater β leads to a larger space of marginal connection
benefit pair that facilitates a link. In particular, two players, one of whom enjoys a large
marginal connection benefit from a link while the other gets a small marginal connection
benefit from the link, can only be linked when link investment substitutability is large.
We now combine the above observation with our understanding on how MB(i← j,g) is
affected by the network positions of i and j to explain how link investment substitutability
affects the structure of weighted pairwise stable networks.
When β is small, for two players i and j to have a link, the marginal connection benefits
they obtain from the link must both be beyond a certain level. Hence, i needs to have a
shorter distance to some players than j does and j needs to have a shorter distance to some
other players than i does. It is not likely that two players are linked and one is much better
connected than the other.
When β is large, two players can have a link as long as one enjoys a large marginal
connection benefit from the link. A link between a well-connected player and a poorly-
connected player is now common.
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We illustrate the above influence of β on network structures with an examination of
the stability of the star network. Since links in the star network are all between a very well
connected centre player and a relatively poorly connected periphery player, we would expect
the star network to be weighted pairwise stable in rare cases when β is small but much more
frequently when β is large. We now verify this conjecture.
For the star network to be weighted pairwise stable, we require that the centre player m
and a periphery player p want to maintain their link:
h(
MB(m← p,star)
c
,
MB(p← m,star)
c
)≥ 1 (2.1)
and that two periphery players p and p′ do not want to form a new link:
h(
MB(p← p′,star)
c
,
MB(p′← p,star)
c
)≤ 1 (2.2)
For a star network with n players, if the centre player cuts his link with a periphery
player, his distances to other players are not changed and he only forgoes the exchange of
intrinsic value with the periphery player that worth δ , so
MB(m← p,star) = δ (2.3)
If a periphery player loses his link with the centre player, he loses connections to all
other players. Since his distance to the centre player was 1 and his distances to the other
(n−2) periphery players were 2,
MB(p← m,star) = δ +(n−2)δ 2 (2.4)
Finally, if two periphery players form a link, they shorten the distance to each other. But
their distances to other players are not changed, hence
MB(p← p′,star) = MB(p′← p,star) = δ −δ 2 (2.5)
Combine Requirements 2.1 and 2.2 with Equations 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5, the star network is
weighted pairwise stable if and only if
(
1
2(
δ
c )
β + 12(
δ+(n−2)δ 2
c )
β
) 1
β ≥ 1(
1
2(
δ−δ 2
c )
β + 12(
δ−δ 2
c )
β
) 1
β ≤ 1
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which can be simplified to
δ −δ 2 ≤ c≤
(
1
2
δβ +
1
2
(δ +(n−2)δ 2)β
) 1
β
So the range of link investment cost c that makes the star network weighted pairwise
stable changes with the value of β . We demonstrate this with Figure 2.3 that draws the range
of c for the star to be weighted pairwise stable under δ = 0.8,n = 12 and different values of
β . We can see that the range significantly broadens as β gets larger. Greater link investment
substitutability supports the star structure.
β
c
range of c such that the star is weighted pairwise stable
0.64
2.4
6
1.44
-1 0 1 2 3
Figure 2.3 Link investment substitutability and the stability of the star (δ = 0.8,n = 12)
We finish our analysis for the weighted connections model with an investigation on the
tension between efficiency and stability.
We measure the tension in the following way. For a network g that can be efficient,
we compare the range of situations in which it is efficient but not stable with the range of
situations in which it is efficient and obtain a ratio that is between 0 and 1. The larger the
ratio, the stronger the tension. Formally, we restrict the cost of link investment to be between
0 and n: c ∈ [0,n]. Note that if c > n, the empty network is efficient and is the unique
weighted pairwise stable network. Let Ge(c) be the set of networks that are efficient when
the cost of link investment is c and Gwps(c) be the set of networks that are weighted pairwise
stable when the cost of link investment is c. We define
T (g) =
| {x ∈ [0,n] : g ∈ Ge(x),g /∈ Gwps(x)} |
| {x ∈ [0,n] : g ∈ Ge(x)} |
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We show that
Proposition 2.3.
(i) T(complete) is 0 when β ≤ 1 and increases with β when β > 1,
(ii) T(star) decreases with β when β ≤ 1, reaches 0 when β = 1, and increases with β
when β > 1,
(iii) T(empty) is 0 for all β ∈ R
Proposition 2.3 shows that when β = 1 (so that link investments are perfect substitutes:
h(ai j,a ji) = 12(ai j +a ji), whenever a network is efficient, it is also weighted pairwise stable.
As the link formation technology move towards the bilateral link formation assumption (β →
−∞) or the unilateral link formation assumption (β → +∞), a tension between efficiency
and stability emerges for certain networks.
The intuition behind the result is the following. When an efficient network is not stable,
there is a pair of players who do not find it mutually profitable to form a link that enhances
aggregate welfare. The reason that they cannot sponsor the link in a mutually beneficial way
might be the inflexibility of the link formation protocol. For example, under the bilateral
link formation specification, if i benefits significantly from a link with j but j only benefits
trivially from the link, the link cannot be formed since i and j need to make the same level
of link investments. When the link formation technology becomes more flexible, the above
restriction is relaxed. This makes it easier for i to compensate j with a greater amount of
link investment. So the tension between efficiency and stability reduces as link investments
approach perfect substitutes.
This finding shows the great impact link investment substitutability can have for the
welfare of players.
2.4 Application II: Law of the Few
The second network formation scenario we examine is one where players produce goods
themselves and simultaneously form links to enjoy the externalities from the production
of others. Galeotti and Goyal (2010) model such interactions with the assumption that
link investments are binary and links can be unilaterally formed. They solve for the Nash
equilibrium and strict Nash equilibrium of the game and show that in equilibrium, only a
small fraction of players engage in production activities while the majority of players focus
on link formation. They use the results to explain the empirical finding that in many online
information sharing networks, the number of users writing comments and reviews is small
38
and most users only follow the content providers. Based on this finding, they title their paper
Law of the Few.
We extend the model in Galeotti and Goyal (2010) by allowing weighted link investments
and assume that links can be formed with the CES link formation technology. We carry
out this exercise because we believe in certain contexts, our assumption better describes
the situations players face. For example, when information sharing is achieved with email
exchanges, players can choose the frequency of correspondence (so we allow weighted link
investments) and they enjoy better communication efficiency when the two sides put in a
similar amount of effort (we can assume link investments to be complementary at a certain
level by setting the value of β ). When information sharing is achieved with face to face
contacts, players can again choose how enthusiastic to be and the complementarity between
link investments can be even greater than in the case of email exchanges (we can capture this
by setting a smaller β ).
We show that the law of the few prediction in Galeotti and Goyal (2010) is robust when
link investments are strategic substitutes (when β > 1), but equilibrium characterization
becomes quite different when link investments get more complementary. In that case, all
players make some production effort on their own, links are sponsored in relatively reciprocal
ways, and there is less disparity in the network positions of players. We also compare the
welfare of players under different levels of link investment substitutability.
In the following parts of the analysis, we describe the model and results with an
information searching and sharing story. However, the understanding obtained should not be
restricted to that specific context.
2.4.1 The Model
Consider the following game played by a set of players N = {1, ...,n}. Each player
i ∈ N chooses si = {xi,ai}, where xi ∈ X represents player i’s effort in searching and ai =
{ai1, ...,aii−1,aii+1, ...ain} ∈ Ai represents i’s investments in links with other players. We
assume the space of strategies player i can choose from to be Si = X×Ai = Rn. A strategy
profile is s = {s1, ...,sn} and the space of strategy profiles is S = S1×S2× ...×Sn.
The link investments of all players a = {a1, ...,an} pin down a network structure (N,g)
where g = {gi j}i, j∈N is an n×n matrix and gi j measures the strength of link between i and
j. We assume that gi j is determined by ai j and a ji according to the CES link formation
specification:
gi j(a) = h(ai j,a ji) == (
1
2
aβi j +
1
2
aβji)
1
β
where β ∈ R captures the degree of substitutability between link investments ai j and a ji.
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We define the utility of player i under strategy profile s ∈ S as:
ui(s) = f (xi+∑
j ̸=i
gi j(a)x j)− cxi− k∑
j ̸=i
ai j
where f is twice continuously differentiable, increasing, and strictly concave, c > 0 and k > 0.
The utility specification is based on the following story. Players get utility from information
that comes from searching or communication with other players they have links with. The
proportion of information one can get from another player is proportional to the strength of
link they have. There is a cost c > 0 for effort and a cost k > 0 for link investment. The f
function captures how players value information: the value is increasing with information at
a decreasing rate. Assume that f ′(0)> c and lim
y→+∞ f
′(y)< c so there exists a yˆ > 0 such that
f ′(yˆ) = c. Consider a player who does not have links, yˆ would be his optimal effort level and
the resulting amount of information he obtains.
We solve for the Nash equilibrium and strict Nash equilibrium of the game. A strategy
profile s∗ is a Nash equilibrium if for all i ∈ N and all si ∈ Si:
ui(s∗)≥ ui(si,s∗−i).
A strategy profile s∗ is a strict Nash equilibrium if for all i ∈ N and all s′i ∈ Si\{s∗i }:
ui(s∗)> ui(s′i,s
∗
−i).
2.4.2 Equilibrium Characterization
We first characterize the Nash equilibrium of the game when link investments are
strategic complements (when β < 1). In this case, the equilibrium network can consist of
several components where a pair of players are connected if and only if they belong to the
same component.
We now define the concept of a component. For the purpose of analysing our model, we
also include information on efforts and link investments into our definition.
Definition 2.4. Two players i and j are connected in a network g if there exists a sequence
of nodes i = v0,v1,v2, ...,vm = j such that gvk−1vk > 0 for k = 1, ...,m.
A component C=(NC,sC) of a strategy profile s is a subset of players and their strategies
such that /0 ̸= NC ⊂ N, sC = {si}i∈NC , and
(i) ∀i, j ∈ NC: i and j are connected in g(s),
(ii) ∀i ∈ NC, j /∈ NC: i and j are not connected in g(s).
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Our equilibrium characterization involves four kinds of components: the isolated com-
ponent, the regular component, the bipartite component and the multi-centre star component.
(a) the isolated component I (b) the regular component R
(c) the bipartite component B (d) the multi-centre star component S
Figure 2.4 Four kinds of equilibrium components
To be specific, the isolated component I = (NI,sI) has a single player who searches for
yˆ of information and does not invest in relationships with others:| NI |= 1∀i ∈ NI : xi = yˆ and ai j = 0 for all j ̸= i
The regular component R= (NR,sR) has a set of players who all search for 2k/c amount
of information, make cyˆ/2k−1 amount of link investments to other players in the regular
component, and sponsor links to each other in a completely reciprocal manner:
| NR |> 1
∀i ∈ NR : xi = 2kc and ∑ai j = cyˆ2k −1
∀i, j ∈ NR : ai j = a ji
The bipartite component B = (NB,sB) has two groups of players searching for different
amounts (x1 and x2) of information and investing in intergroup links. The way a link between
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two players is sponsored depends on the relative amount of efforts they make. Let x1 and x2
be two scalers where x1,x2 ∈ (0, yˆ), x1 ̸= x2 and
x1
β
1−β + x2
β
1−β = 2
1
1−β (
k
c
)
β
1−β
The bipartite component features:
NB =U ∪V where U ̸= /0,V ̸= /0, and U ∩V = /0
∀i ∈U : xi = x1,∑ai j = (cx
β
2
2k )
1
1−β (yˆ− x1), and ai j = 0 for all j /∈V
∀ j ∈V : x j = x2,∑a ji = (cx
β
1
2k )
1
1−β (yˆ− x2), and a ji = 0 for alli /∈U
∀i ∈U, j ∈V : ai ja ji = (
x2
x1
)
1
1−β or ai j = a ji = 0
The multi-centre star component S = (NS,sS) has two groups of players where players
in one group search for yˆ amount of information while players in the other group do not
search and unilaterally sponsor links to searchers:
NS =U ′∪V ′ where U ′ ̸= /0,V ′ ̸= /0, and U ′∩V ′ = /0
∀i ∈U ′ : xi = yˆ and ai j = 0 for all j ̸= i
∀ j ∈V ′ : x j = 0,∑a ji = 2
1
β zˆ
yˆ where zˆ satisfies f
′(zˆ) = 2
1
β k
yˆ
We have the following Nash equilibrium characterization of the game when link invest-
ments are strategic complements.
Proposition 2.4. Consider the game with β < 1. If yˆ≤ 2k/c, the game has a unique Nash
equilibrium where each player forms an I component. If yˆ > 2k/c, then s∗ is an equilibrium
if and only if the components players form are
(i) a combination of I, R and B components when β < ln2ln(cyˆ/k) ,
(ii) a combination of I, R, B and S components when β = ln2ln(cyˆ/k) ,
(iii) a combination of R and B components, or a single S component with |V ′ |= 1 when
ln2
ln(cyˆ/k) < β < 1.
We can see that when yˆ ≤ 2k/c, there will not be any linking activity in equilibrium
because the amount information one can get from a neighbour is too small compared to the
cost of a link. We are more interested in understanding the equilibrium when yˆ > 2k/c such
that there can be some linking activity. We make two general observations for this case. First,
there can always be a very symmetric equilibrium structure that consists only of regular
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components. Second, an asymmetric equilibrium structure featuring the multi-centre star can
emerge as β grows over a certain threshold (link investments are sufficiently substitutable).
Another thing to note is that link investment substitutability influences the structure
of bipartite components that can be formed in equilibrium. From our previous definition
of the bipartite component, we can see that β affects the relationship between the levels of
efforts made by linked players from the two groups and how relative efforts influence link
investments.
We illustrate the influence of β on efforts with Figure 2.5 that plots possible values of
x1 and x2 under two different β s.
x1
x2
2
1
Figure 2.5 The efforts of two linked players when β = β1 and when β = β2 (β1 > β2)
Note that with both β s, when a player from one group of the bipartite component
makes more efforts, his linked player from the other group searches less. Link investment
substitutability plays a role in affecting how much the efforts players in one group make drop
as players in the other group search more. We can see that a greater β (β1) leads to a greater
change and hence a larger possible difference in the efforts of two different players.
Regarding the effect of β on link investments, we know that
ai j
a ji
= (
x2
x1
)
1
1−β = (
x j
xi
)
1
1−β
and 1β > 0 when β < 1. So a player i invests relatively more to a link with j if j searches
relatively more. The level of link investment substitutability determines the scale of the
influence relative efforts have in link investments. Since 1β rises with β , a grater link
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investment substitutability leads to a more elastic response in link investments to differences
in efforts.
We close our equilibrium analysis for strategic complements with a strict Nash equi-
librium characterization. This can be easily obtained by ruling out the strategy profiles in
Proposition 2.4 where some players are indifferent between the equilibrium strategy and
another strategy.
Corollary 2.1. Consider the game with β < 1. If yˆ≤ 2k/c, then there is a unique strict Nash
equilibrium where each player forms an I component. If yˆ > 2k/c, then there is no strict
Nash equilibrium when β ≤ ln2ln(cyˆ/k) , and there is a unique strict Nash equilibrium where a
single S component with |V ′ |= 1 is formed when ln2ln(cyˆ/k) < β < 1.
We now move to investigate the Nash equilibrium of the game when link investments
are strategic substitutes (when β > 1).10 We show that a Nash equilibrium must have the
following features.
Proposition 2.5. Consider the game with β > 1. If yˆ≤ 2 1β k/c, the game has a unique Nash
equilibrium where each player forms an I component. If yˆ > 2
1
β k/c, then a Nash equilibrium
s∗ must satisfy:
(i) the effort level of all players lies between [0, yˆ] and there can be at most one player
who searches for more than 2
1
β k/c:x∗i ∈ [0, yˆ] for all i ∈ N|{i ∈ N : x∗i > 2 1β kc}| ≤ 1
(ii) all links are sponsored unilaterally and only players who search for at least 2
1
β k/c
receive link investments: a∗i ja∗ji = 0 for all i ∈ N, j ̸= ia∗i j > 0 only if x∗j ≥ 2 1β kc
Again, when yˆ is small, players do not invest in links in equilibrium because the amount
of information to obtain is too small to incentivize linking. When yˆ exceeds the 2
1
β k/c
threshold, players start to make link investments. Note that an equilibrium structure here is
very different from those that can emerge when link investments are strategic complements.
10 We provide the solution for Nash equilibrium when β = 1 in the appendix. The characterization is similar to
the case when β > 1.
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The most obvious difference is that all links are sponsored unilaterally when link investments
are strategic substitutes. This contradicts the reciprocal link investments in the regular
components and the proportional link investments in the bipartite components when link
investments are strategic complements.
Also, note that now the equilibrium network has a core-periphery structure where players
who search for at least 2
1
β k/c are in the core and can have links to each other while players
who search for less than 2
1
β k/c are in the periphery and issue links to core players. We also
show that there can only be one player who searches for a large amount of (more than 2
1
β k/c)
information.
Our Nash equilibrium characterization with β > 1 resonates with the equilibrium
characterization in Galeotti and Goyal (2010). They show that under the unilateral link
investment assumption (Ai j ∈ {0,1} and gi j = max{ai j,a ji} for all i ∈ N, j ̸= i), the Nash
equilibrium network has a core-periphery structure where core players search for more
information than periphery players.
We also characterize the strict Nash equilibrium of the game when β > 1.
Remark 2.2. Consider the game with β > 1. If yˆ≤ 2 1β k/c, then there is a unique strict Nash
equilibrium where each player forms an I component. If yˆ > 2
1
β k/c, then there is a unique
strict Nash equilibrium where a single S component with |V ′ |= 1 is formed.
2.4.3 Comparative Statics
We provide comparative statics analysis on β in this section. We ask ourselves two
questions. First, as analysed in the previous section, how does β influence players’ searching
and linking behaviours. Second, in an asymmetric equilibrium where players choose different
strategies, how does β affect the utility distribution.
We start with the first question. We define four measures of equilibrium disparity for
our analysis. They focus on different aspects of equilibrium structures as explained below.
Let S∗ be the set of strategy profiles that are Nash equilibria.
The supremum difference in equilibrium efforts SDx measures how different two players’
efforts can be in an equilibrium:
SDx = sup
s∗∈S∗,i, j∈N, j ̸=i
|x
∗
i − x∗j
x∗i + x∗j
|
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The infimum difference in equilibrium efforts IDx measures how close two players’
efforts can be in an equilibrium:
IDx = inf
s∗∈S∗,i, j∈N, j ̸=i
|x
∗
i − x∗j
x∗i + x∗j
|
The supremum difference in link investments SDa measures how different link invest-
ments from two sides of a link can be for its formation:
SDa = sup
s∗∈S∗,i, j∈N,gi j∗>0
|a
∗
i j−a∗ji
a∗i j +a∗ji
|
The infimum difference in link investments IDa measures how close link investments
from two sides of a link can be for its formation:
IDa = inf
s∗∈S∗,i, j∈N,gi j∗>0
|a
∗
i j−a∗ji
a∗i j +a∗ji
|
We show that all four measures of disparity above are non-decreasing in β .
Proposition 2.6. Consider the game with yˆ > 2k/c so that there can always be linking
activities in equilibrium:
(i) SDx rises with β when β < ln(2)ln(cyˆ/k) and is 1 when β ≥
ln(2)
ln(cyˆ/k) ,
(ii) IDx is 0 for all β ∈ R,
(iii) SDa rises with β when β < ln(2)ln(cyˆ/k) and is 1 when β ≥
ln(2)
ln(cyˆ/k) ,
(iv) IDa is 0 for when β ≤ 1 and is 1 when β > 1.
From Proposition 2.6, we can see that SDx and SDa are affected by β in a similar
pattern. They both rise with β and reach 1 when β gets greater than ln(2)ln(cyˆ/k) . Recall that when
β ≥ ln(2)ln(cyˆ/k) , players can always form a multi-centre star in equilibrium where periphery
players do not search and unilaterally make link investments to core players., so there can be a
huge difference in how players obtain information when β ≥ ln(2)ln(cyˆ/k) . When link investments
are less substitutable (β < ln(2)ln(cyˆ/k) ), the scale of disparity in equilibrium strategies is restricted.
There is a smooth increase in how different equilibrium efforts can be and how difference
equilibrium link investments can be as link investment suggestibility rises.
For the infimum difference measures, while IDx remains 0 for all values of β , IDa
takes a huge jump from 0 to 1 when link investments change from strategic complements
(β < 1) to strategic substitutes (β > 1). This is because when link investments are strategic
complements, links are always reciprocally sponsored in a regular component that can
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emerge in equilibrium. But when link investments are strategic substitutes, links are always
unilaterally sponsored.
We have learnt from Proposition 2.6 how different characteristics of equilibrium struc-
ture change smoothly or discretely with β . We now move to the second question on how β
affects the utility distribution of players.
In an asymmetric equilibrium, players adopt different strategies to obtain information.
Some can specialize in searching while others devote more to linking. The utility of players
can also be different given different equilibrium strategies. We analyse the relationship
between players’ behaviour (their level of effort) and their utility and how β affects this
relationship.
Proposition 2.7. Consider the game with β < 1. In a Nash equilibrium s∗,
if 0 < x∗i < x∗j < β yˆ or yˆ > x∗i > x∗j > β yˆ, then ui(s∗)< u j(s∗).
Consider the game with β > 1. In a Nash equilibrium s∗,
(i) if x∗i ,x∗j ∈ [0,2
1
β k/c), then ui(s∗) = u j(s∗),
(ii) if x∗i ∈ [0,2
1
β k/c) and x∗j = 2
1
β k/c, then ui(s∗)≤ u j(s∗),
(iii) if x∗i ∈ [0,2
1
β k/c] and x∗j > 2
1
β k/c, then ui(s∗)> u j(s∗).
Proposition 2.7 tells us that when link investments are strategic complements, there is
an optimal level of effort max{0,β yˆ} that leads to the greatest equilibrium utility: when two
players both search for less than β yˆ or more than β yˆ, the one whose effort is closer to β yˆ
obtains a larger utility. Since this optimal level of effort rises with β , greater link investment
substitutability favours those who search more. The reason for this favour is that with greater
link investment substitutability, those who search more can attract more link investments
from other players and then access their information at a lower cost.
When link investments are strategic substitutes, Proposition 2.7 shows an advantage for
a player who searches for 2
1
β k/c but a disadvantage for a player who searches for more than
2
1
β k/c. The advantage for those who make 2
1
β k/c amount of effort can be explained with
the same reasoning above on why greater β favours searchers. When a player searches for
2
1
β k/c, he will receive unilateral link investments from other players who might be searching.
He hence accesses some information for free. However, if a player searches for more than
2
1
β k/c, he will also receive unilateral link investments but those who invest will not search at
all since acquiring information from the player is chapter than searching.
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2.5 Discussion
This chapter suggests a research agenda on link formation technology and network
formation. We have proposed an approach that utilizes the CES function and illustrated the
applicability and usefulness of it with practices on two well-known models. We believe that
the approach can be used in various other network formation setups and deliver meaningful
messages.
The chapter also offers a prospect for empirical research on network formation. The
variation we introduce on link investment substitutability could be an omitted variable in
works that adopt the bilateral or unilateral link formation assumption. Adding a degree
of freedom along that dimension can reduce the bias of estimator significantly in certain
cases. Given the wide adoption of the CES function in macro literature, we believe the
practice should not be very challenging. We believe that it would be a promising research
agenda to further explore the connection between link investment substitutability and network
formation, especially for more general network utility functions, instead of the two particular
games analysed in this paper. Such an analysis might provide us with a network formation
explanation of welfare disparity among agents.
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Appendix 2.A Proofs
Proof for Remark 2.1
We first prove the “if” part, i.e. with the restrictions on the network formation game,
when a network g satisfies the conditions specified in Remark 2.1, then it also satisfy the
conditions specified in Definition 2.2 for it to be weighted pairwise stable.
Let g be a network that satisfy conditions specified in Remark 2.1, and let a be an
investment profile where a= g. So ai j = a ji = 1 when gi j = 1 and ai j = a ji = 0 when gi j = 0.
Given the specification on A and H in Remark 2.1, we can see a ∈ A and g = H(a). To show
that g to be weighted pairwise stable, we only need that for this a:
(i) for all i, j ∈ N and all a′i j ∈ Ai j,
vi(a;H)≥ vi(a′i j,a−i j;H)
(ii) there does not exists i, j ∈ N such that for some a′i j ∈ Ai j and a′ji ∈ A ji,
vi(a′i j,a
′
ji,a−i j, ji;H)≥ v j(a;H)
v j(a′i j,a
′
ji,a−i j, ji;H)≥ v j(a;H)
with at least one inequality being strict.
For (i), suppose there exists an i and a′i j ∈ Ai j such that vi(a;H) < vi(a′i j,a−i j;H).
It cannot be a′i j > ai j, because given the specification on H, h(a′i j,a ji) = (ai j,a ji) when
a′i j > ai j, and since ui(g,a) is decreasing in ai j, an increase in ai j can only lead to a decrease
in utility. It also cannot be a′i j < ai j. When ai j = 0, this is obvious from the specification
on A; when ai j = 1, having a′i j < ai j means h(a′i j,a ji)< 1, indicating a cut of link between
i and j. With condition (i) of Remark 2.1, we know that vi(g;H) ≥ vi(g− gi j;H). Since
a = g, we have vi(a;H) = vi(g;H). Since ui(g,a) is decreasing in ai j and independent of ak
for k ̸= i, vi(g−gi j;H)≥ vi(a′i j,a−i j;H). So, we have vi(a;H) = vi(g;H)≥ vi(g−gi j;H)≥
vi(a′i j,a−i j;H), which contradicts vi(a;H)< vi(a′i j,a−i j;H).
For (ii), suppose there exists i, j ∈ N such that for some a′i j ∈ Ai j and a′ji ∈ A ji, both
players are better off (one strictly). Given that ui(g,a) is decreasing in ai j and given our
specification on H, it suffice to examine a′i j = a′ji = 0 when ai j = ai j = 1 and a′i j = a′ji = 1
when ai j = ai j = 0. For the former one, we have
vi(a;H) = vi(g;H)≥ vi(g−gi j;H) = vi(a′i j,a′ji,a−i j, ji;H)
49
so players cannot benefit from the deviation. For the latter one, we have that it cannot be
vi(a′i j,a
′
ji,a−i j, ji;H) = vi(g+gi j;H)≥ v j(g;H) = vi(a;H)
v j(g−gi j;H) = vi(a′i j,a′ji,a−i j, ji;H) = v j(g+gi j;H)≥ v j(g;H) = v j(a;H)
with at least one inequality being strict, so players cannot benefit (with one strictly) from the
deviation.
We have finished our proof for the “if” part and move to the “only if” part now. We
need to show that with the restrictions on the network formation game, when a network g is
weighted pairwise stable, it satisfies the conditions specified in Remark 2.1.
When a network is weighted pairwise stable, we know the a that supports it need to
satisfy vi(a;H)≥ vi(a′i j,a−i j;H) for all i, j ∈ N and all a′i j ∈ Ai j. With our specification on
H, and that ui(g,a) is decreasing in ai j, it implies that a = g.
When gi j = 1, we have ai j = a ji = 1, let aˆi j = aˆ ji = 0. Since vi(a;H)≥ vi(a′i j,a−i j;H)
for all a′i j ∈ Ai j, we have vi(g;H)≥ vi(aˆi j,a−i j;H). Since ui(g,a) is independent of ak for all
k ̸= i, we have vi(aˆi j,a−i j;H) = vi(aˆi j, aˆ ji,a−i j, ji;H) = vi(g−gi j;H) given our specification
for H. So we have
vi(g;H)≥ vi(g−gi j;H)
when gi j = 1.
When gi j = 0, we have ai j = a ji = 0, since there does not exists a′i j ∈ Ai j and a′ji ∈ A ji
that make both players are better off (one strictly), aˆi j = aˆ ji = 1 wouldn’t. So it cannot be
vi(g+gi j;H) = vi(aˆi j, aˆ ji,a−i j, ji;H)≥ v j(a;H) = vi(g;H)
v j(g+gi j;H) = v j(aˆi j, aˆ ji,a−i j, ji;H)≥ v j(a;H) = v j(g;H)
with at least one inequality being strict.
We have finished our proof for the “only if” part.
Proof for Proposition 2.1
We show that the cost of a link is minimized when ai j = a ji = 1 for β < 1 and ai j =
2
1
β ,a ji = 0 or ai j = 0,a ji = 2
1
β when β > 1. Our goal is to:
min(ai j +a ji)c s.t. ai j ≥ 0,a ji ≥ 0 and (12a
β
i j +
1
2
aβji)
1
β = 1 (2.6)
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i.e.
min[ai j +2
1
β (1− 1
2
aβi j)
1
β ]c s.t. ai j ≥ 0 and 1− 12a
β
i j ≥ 0 (2.7)
First order derivative of the objective w.r.t ai j is:
1+2
1
β
1
β
(1− 1
2
aβi j)
1
β−1(−1
2
)βaβ−1i j (2.8)
which is equal to 0 when ai j = 2
1
β (1− 12aβi j)
1
β = a ji = 1, and the second order derivative of
the objective w.r.t ai j is:
2
1
β−1[(
1
β
−1)(1− 1
2
aβi j)
1
β−2(−1
2
)βa2β−2i j +(1−
1
2
aβi j)
1
β−1(β −1)aβ−2i j ]
=2
1
β−1(β −1)[(1
2
)(1− 1
2
aβi j)
1
β−2βa2β−2i j +(1−
1
2
aβi j)
1
β−1aβ−2i j ]
(2.9)
which is positive when β > 1 and negative when β < 1. So the minimizing problem has an
interior solution of ai j = a ji = 1 when β < 1 and a boundary solution of ai j = 2
1
β ,a ji = 0
or ai j = 0,a ji = 2
1
β when β > 1. This proves that in the efficient case, a link is reciprocally
sponsored when β < 1 and unilaterally sponsored when β > 1. When β = 1, we can see the
cost of link is always 2c whatever is the way two players share the cost of a link. And hence
we can see the minimized cost of a link is 2c when β ≤ 1 and 2 1β c when β > 1.
The efficient network structure characterization then follows directly from Proposition 1
of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).
Proof for Lemma 2.1
For point (i), first it’s obvious that for all k∈N, either dik(g+ i j)< dik(g) or dik(g+ i j)=
dik(g) since the addition of a link would not make the distance from i to other nodes longer.
If dik(g+ i j)< dik(g), it must be that there is a new path from i to k that is shorter than all
original paths. Since there is only one such new path that travels through j, the condition for
dik(g+ i j)< dik(g) to be the case is d jk(g)+1 < dik(g) and the new distance is d jk(g)+1.
For point (ii), we have for all k ∈ N, either dik(g− i j)> dik(g) or dik(g− i j) = dik(g)
since the deduction of a link would not make the distance from i to other nodes shorter.
If dik(g− i j) > dik(g), it must be that the original shortest path from i to k that travels
through j. The condition for that to be the case is dik(g) = d jk(g)+1 and the new distance is
min
l:l ̸= j,dil(g=1
dlk(g)+1.
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Proof for Proposition 2.2
For the “if” part, we need to show that if a distance matrix d satisfies condition (i) and
(ii) of Proposition 2.2, then the underlying network g is pairwise stable. To see that, let
investment profile a be such that:
ai j =
WS
i j
i (d) if di j = 1
0 if di j > 1
Then we can see, first, if di j = 1:
gi j(a) = 1{h(ai j,a ji)≥ 1}
= 1{h(WSi ji (d),WSi jj (d))≥ 1}
= 1
and if di j > 1:
gi j(a) = 1{h(ai j,a ji)≥ 1}
= 1{h(0,0)≥ 1}
= 0
so a constructs the network g associated with d. Condition (i) for the definition of a pairwise
stable network is satisfied.
Also, for all i, j ∈ N where gi j = 1, since we set ai j =WSi ji (d), we have:
(WSi ji (d)−ai j)c = 0
∑
k:dik=d jk+1
δ dik(1−δ
min
l:l ̸= j,dil=1
dlk+1−dik
)− c ·ai j = 0
∑
k∈N
δ dik(g)− c ·∑
k ̸=i
aik− (∑
k∈N
δ dik(g−i j)− c · ∑
k ̸=i, j
aik) = 0
ui(g,ai) = ui(g− i j,ai−a⟨i j⟩i j )
and similarily
u j(g,a j) = u j(g− i j,a j−a⟨ ji⟩ji )
fulfilling condition (ii) for the definition of a pairwise stable network.
Finally, for all i, j ∈ N where j ̸= i and gi j = 0, if there exists a′i j,a′ji ≥ 0 such that
h(a′i j,a′ji)≥ 1 and that ui(g+ i j,ai+a′i j⟨i j⟩)≥ ui(g,ai) and u j(g+ i j,a j+a′ji⟨ ji⟩)≥ u j(g,a j),
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with at least one inequality being strict, then we have:
∑
k∈N
δ dik(g+i j)− c ·∑
k ̸=i
aik− c ·a′i j− (∑
k∈N
δ dik(g)− c ·∑
k ̸=i
aik)≥ 0
∑
k:dik>d jk+1
δ d jk+1(1−δ dik−d jk−1)− c ·a′i j ≥ 0
(WF i ji (d)−a′i j)c≥ 0
WF i ji (d)≥ a′i j
and similarily
WF i jj (d)≥ a′ji
with at least one inequality being strict. But then since
h(a′i j,a
′
ji)≥ 1
we have
h(WF i ji (d),WF
i j
j (d))≥ 1
violating condition (ii) in Proposition 2.2. So d also satisfies condition (iii) for the definition
of a pairwise stable network.
Since the g underlying d satisfies all three conditions for a network to be pairwise stable,
we proved the “if” part of the proposition.
For the “only if” part, we need to show that if network g is pairwise stable, then the
associated distance matrix d satisfies condition (i) and (ii) in Proposition 2.2.
If g is pairwise stable, then there exists an investment profile a such that: when gi j = 1
(i.e. di j = 1), h(ai j,a ji)≥ 1 and
ui(g,ai) = ∑
k∈N
δ dik(g)− c ·∑
k ̸=i
aik ≥ ∑
k∈N
δ dik(g−i j)− c · ∑
k ̸=i, j
aik = ui(g− i j,ai−a⟨i j⟩i j )
∑
k∈N
(δ dik(g)−δ dik(g−i j))− c ·ai j ≥ 0
∑
k:dik=d jk+1
δ dik(1−δ
min
l:l ̸= j,dil=1
dlk+1−dik
)− c ·ai j ≥ 0
WSi ji (d)≥ ai j
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and similarily
WSi jj (d)≥ a ji
Since h(ai j,a ji)≥ 1, we have h(WSi ji (d),WSi jj (d))≥ 1 which is condition (i) in Proposition
2.2.
When gi j = 0 and j ̸= i (i.e. di j > 1), according to the definition, there cannot exists
a′i j,a′ji ≥ 0 such that h(a′i j,a′ji)≥ 1 and that
ui(g+ i j,ai+a′i j
⟨i j⟩
) = ∑
k∈N
δ dik(g+i j)− c ·∑
k ̸=i
aik− c ·a′i j ≥ ∑
k∈N
δ dik(g)− c ·∑
k ̸=i
aik = ui(g,ai)
(2.10)
u j(g+ i j,a j+a′ji
⟨ ji⟩
) = ∑
k∈N
δ d jk(g+ ji)−c ·∑
k ̸= j
aik−c ·a′ji ≥ ∑
k∈N
δ d jk(g)−c ·∑
k ̸= j
a jk = ui(g,a j)
(2.11)
with one inequality being strict.
Inequality 2.10 can be simplified to:
ui(g+ i j,ai+a′i j
⟨i j⟩
) = ∑
k∈N
δ dik(g+i j)− c ·∑
k ̸=i
aik− c ·a′i j ≥ ∑
k∈N
δ dik(g)− c ·∑
k ̸=i
aik = ui(g,ai)
∑
k∈N
(δ dik(g+i j)−δ dik(g))− c ·a′i j ≥ 0
∑
k:dik>d jk+1
δ d jk+1(1−δ dik−d jk−1)− c ·a′i j ≥ 0
WF i ji (d)≥ a′i j
and similarily inequality 2.11 can be simplified to:
WF i jj (d)≥ a′ji
So for g to be pairwise stable, for any a′i j,a′ji ≥ 0 such that h(a′i j,a′ji) = 1, it cannot
be WF i ji (d) ≥ a′i j and WF i jj (d) ≥ a′ji, with one inequality being strict. Since h(ai j,a ji) is
increasing in both ai j and a ji, we have
h(WF i jj (d),WF
i j
j (d))≤ 1
for all i, j ∈ N with di j > 1, which is condition (ii) in Proposition 2.2.
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Proof for Proposition 2.3
(i) The complete network is weighted pairwise stable when c ∈ [0,δ − δ 2]. We now
compare this parameter range with that that makes the complete network efficient. When
β ≤ 1, the two ranges coincide with each other. Yet when β > 1, we can see that [0,δ−δ 2]⊂
[0,21−
1
β (δ − δ 2)] and since 21− 1β is increasing in β , there is a growing tendency for the
complete network to be efficient yet not MI-pairwise stable as β rises.
(ii) For the star network to be weighted pairwise stable, we need the distance advantage
pair for any two periphery players to be in the infeasible production range, or on the
production frontier such that they do not have strict incentive to form a link, and the distance
advantage pair for the center player and a periphery player to be in the feasible production
range such that they can coordinate in some way to maintain the link. This holds when c ∈
[δ−δ 2,(12δβ+ 12(δ+(n−2)δ 2)β )
1
β ]. Note that when β ≤ 1, with the power mean inequality,
we can show that [δ −δ 2,(12δβ + 12(δ +(n−2)δ 2)β )
1
β ] ⊂ [δ −δ 2,21− 1β (δ + n−22 δ 2)] and
(12δ
β + 12(δ +(n−2)δ 2)β )
1
β is increasing in β . So the range of link investment cost c that
makes the star weighted pairwise stable is a subset of the range of it that makes the star
efficient, but the difference in the two ranges are shrinking in β , i.e. in some cases, when star
is the efficient network, it is not supported as weighted pairwise stable, but the likelihood of
such cases is declining as β grows when β ≤ 1.
When β > 1, we will compare the parameter range [21−
1
β (δ −δ 2),(12δβ + 12(δ +(n−
2)δ 2)β )
1
β ] such that the star is efficient and weighted pairwise stable when c lies in it, with
[21−
1
β (δ −δ 2),21− 1β (δ + n−22 δ 2) such that the star is efficient when c lies in it.11 We can
show that as n→∞, the two ranges tend to be identical for all β > 1. Combining our analysis
on the weighted pairwise stability of the star when β ≤ 1, we can infer that the asymmetric
structure is supported under larger β and this leads to a higher level of coordination between
efficient and weighted pairwise network structure when β rises, given that the efficient
structure is asymmetric.
(iii) Finally, for the empty network structure to be weighted pairwise stable, we need
that no pairs of players can coordinate in any way to form a link, i.e. δ ≤ c which is satisfied
for all cases when the empty network is efficient.
Proof of Propsition 2.4
First, we do some best response analysis for players.
11 We arrive at the first range because we can show that δ − δ 2 ≤ 21− 1β (δ − δ 2) and ( 12δ β + 12 (δ +(n−
2)δ 2)β )
1
β ≤ 21− 1β (δ + n−22 δ 2) with the help of properties of p-norms.
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Let BRi(s−i) = {si | ui(si,s−i) ≥ ui(s′i,s−i) ∀s′i ∈ Si} be the set of i’s best responses
given s−i. We know that a strategy profile s∗ is a Nash equilibrium if and only if for all player
i ∈ N:
s∗i ∈ BRi(s∗−i)
We first list some basic conditions on s∗i for it to be a best response:
Lemma 2.2. If s∗i = {x∗i ,a∗i1, ...,a∗ii−1,a∗ii+1, ...a∗in} ∈ BRi(s−i), then:
(i) x∗i +∑ j ̸=i h(a∗i j,a ji)x j ≥ yˆ, and x∗i +∑ j ̸=i h(a∗i j,a ji)x j = yˆ if x∗i > 0,
(ii) x∗i ≤ yˆ, and
(iii) x∗i > 0 or a∗i j > 0 for some j, in any equilibrium s∗.
Proof for Lemma 2.2:
Proof. For the first point, suppose x∗i +∑ j ̸=i h(a∗i j,a ji)x j < yˆ, then since f ′(yˆ) = c and
f ′′()< 0, we have f ′(x∗i +∑t ̸=i h(a∗it ,ati)xt)− c > 0, player i will want to put in more effort
and s∗i cannot be a best response.
When x∗i > 0, suppose x∗i +∑ j ̸=i h(a∗i j,a ji)x j > yˆ, we can infer that f ′(x∗i +∑t ̸=i h(a∗it ,ati)xt)−
c < 0, player i will want to put in less effort and s∗i cannot be a best response. And knowing
that x∗i +∑ j ̸=i h(a∗i j,a ji)x j ≥ yˆ, we get x∗i +∑ j ̸=i h(a∗i j,a ji)x j = yˆ when x∗i > 0.
Moreover, since h(a∗i j,a ji)x j ≥ 0 ∀ j ̸= i, combine the first point, we know x∗i ≤ yˆ.
Finally, in equilibrium it cannot be that x∗i = 0 and a∗i j = 0 ∀ j ̸= i. This is because if
x∗i = 0, then a∗ji = 0 ∀ j ̸= i, as linking to i incurs no benefit but cost for j. Thus h(a∗i j,a∗ji) =
h(0,0) = 0 ∀ j ̸= i. This leads to x∗i +∑ j ̸=i h(a∗i j,a∗ji)x∗j = 0, contradicting the first condition.
From Lemma 2.2, we know that there is a minimum amount of information to obtain
and a maximum amount of effort to exert, and that every player has to pay something in
equilibrium, in the form of searching or link investment.
We now make some further notes on s∗. Given other players’ strategy s−i, player i
best respond by solving a nonlinear optimization problem with the constraints that xi ≥ 0
and ai j ≥ 0 ∀ j ̸= i. Therefore, if s∗i = {x∗i ,a∗i1, ...,a∗ii−1,a∗ii+1, ...a∗in} ∈ BRi(s−i), we have the
following Karush-Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions: f ′(x∗i +∑l ̸=i h(a∗il,ali)xl)− c = 0, if x∗i > 0f ′(x∗i +∑l ̸=i h(a∗il,ali)xl)− c≤ 0, if x∗i = 0 (2.12)
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and for all j ̸= i: f ′(x∗i +∑l ̸=i h(a∗il,ali)xl)hx(a∗i j,a ji)x j− k = 0, if a∗i j > 0f ′(x∗i +∑l ̸=i h(a∗il,ali)xl)hx(a∗i j,a ji)x j− k ≤ 0, if a∗i j = 0 (2.13)
i.e. if x∗i or a∗i j is an interior solution, then the marginal benefit from it must be zero; if it is a
corner solution, then the marginal benefit must be less than or equal to zero.
We know that f is a concave function and h(ai j,a ji) taken a ji as given is a concave
function of ai j when β ≤ 1. So the utility function of player i is a concave function of xi and
{ai j} j ̸=i when β ≤ 1. Moreover we know that the inequality constraints are convex, so the
KKT necessary conditions are also sufficient for optimazation when β ≤ 1.
Regardless of whether the KKT conditions are sufficient, we know the following must
be true for the best response:
Lemma 2.3. If s∗i = {x∗i ,a∗i1, ...,a∗ii−1,a∗ii+1, ...a∗in} ∈ BRi(s−i), then
hx(a∗i j,a ji)x j ≤ k/c ∀ j ̸= i (2.14)
when x∗i > 0,
hx(a∗i j,a ji)x j ≥ k/c (2.15)
when a∗i j > 0, and
hx(a∗i j,a ji)x j = k/c (2.16)
when x∗i > 0 and a∗i j > 0.
Proof for Lemma 2.3:
Proof. First, if x∗i > 0, then we know from (2.12):
f ′(x∗i +∑
l ̸=i
h(a∗il,ali)xl) = c (2.17)
and from (2.13) we know for all j ̸= i:
f ′(x∗i +∑
l ̸=i
h(a∗il,ali)xl)hx(a
∗
i j,a ji)x j ≤ k (2.18)
Combining (2.17) and (2.18), we have for all j ̸= i:
hx(a∗i j,a ji)x j ≤ k/c (2.19)
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Then, if a∗i j > 0, then we know from (2.13):
f ′(x∗i +∑
l ̸=i
h(a∗il,ali)xl)hx(a
∗
i j,a ji)x j = k (2.20)
and from (2.12) we have:
f ′(x∗i +∑
l ̸=i
h(a∗il,ali)xl)≤ c (2.21)
Combining (2.20) and (2.21), we have:
hx(a∗i j,a ji)x j ≥ k/c (2.22)
Finally, if x∗i > 0 and a∗i j > 0, we know (2.19) and (2.22) are both true, so:
hx(a∗i j,a ji)x j = k/c (2.23)
Intuitively, we can interpret the relationships specified by (2.14), (2.15) and (2.16)
as comparing the relative marginal revenue between investing in relationship with j and
searching, which is hx(a∗i j,a ji)x j, with the relative cost of the two options, which is k/c. For
example, if x∗i > 0 and a∗i j > 0, it indicates that the relative marginal revenue must be equal to
the relative marginal cost such that player i is indifferent between the two ways of acquiring
information.
Now we start to prove Proposition 2.4.
Proposition 2.4 gives the necessary and sufficient conditions for s∗ to be an equilibrium
for different parameter values when β < 1. It is straightforward to prove that the conditions
are sufficient: we can verify that all players are best responding. So here we only prove that
the conditions are necessary, i.e. we have characterized all possible equilibrium.
Suppose there is a Nash equilibrium s′ such that there exists a resulting component
C′ = (NC′,gC′) that is not characterized by I,R,B, or S.
It cannot be that | NC′ |= 1. Because when | NC′ |= 1, from Lemma 2.2 it must be x′i = yˆ
in equilibrium, which is the same as I.
If | NC′ |> 1, then there exisits i, j ∈ NC′ such that g′i j > 0. First look at the case when
a′i j > 0 and a′ji > 0 for all i, j ∈ NC
′
where g′i j > 0.
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Since a′i j > 0 and a′ji > 0, we know that x′i > 0 and x′j > 0, otherwise at least on player
would not want to make investment in the link. Then from Lemma 2.3, we get:hx(a
′
i j,a
′
ji) =
k
cx′j
hy(a′i j,a′ji) =
k
cx′i
(2.24)
We also know that for CES link formation function, the following is true:
hx(ai j,a ji)
β
β−1 +hy(ai j,a ji)
β
β−1 = 2
1
1−β (2.25)
Substitute hx(ai j,a ji) and hy(ai j,a ji) with kcx′j
and kcx′i
respectively, we get:
x′i
β
1−β + x′j
β
1−β = 2
1
1−β (k/c)
β
1−β (2.26)
With Implict Function Theorem, We can see that
dx′j
dx′i
=−(x′i/x′j)
2β−1
1−β < 0 for positive x′i and
x′j. This means that if i and j are connected, then there is a one-to-one relationship between
their effort.
If there exists i, j ∈ NC′ s.t. a′i j > 0 and x′i = x′j, then for all l ∈ NC
′
, we have x′l = x
′
i = x
′
j
given the one-to-one relationship for linked players. Then with equation (2.26), we get
x′l = 2k/c, and from equation (2.24), we get hx(a
′
i j,a
′
ji) = 1/2, and hence a
′
i j = a
′
ji. Finally,
from Lemma 2.2, since x′i+∑ j ̸=i h(a′i j,a′ji)x′j = yˆ, we get ∑ j ̸=i a′i j = cyˆ/2k−1. In this case
C′ belongs to R type of component.
If there exists i, j ∈ NC′ s.t. a′i j > 0 and x′i ̸= x′j, let x′i = x1 and x′j = x2. Since a′i j > 0
and a′ji > 0, from Lemma 2.2 we know 0 < x′i < yˆ and 0 < x′j < yˆ, so we have 0 < x1 < yˆ and
0 < x2 < yˆ. It is immediate to see that if there exists a sequence of nodes i = v0,v1, ...,vm = l,
such that gvk−1vk > 0 for k = 1, ...,m and m is an even number, then x
′
l = x
′
i = x1. If there
exists a sequence of nodes i = i0, i1, i2, ..., im = l, such that gikik+1 > 0 for k = 0,1, ...,m−1
and m is an odd number, then x′l = x
′
j = x2. This follows from the one-to-one relationship
between two connected nodes. And from this we can see for all l ∈ NC′ , x′l = x1 or x′l = x2.
Define U = {i ∈ NC′ | x′i = x1} and V = { j ∈ NC
′ | x′j = x2}, we can see that in equilib-
rium, a player from U can only be connected to a player from V and vice versa, i.e. a′i j = 0 if
i, j ∈U or i, j ∈V .
Also, an examination of the CES function gives us:
hx(ai j,a ji) =
∂h(ai j,a ji)
∂ai j
= (1/2)
1
β (1+(a ji/ai j)β )
1−β
β (2.27)
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So for i ∈U , j ∈V and g′i j > 0, from equation (2.27) and (2.26), we can infer that a′i j/a′ji =
(x2/x1)
1
1−β . Finally, from Lemma 2.2, we can get ∑a′i j = (
cxβ2
2k )
1
1−β (yˆ− x1) ∀i ∈ U , and
∑a′ji = (
cxβ1
2k )
1
1−β (yˆ− x2) ∀ j ∈V . In this case C′ belongs to B type of component.
If there exists i, j ∈NC′ such that a′i j > 0 and a′ji = 0, then we know that β > 0 and there
exist j ∈ NC′ such that x′j ≥ 2
1
β k/c. Because we have a′i j > 0 and a′ji = 0, if x′j < 2
1
β k/c,
then:
hx(a′i j,a
′
ji)x
′
j = (1/2)
1
β x′j < k/c (2.28)
violating the condition for a′i j > 0 in Lemma 2.3.
Since x′j ≥ 2
1
β k/c, we know that a′jl = 0 ∀l ̸= j. If there is a l such that a′jl > 0, then
hx(a′l j,a
′
jl)x
′
j > (1/2)
1
β 2
1
β k/c = k/c. (2.29)
violating the condition for x′l > 0 in Lemma 2.3, so x
′
l = 0. But as x
′
l > 0, we have a
′
jl = 0.
Now, for all l such that g′jl > 0, we know that a
′
jl = 0, hence a
′
l j > 0. It must be that
x′l = 0, because otherwise
hx(a′jl,a
′
l j)x
′
l →+∞> k/c (2.30)
violating the condition for x′j > 0 in Lemma 2.3.
So for all l such that g′jl > 0, x
′
l = 0. From Lemma 2.2, we can infer x
′
j = yˆ.
Returning to the link g′i j > 0 we looked at in the start, since g′i j > 0, we know that x′i = 0.
This implies that a′li = 0 ∀l ̸= i since linking to i brings no benefit for l. So for all l such that
g′il > 0, we know that a
′
li = 0, hence a
′
il > 0. We can show x
′
l = yˆ using the same logic for
showing x′j = yˆ.
In brief, we have now proved that if there exists i, j ∈ NC′ such that a′i j > 0 and a′ji = 0,
then x′i = 0, x′j = yˆ. And for all players l that is connected to j, we have a′jl = 0, a
′
l j > 0, and
x′l = 0. For all players l connected to i, we have a
′
li = 0, a
′
il > 0 x
′
l = yˆ.
With the above result, using iterative reasoning, it’s immediate to see that for a′i j > 0
and a′ji = 0, if there exists a sequence of nodes i = v0,v1, ..., im = l, such that gvk−1vk > 0
for k = 1, ...,m and m is an even number, then x′l = x
′
i = 0. If there exists a sequence of
nodes i = v0,v1, ..., im = l, such that gvk−1vk > 0 for k = 1, ...,m and m is an odd number, then
x′l = x
′
j = yˆ. And from this we can see for all l ∈ (NC
′
,gC
′
), x′l = 0 or x
′
l = yˆ.
Define U ′ = {i ∈ NC′ | x′i = 0} and V ′ = { j ∈ NC
′ | x′j = yˆ}, we can see that for i ∈U ′:
a′i j > 0 only if j ∈V ′, and for a′i j > 0, we know the following from the best response analysis:
f ′(x′i+ ∑
j∈V ′
h(a′i j,a
′
ji)x
′
j)hx(a
′
i j,a
′
ji)x
′
j− k = 0
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Substitute the variables with our results, get:
f ′(∑
j∈V ′
(1/2)
1
β a′i jyˆ)(1/2)
1
β yˆ− k = 0
Let zˆ be a scaler such that f ′(zˆ) = 2
1
β k/yˆ, we can see ∑ j∈V ′ a′i j = 2
1
β zˆ/yˆ.
For j ∈V ′, we have already shown that a′jl = 0 ∀l ̸= j. We can see that C′ belong to S
type of components now.
We have looked at all possibilities for C′ = (NC′ ,gC′) under Nash equilibrium, and show
that it can always be characterized by one of the I,R,B or S components.
Now we show that equilibrium network can only be the specific kind of combinations
of I,R,B and S components for different parameter ranges. When yˆ≤ 2k/c, we need to show
that there does not exist s′ ̸= s∗ such that s′ is a Nash equilibrium. Suppose there is a s′ where
∃i ∈ N such that x′i ̸= yˆ or ∃i, j ∈ N such that a′i j > 0.
If x′i ̸= yˆ, from Lemma 2.2 we know that it must be ∑ j ̸=i h(a′i j,a′ji) > 0, indicating it
cannot be a′i j = a′ji = 0. So for s′ ̸= s∗ to be an equilibrium, there exists i, j ∈ N such that
a′i j > 0.
When yˆ < 2k/c, from Lemma 2.2 we know:
x′j ≤ yˆ < 2k/c (2.31)
and from Lemma 2.3 we know:
hx(a′i j,a
′
ji)x
′
j ≥ k/c (2.32)
Combining the above two conditions, we need:
hx(a′i j,a
′
ji)> 1/2 (2.33)
An examination of how hx(ai j,a ji) varies with a ji/ai j tells that when β < 0, (2.33)
implies:
a′ji/a
′
i j > 1 (2.34)
So a′ji > 0 as well. Then we can do the same analysis for a′ji and get:
a′i j/a
′
ji > 1 (2.35)
A contradiction.
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When yˆ = 2k/c, if both x′i and x′j are less than yˆ, we can again get x′i < 2k/c and
x′j < 2k/c like in equation (2.31). Using the same logic we arrive at a contradiction. If x′i
or x′j equal to yˆ, then from Lemma 2.2, we have h(a′i j,a′ji) = 0, indicating a′i j = a′ji = 0. A
contradiction.
So when yˆ≤ 2k/c, the unique equilibrium is s∗ where a∗i j = 0 for all i, j ∈ N, and x∗i = yˆ
for all i ∈ N.
When β < ln2ln(cyˆ/k) , we only need to show that there cannot be any S component in
equilibrium when. We prove this by showing that if s∗ is a Nash equilibrium, then @i, j ∈ N
such that a∗i j > 0 and a∗ji = 0. If a∗ji = 0, then for s∗i ∈ BRi(s∗−i), it must be a∗i j = 0, otherwise:
hx(a∗i j,a
∗
ji)x
∗
j < (1/2)
1
β 2
1
β k/c = k/c (2.36)
violating the condition for a∗i j > 0 in Lemma 2.3. So there cannot be unilaterally sponsored
link in equilibrium when yˆ < 2
1
β k/c. But all links in S are unilarterally sponsored, so there
cannot be any S component in this case.
When β = ln2ln(cyˆ/k) , nothing to be further proved.
When β > ln2ln(cyˆ/k) , we first show that there cannot be any I component in equilibrium
when 0 < β < 1 and yˆ > 2
1
β k/c. If there is an equilibrium s′ with a I component, then there
exist j ∈ N such that j ∈ NI , indicating x′j = yˆ and g′i j = 0 ∀i ̸= j.
Then ∀i ̸= j we have x′i = 0, because it is always true that:
hx(a′i j,a
′
ji)x
′
j > (1/2)
1
β 2
1
β k/c = k/c (2.37)
violating the condition for x′i > 0 in Lemma 2.3. Moreover, from Lemma 2.2 we know
x′i+∑l ̸=i g′ila
′
l ≥ yˆ ∀i ̸= j. But as x′i = 0 and x′l = 0 ∀l ̸= j, we can infer that g′i j > 0, violating
the assumption.
So when β > ln2ln(cyˆ/k) , we can only have R,B, and S components in equilibrium. There
are seven possible combinations for the three elements: (1) all components are R; (2) all
components are B; (3) all components are S; (4) there are R and B components; (5) there are
R and S components; (6) there are B and S components; and (7) all three kinds of components
coexists.
We show that if there is an S component in equilibrium, then |V ′ |= 1 and there cannot
be any other component. This is because for j ∈ V ′, we have x∗j = yˆ and a∗ji = 0 ∀i ̸= j,
then we can follow the same argument above to show that x∗i = 0 and g∗i j > 0 ∀i ̸= j. This
eliminates the possibility that an S coexists with other components or |V ′ |> 1.
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Hence we know that combination (5) (6) and (7) cannot be equilibrium, and for situation
(3), we know there can only be one component S with |V ′ |= 1.
We have finished the proof.
Proof for Proposition 2.5
Suppose there exisits a Nash equilibrium s′ with a′i j > 0 and a′ji > 0. This implies x′i > 0
and x′j > 0 as otherwise linking incurs no benefit and a′i j > 0 and a′ji > 0 can not be part of
best response for i and j.
Since x′i > 0 and a′i j > 0, from Lemma 2.3, we have:
hx(a′i j,a
′
ji)x
′
j =
k
c
(2.38)
Let s∗i be a strategy for player i where:
• x∗i = 0
• a∗i j = a′i j +
x′i
hx(a′i j,a′ji)x′j
• a∗il = a
′
i j for all l ̸= j
We can compare s∗i and s′i for player i facing s′−i:
ui(x∗i ,s
′
−i)−ui(s′) = f (x∗i +∑
l ̸=i
h(a∗il,a
′
li)x
′
l)− f (x′i+∑
l ̸=i
h(a′il,a
′
li)x
′
l)
− cx∗i − k∑
l ̸=i
a∗il + cx
′
i+ k∑
l ̸=i
a′il
= f (h(a∗i j,a
′
ji)x
′
j + ∑
l ̸=i, j
h(a′il,a
′
li)x
′
l)
− f (x′i+h(a′i j,a′ji)x′j +∑
l ̸=i
h(a′il,a
′
li)x
′
l)
− k(a′i j +
x′i
hx(a′i j,a′ji)x′j
)− k ∑
l ̸=i, j
a′il + cx
′
i+ ka
′
i j + k ∑
l ̸=i, j
a′il
= f (h(a∗i j,a
′
ji)x
′
j + ∑
l ̸=i, j
h(a′il,a
′
li)x
′
l)
− f (x′i+h(a′i j,a′ji)x′j +∑
l ̸=i
h(a′il,a
′
li)x
′
l)
(2.39)
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Since f ′(y)> 0, the sign of ui(x∗i ,s′−i)−ui(s′) is the same as the sign of:
h(a∗i j,a
′
ji)x
′
j + ∑
l ̸=i, j
h(a′il,a
′
li)x
′
l− x′i−h(a′i j,a′ji)x′j−∑
l ̸=i
h(a′il,a
′
li)x
′
l
=[h(a′i j +
x′i
hx(a′i j,a′ji)x′j
,a′ji)−h(a′i j,a′ji)]x′j− x′i
>hx(a′i j,a
′
ji)x
′
j
x′i
hx(a′i j,a′ji)x′j
x′j− x′i = 0
(2.40)
since hxx(ai j,a ji)> 0 for all ai j > 0,a ji > 0 under β > 1.
So we can see that s′i /∈ BRi(s′−i), s′ cannot be a Nash equilibrium.
We first prove that when yˆ < 2
1
β k/c, the strategy profile s∗ where a∗i j = 0 ∀i ̸= j and
x∗i = yˆ ∀i ∈ N is an equililbrium.
For all player i ∈ N, he is facing x∗j = yˆ and a∗ji = 0 ∀ j ̸= i. Hence:
hx(ai j,a∗ji)x
∗
j = (1/2)
1
β x∗j < k/c (2.41)
for all ai j > 0. From Lemma 2.3, we know that if s′i ∈ BRi(s∗−i), then a′i j = 0 = a∗i j ∀ j ̸= i.
Then, from Lemma 2.2, we get x′i = yˆ = x∗i . Since BRi(s−i) ̸= /0, we know s∗i ∈ BRi(s∗−i)
∀i ∈ N. So s∗ is a Nash equililbrium.
We can also prove that there is no other Nash equilibrium. Suppose there is a strategy
profile s′ ̸= s∗ that is also an equilibrium. It can either be that there exists i ∈ N where x′i ̸= yˆ
or there exists i, j ∈ N where a′i j > 0. If x′i ̸= yˆ, from Lemma 2.2, we need h(a′i j,a′ji)x′j > 0,
so we have at least a′i j > 0 or a′ji > 0. Thus if there is a equilibrium s′ ̸= s∗, then there exists
i, j ∈ N where a′i j > 0.
Since a′i j > 0, from Lemma 2.3 we know:
hx(a′i j,a
′
ji)x
′
j ≥ k/c (2.42)
We also know that hx(a′i j,a′ji) ≤ (1/2)
1
β when β > 1, so we need x′j ≥ 2
1
β k/c > yˆ,
violating Lemma 2.2. So s′ cannot be an equilibrium.
Now we have proved that when yˆ < 2
1
β k/c, the strategy profile s∗ where he strategy
profile s∗ where a∗i j = 0 ∀i ̸= j and x∗i = yˆ ∀i ∈ N is the unique Nash equilibrium.
When yˆ ≥ 2 1β k/c, we seperate our analysis of equilibrium s∗ to the case where there
exist m ∈ N such that x∗m > 2
1
β k/c and the case where x∗i ≤ 2
1
β k/c ∀i ∈ N.
When there exist m ∈ N such that x∗m > 2
1
β k/c, we can show x∗i ≤ 2
1
β k/c ∀i ̸= m.
Suppose this is not the case and there exisit i ̸=m such that x∗i > 2
1
β k/c, then it cannot be that
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a∗im > 0 and a∗mi > 0 as shown in Lemma 2.2 . It also cannot be a∗im = 0 or a∗mi = 0. Suppose
a∗mi = 0, this leads to
hx(a∗im,a
∗
mi)x
∗
m > k/c (2.43)
and according to Lemma 2.3, it is only true when x∗i = 0, contradicting our assumption. Using
the same logic, we can show it cannot be a∗im = 0 as well. We cannot find an equilibrium
relationship for i and m when they are both greater than 2
1
β k/c, so there can only be one
player m with x∗m > 2
1
β k/c.
We also have g∗im > 0 ∀i ̸= m. Suppose this is not the case and there exists i ∈ N such
that a∗im = a∗mi = 0, then again
hx(a∗im,a
∗
mi)x
∗
m > k/c (2.44)
implying x∗i = 0. From Lemma 2.2, we know that there must exists j ∈ N such that a∗i j > 0.
Since x∗m > x∗j ∀ j ̸= m, it must be a∗im > 0, violating the assumption.
Since g∗im > 0 ∀i ̸= m and links are sponsored unilaterally in equilibrium, we can either
have a∗im > 0,a∗mi = 0 or a∗mi > 0,a∗im = 0.
Let U = {i ∈ N | a∗im > 0,a∗mi = 0}. We can see that for i ∈U :
(1) x∗i = 0. Because as we always have:
hx(a∗im,a
∗
mi)x
∗
m > k/c (2.45)
and from Lemma 2.3 we know x∗i = 0.
(2) a∗il = 0 ∀l ̸= m. As links are unilaterally sponsored, the marginal production from
investments is the same. So when agents decide who to link to, they only care about the level
of effort. Since m puts in most effort, players will only want to link with m.
(3) a∗im = 2
1
β zˆ/x∗m where f ′(zˆ) = 2
1
β k/x∗m. With the previous two points, we only need
to solve the optimization problem for i to figure out the value of a∗im. At the optimal point,
we have the following first order condition:
f ′(h(a∗im,0)x
∗
m)hx(a
∗
im,0)x
∗
m− k = 0 (2.46)
and we can get obtain from it a∗im = 2
1
β zˆ/x∗m where f ′(zˆ) = 2
1
β k/x∗m.
Let V = { j ∈ N | a∗jm = 0,a∗m j > 0}. We can see that for j ∈V :
(1) x∗j = 2
1
β k/c. Since a∗m j > 0, from Lemma 2.3 we know that:
hx(a∗m j,0)x
∗
j ≥ k/c (2.47)
Hence x∗j ≥ 2
1
β k/c. We have shown already that x∗i ≤ 2
1
β k/c ∀i ̸= n, so x∗j = 2
1
β k/c.
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(2) a∗jl = 0 ∀l /∈V . This is obvious as in definition we know a∗jm = 0 and since x∗i = 0
∀i ∈U , so a∗ji = 0 ∀i ∈U .
(3) ∑l∈V a∗jl = (yˆ− (1/2)
1
β a∗m jx∗m)k/c−2
1
β −∑l ̸= j a∗l j. From Lemma 2.2, we know that:
x∗j +∑
l ̸= j
h(a∗jl,a
∗
l j)x
∗
l = yˆ (2.48)
and can then derive the result.
This is the (a) kind of characterization in the Lemma.
Now we look at the case when x∗i ≤ 2
1
β k/c ∀i ∈ N.
First we show that there exists j ∈ N such that x∗j = 2
1
β k/c. Otherwise x∗j < 2
1
β k/c
∀ j ∈ N, then for all i ̸= j we have:
hx(a∗i j,a
∗
ji)x
∗
j < k/c (2.49)
and according to Lemma 2.3, we have a∗i j = 0 ∀ j ̸= i. Then x∗i +h(a∗i j,a∗ji)x∗j = x∗i < 2
1
β k/c≤
yˆ, violating Lemma 2.2. So we know there exists j ∈ N such that x∗j = 2
1
β k/c.
Let U ′ = {i ∈ N | x∗i < 2
1
β k/c} and V ′ = { j ∈ N | x∗j = 2
1
β k/c}, we then know V ′ ̸= /0.
And for i ∈U ′, we know a∗il = 0 ∀l ∈U ′ according to Lemma 2.3, since
hx(a∗il,a
∗
li)x
∗
l < k/c (2.50)
and ∑l∈V ′ a∗il = (yˆ− x∗i )c/k from Lemma 2.2.
For j ∈V ′, we need a∗jl = 0 ∀l ∈U ′ according to Lemma 2.3, since
hx(a∗jl,a
∗
l j)x
∗
l < k/c (2.51)
and ∑l∈B′ a∗jl = (yˆ− (1/2)
1
β ∑i∈A′ a∗i jx∗i )−2
1
β −∑l∈B′ a∗l j from Lemma 2.2.
This is the (b) kind of characterization in the Lemma.
We have done an exhaustive analysis on Nash equilibrium for the case when yˆ≥ 2 1β k/c,
and can see that it can only be the two kinds of characterization.
First we show that there exist a Nash equilibrium s∗ that satisfies conditions in (a) of
Lemma ??. Let s∗ be a strategy profile where N = {m,U} and:
• x∗m = yˆ; x∗i = 0 ∀i ∈U
• a∗mi = 0 ∀i ∈U
• ∀i ∈U : a∗il = 0 ∀l ̸= m; a∗im = 2
1
β zˆ/yˆ where f ′(zˆ) = 2
1
β k/yˆ
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We can see that s∗ belong to the set of strategy profiles characterized by (a) of Lemma
?? when V = /0. We can easily verify that this is a Nash equilibrium by showing that all
players are best responding. For m, his best response is to exert yˆ effort and issue links to no
one. For ∀i ∈U , he is best responding by getting all information from m. And from the KKT
condtion, the optimal investment level will be a∗im = 2
1
β zˆ/yˆ where f ′(zˆ) = 2
1
β k/yˆ. So s∗ is a
Nash equilibrim.
Now we show all strategy profile s∗ characterized by (b) of Lemma 2.4 are Nash
equilibrium. We can verify this by showing that all players are best responding in s∗. For
∀i ∈U ′, we can see that i is indifferent between exerting effort and unilaterally issuing links
to players in set V ′. And there are no better options for i. So s∗i ∈ BRi(s∗−i). Similarily, for
j ∈V ′, we can see that j is indifferent between exerting effort and unilaterally issuing links to
players in set V ′. And there are no better options for j. So s∗j ∈ BR j(s∗− j). Thus s∗ is a Nash
equilibrim.
Proof for Proposition 2.6
Follow our equilibrium characterization, we can see that DS and DR are less than one
when β < ln(2)ln(cyˆ/k) and are equal to one when β ≥
ln(2)
ln(cyˆ/k) . So we only need to show how DS
and DR change with β when β < ln(2)ln(cyˆ/k) in the proof.
First we show that when β < ln(2)ln(cyˆ/k) and yˆ > 2k/c, then:
x∗in f
β
1−β + yˆ
β
1−β = 2
1
1−β (k/c)
β
1−β (2.52)
We know that when β < ln(2)ln(cyˆ/k) and yˆ > 2k/c, in equilibrium we have:
• If i ∈ NI: x∗i = yˆ
• If i ∈ NR: x∗i = 2k/c
• If i ∈ NB: x∗i = x1 or x∗i = x2, where 0 < x1 < yˆ, 0 < x2 < yˆ, x1 ̸= x2, and:
x1
β
1−β + x2
β
1−β = 2
1
1−β (k/c)
β
1−β (2.53)
Since yˆ > 2k/c, we know x∗in f ̸= yˆ, and 2k/c solves equation (2.53) at 0 < x1 = x2 < yˆ,
so we have x∗in f = min{infx1, infx2}. As x1 and x2 is symmetric in equation (2.53), we have
x∗in f = infx1 = infx2
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Returning to equation (2.53), take k, c as constants, we can see x1 is determined by x2
and β , so let x1 = φ(x2,β ). With Implicit Function Theorem we can get:
dx1
dx2
=−(x2/x1)
2β−1
1−β < 0 (2.54)
Hence we have:
(infx1)
β
1−β +(supx2)
β
1−β = 2
1
1−β (k/c)
β
1−β (2.55)
And since x∗in f = infx1 and supx2 = yˆ, we have:
x∗in f
β
1−β + yˆ
β
1−β = 2
1
1−β (k/c)
β
1−β (2.56)
So we have x∗in f = φ(yˆ,β ), we now show x
∗
in f is decreasing in β .
From equation (2.54), we can see that there is a negative relationship between x1 and x2,
we can also check how fast x1 decrease with x2:
d dx1dx2
dβ
=−(x2/x1)
2β−1
1−β 1
(1−β )2 ln
x2
x1
(2.57)
which is negative when x1 < x2. Since when x2 = 2k/c, we have x1 = x2, so
d dx1dx2
dβ is negative
when x2 > 2k/c. Hence we know that for a greater β , x1 is decreasing at a faster rate as x2
increases when x2 > 2k/c. This indicates that if β1 > β2, we have:
φ(yˆ,β1)−φ(2k/c,β1)< φ(yˆ,β2)−φ(2k/c,β2) (2.58)
Since φ(2k/c,β1) = φ(2k/c,β2) = 2k/c, we have:
φ(yˆ,β1)< φ(yˆ,β2) (2.59)
for β1 > β2, i.e. x∗in f is smaller when β is greater.
First we show dDSdβ > 0 when β <
ln(2)
ln(cyˆ/k) . We have:
DS = sup
s∗∈S∗
max
i, j∈N
| x
∗
i − x∗j
x∗i + x∗j
|
= sup
s∗∈S∗
maxi∈N x∗i −mini∈N x∗i
maxi∈N x∗i +mini∈N x∗i
=
yˆ− x∗in f
yˆ+ x∗in f
(2.60)
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since x∗i > 0 for all i ∈ N and s∗ ∈ S∗.
We know x∗in f > 0 and we have shown that
dx∗in f
dβ < 0 when β <
ln(2)
ln(cyˆ/k) , so we get:
dDS
dβ
=
dDS
dx∗in f
dx∗in f
dβ
=− 2yˆ
(yˆ+ x∗in f )2
dx∗in f
dβ
> 0
(2.61)
Now we show dDRdβ > 0 when β <
ln(2)
ln(cyˆ/k) , and limβ→−∞
DR = 0. Since:
a∗i j/a
∗
ji = (x
∗
j/x
∗
i )
1
1−β (2.62)
We have:
DR = sup
s∗∈S∗
max
i, j∈N,g∗i j>0
| a
∗
i j−a∗ji
a∗i j +a∗ji
|
= sup
s∗∈S∗
max
i, j∈N,g∗i j>0
| (x
∗
j/x
∗
i )
1
1−β −1
(x∗j/x∗i )
1
1−β +1
|
= 1− 2
(yˆ/x∗in f )
1
1−β +1
(2.63)
since the player exerting most effort can always be connected to the player exerting least
effort. We already proved
d(yˆ/x∗in f )
dβ > 0 just now. Also we have yˆ/x
∗
in f > 1 and
d 11−β
dβ > 0,
hence we have dDRdβ > 0.
Moreover, we know lim
β→−∞
1
1−β = 0 and limβ→−∞
x∗in f > 0, so limβ→−∞
DR = 1−1 = 0.
Proof for Proposition 2.7
In Proposition 2.7, we categorize all equilibria into three kinds, and show how a player’s
utility is related to his effort level respectively. We now prove the results for the three
situations one by one.
First, if we exclude the case that β = ln(2)ln(cyˆ/k) , then we know from analysis in Section 3.3
that the resulting network can always consists of R and B components. When β < ln(2)ln(cyˆ/k) , the
equilibrium network may also encompass I components. When β = ln(2)ln(cyˆ/k) , the equilibrium
can consists of I,R,B and a particular kind of S components where players exerting 0 effort
get yˆ information. We can also show that all players in this kind of equilibrium will obtain
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exactly yˆ information. So the difference in utility results from different costs players need to
pay.
If i ∈ NI ∪NS, we can see that the aggregate cost player i needs to pay is cyˆ.
If i ∈ NR, we can view it as a special case of i ∈ NB with x∗i = 2k/c. So for i ∈ NR∪NB,
let x∗i = x1 hence all players connected to i exert effort level x2 where:
x1
β
1−β + x2
β
1−β = 2
1
1−β (k/c)
β
1−β
We can show that aggregate cost player i needs to pay in this case is:
ci = cx1+ k(
cxβ2
2k
)
1
1−β (yˆ− x1)
= cyˆ− [cyˆ− cx1− k(cx
β
2
2k
)
1
1−β (yˆ− x1)]
= cyˆ− (yˆ− x1)(c− k(cx
β
2
2k
)
1
1−β )
= cyˆ− (yˆ− x1)(c− k( c2k )
1
1−β (2
1
1−β (
k
c
)
1
1−β − x
β
1−β
1 ))
= cyˆ− (yˆ− x1)(c− c+ k( c2k )
1
1−β x
β
1−β
1 )
= cyˆ− (yˆ− x1)k( c2k )
1
1−β x
β
1−β
1
< cyˆ
(2.64)
We can differenciate the cost ci with xi = x1, and get:
dci
dx1
=−k( c
2k
)
1
1−β [−x
β
1−β
1 +(yˆ− x1)
β
1−β x
2β−1
1−β
1 ]
=−k( c
2k
)
1
1−β [
yˆ− x1
x1
β
1−β −1]
(2.65)
And we can see when β ≤ 0, dcidx1 is positive for all x1 ∈ (0, yˆ), so utility is always decreasing
in effort level and the statement is true for β ≤ 0. When 0 < β < 1, dcidx1 is negative when
x1 < β yˆ and positive when x1 > β yˆ. So utility is decreasing in effort level when β ≤ 0
and when xi exceeds β yˆ when 0 < β < 1, and increasing in effort level when it is less than
β yˆ when 0 < β < 1, so the statement is true for 0 < β < 1. This is the proof for the first
statement in Proposition 2.7.
For the second statement in Proposition 2.7, from analysis in Section 3.3, we know the
kind of equilibrium we are looking at are the (b) kind of equilibrium when β = 1 and (b)
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kind of equilibrium when β > 1. For both cases, we can see that players can be seperated
into two groups, U ′ = {i ∈ N | x∗i < 2
1
β k/c} and V ′ = { j ∈ N | x∗j = 2
1
β k/c}. We can see
that all players will get yˆ information, so the difference in utility is related to different costs
players pay. For i ∈U ′, we have:
ci = cxi+ k(yˆ− xi)c/k
= cyˆ
(2.66)
For j ∈V ′, we have:
c j = c2
1
β k/c+ k[(yˆ− (1/2) 1β ∑
i∈U ′
a∗i jx
∗
i )c/k−2
1
β − ∑
l∈V ′
a∗l j]
= cyˆ− c(1/2) 1β ∑
i∈U ′
a∗i jx
∗
i − k ∑
l∈V ′
a∗l j
≤ cyˆ
(2.67)
And we know ∑ j∈V ′ a∗l j > 0 so there must exist a j ∈ V ′ such that ∑l∈V ′ a∗l j > 0. Hence
inequality (2.67) must be strict for some j ∈ V ′. We have shown the second statement of
Proposition 2.7 now.
For the third statement in Proposition 2.7, based on the analysis from Section 3, we
know the kind of equilibrium that satisfies the description are unique S component when
ln(2)
ln(cyˆ/k) < β < 1 and (b) kind of equilibrium when β = 1 and β > 1.
For the first two cases, player m gets information at cost c, other players get information
at cost 2
1
β k/yˆ < c, so other players are better off.
For the last case, player m gets information at cost c, player i ∈ A get information at cost
2
1
β k/x∗m < c, and player j ∈ B gets information at cost c but receives some free information
from player m, so m is worst off.
So player m is always worst off. We have shown the third statement of Proposition 2.7
now.
Appendix 2.B Nash Equilibrium When Link Investments
are Perfect Substitutes
We quickly examine the case when β = 1 so that ai j and a ji are perfect substitutes.
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(a) (b)
Figure 2.6 Examples of Nash equilibrium when β = 1, yˆ≥ 2k/c
Lemma 2.4. When β = 1, if yˆ < 2k/c, then there is a unique Nash equilibrium s∗ where
a∗i j = 0 ∀i, j ∈ N, and x∗i = yˆ ∀i ∈ N. If yˆ≥ 2k/c, then s∗ is an equilibrium if and only if it
belongs to one of the following:
(a) N = {m,U} where m /∈U and:
• x∗m = yˆ, and x∗i = 0 ∀i ∈U
• a∗mi = 0 ∀i ̸= m
• ∀i ∈U: a∗i j = 0 ∀ j ̸= m, and a∗im = 2zˆ/yˆ where f ′(zˆ) = 2k/yˆ ∀i ∈U
(b) N = {U ′,V ′} with V ′ ̸= /0, and:
• x∗i < 2k/c ∀i ∈U ′, and x∗j = 2k/c ∀ j ∈V ′
• ∀i ∈U ′: a∗i j > 0 only if j ∈V ′, and ∑a∗i j = (yˆ− x∗i )c/k
• ∀ j ∈V ′: a∗jl > 0 only if l ∈V ′, and ∑a∗jl = (yˆ− 12 ∑i∈U ′ a∗i jx∗i )c/k−2−∑l∈V ′ a∗l j
Figure 2.6 gives two examples of Nash equilibrium that match the description of (a) and
(b) in Lemma 2.4 respectively. The equilibrium characterization when β = 1 differs from
that for the case when β > 1 in two ways. First, in the (a) kinds of equilibrium network, the
possibility of V group is eliminated. Second, in the (b) kind of characterization, links can
now be sponsored bilaterally between core players when β = 1.
Proof for Lemma 2.4:
When β = 1 we know that still the KKT conditions are necessary and sufficient for
optimization, so it is easy to show that s∗ characterized in Lemma 2.4 is Nash equilibrium.
Here we focus on showing that all Nash equilibria have been characterized by conditions in
Lemma 2.4.
When yˆ < 2k/c, we need to show that there does not exist an equililbrium s′ ̸= s∗.
Suppose there is such a s′ then we have x′i ̸= yˆ or there exists i, j ∈ N such that a′i j > 0.
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If x′i ̸= yˆ, from Lemma 2.2 we know that it must be ∑ j ̸=i h(a′i j,a′ji)> 0, indicating there
exists a′i j > 0. So for s′ ̸= s∗ to be an equilibrium, there exists i, j ∈ N such that a′i j > 0.
When yˆ < 2k/c, from Lemma 2.2 we know:
x′j ≤ yˆ < 2k/c (2.68)
and we know that hx(a′i j,a′ji)x′j = 1/2 for all a′i j ≥ 0, a′ji ≥ 0, so
hx(a′i j,a
′
ji)x
′
j =
1
2
x′j < k/c (2.69)
violating the condition for a′i j > 0 in Lemma 2.3. A contradiction.
So when yˆ < 2k/c, the unique equilibrium is s∗ where a∗i j = 0 for all i, j ∈ N, and x∗i = yˆ
for all i ∈ N.
When yˆ≥ 2k/c, suppose there is a strategy profile s′ that is a Nash equilibrium is neither
characterized by (a) nor (b).
If there exist m ∈ N such that x′m > 2k/c, then ∀i ̸= m we have x′i = 0, because it’s
always true that:
hx(a′im,a
′
mi)x
′
m > (1/2)2k/c = k/c (2.70)
violating the condition for x′i > 0 in Lemma 2.3.
From Lemma 2.2, we know that x′m = yˆ. Also we know a′mi = 0 ∀i ̸= m, as linking to a
player other than m incurs no benefit but cost. Then from Lemma 2.2 we know that for all
i ̸= m: x′i+∑l ̸=i h(a′il,a′li)a′l ≥ yˆ. But as x′i = 0, x′l = 0 ∀l ̸= m and a′mi = 0, we can infer that
a′im > 0. And with the KKT condition, we know that when a′im > 0, we have:
f ′(x′i+∑
l ̸=i
h(a′il,a
′
li)x
′
l)hx(a
′
im,a
′
mi)x
′
m = k (2.71)
so a′im = 2zˆ/yˆ where f ′(zˆ) = 2k/yˆ. We can see that s′ is the same as s∗ characterized in (a) of
Lemma 2.4.
If x′i ≤ 2k/c ∀i ∈ N. First we show that there exists j ∈ N such that x′j = 2k/c. If not,
we have x′j < 2k/c ∀ j ∈ N, then for all i ̸= j we have:
hx(a′i j,a
′
ji)x
′
j < k/c (2.72)
and according to Lemma 2.3, we have a′i j = 0 ∀ j ̸= i. Then x′i+h(a′i j,a′ji)x′j = x′i < 2k/c≤ yˆ,
violating Lemma 2.2. So we know there exists j ∈ N such that x′j = 2
1
β k/c.
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Let U ′ = {i ∈ N | x′i < 2k/c} and V ′ = { j ∈ N | x′j = 2k/c}, we then know V ′ ̸= /0. And
for i ∈U ′, we know a′il = 0 ∀l ∈U ′ according to Lemma 2.3, since:
hx(a′il,a
′
li)x
′
l < k/c (2.73)
and ∑l∈B′ a′il = (yˆ− x′i)c/k from Lemma 2.2.
For j ∈V ′, we need a′jl = 0 ∀l ∈U ′ according to Lemma 2.3, since:
hx(a′jl,a
′
l j)x
′
l < k/c (2.74)
and ∑l∈V ′ a′jl = (yˆ− (1/)2
1
β ∑i∈V ′ a′i jx′i)−∑l∈B′ a′l j from Lemma 2.2
We can see that s′ is the same as s∗ characterized in (b) of Lemma 2.4.
We have done an exhaustive analysis on Nash equilibrium for the case when yˆ≥ 2k/c,
and can see that it leads to the two kinds of characterization in Lemma 2.4.
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Chapter 3
A Simple Model of the Power Elite
3.1 Introduction
In The Republic, the choice of those who will rule and the relation between the rulers and
the ruled is a central question (Plato, 1992). Closer to our times, in the 19th century, the Italian
school of sociology proposed a theory of elites defined in terms of the membership of the top
echelons of different – government and non-government – organizations. Building on this
tradition, in his well-known study of mid-twentieth-century American society, Wright Mills
(1956) argued that the power to make major decisions was highly concentrated: a very small
group of individuals moved between the top levels of the Federal government, a few hundred
largest corporations, and the military. He referred to these individuals as the The Power
Elite. Similar claims have been made about the concentration of power and influence in other
societies.1
In a more empirical spirit, a number of scholars have studied the relations between
the boards of directors of firms (banks and corporations). If a director sits on multiple
boards, the different boards are ‘linked’ to each other. Studies have documented the role of
prominent individuals who hold multiple directorships in creating interlocking boards (Baker
et al., 2001, Useem, 1984, Kogut, 2012). While there is broad agreement on these empirical
patterns, opinion is divided on the impact of such small worlds. On the one hand, there is the
view that such cohesion facilitates the spread of information and best practices of cooperative
behaviour. On the other hand, others have argued that such personal connections create and
sustain major lobbies and perpetuate inequality.2
0 This chapter is co-authored with Prof Sanjeev Goyal and Dr Marcin Dziubinski.
1 For an overview of the theory of elites, see Bottomore (1993), and for a critique of theories of elite power
and control, see Dahl (1958).
2 For an overview of the issues, see Granovetter (2017).
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We are led to ask: what are the determinants of exclusive structures and the emergence
of dominant groups? Are such structures socially desirable?
To explore these questions, we propose a model of club memberships. Individuals seek
to belong to clubs. The attractiveness of clubs depends on their productivity, which is a
function of their membership and their connections with other clubs. Clubs seek to admit
members who enhance their appeal. More specifically, we assume that a link between two
clubs is formed when they share common members and the strength of the link is rising in
the membership overlap. The productivity of a club is increasing in its membership size
and its aggregate link strength with other clubs. In the tradition of the theory of clubs, we
assume that there is congestion in the provision of club services: this is captured in a capacity
constraint for every club. As individuals have budget and time constraints we also assume
that there is a maximum number of clubs they can join.
The model has two types of active agents: individuals seeking to join clubs and club
owners. We study efficient and stable club memberships. A club membership profile is
efficient if it maximizes the utility of individuals. It is stable if no individual wishes to quit
clubs, no club wishes to expel any of its members, and there is no individual-club pair that
can jointly deviate and do better.
Our first result provides a characterization of efficient club memberships. It is useful to
separate the result in two parts, one, where the membership availability exceeds club capacity
and two, where the converse holds. We will focus on the former case as it probably is the
more natural setting. Efficiency dictates that some individuals join all the clubs they can
while others join no clubs at all. This concentration of membership is a consequence of the
benefit a club receives by admitting someone who is a member of other clubs. Turning to
the pattern of ties between clubs, the outcome relies on whether club productivity returns
in overlapping common members are convex (marginal returns to membership overlap are
increasing) or concave (marginal returns to membership overlap are decreasing). When the
returns are convex, efficiency requires that clubs have maximal overlap: this in turn means
that strongly connected clubs may get partitioned into distinct cliques. By contrast, when
returns from overlapping members are concave the network of clubs will be evenly connected
with relatively weaker links between clubs.
Our second result provides a characterization of stable club memberships. We will
focus again on the case where membership availability exceeds club capacity. A stable club
membership structure features the separation of most individuals into two distinct groups:
either they join multiple most productive clubs or they are entirely excluded from all clubs.
Convex/concave productivity returns from overlapping members affect the stable network of
clubs similarly as they work for efficiency.
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To summarize, in the natural setting where individual availability is larger than club
capacity, both efficiency and stability dictate that a subset of individuals fully exhaust their
club membership capacity while all others are entirely excluded from all membership. Thus
efficiency and stability both imply significant payoff inequality among otherwise symmetric
individuals.
The returns from overlapping members is key to understanding our model: in the
baseline setting with zero spillovers across clubs, efficiency and stability have very different
implications: in a setting where the number of individuals exceeds club capacity, a club
membership profile in which a large number of individuals are members of one club each
and there are no links between clubs is both efficient and stable.
Our model draws on the theory of clubs and the theory of networks to explain phenomena
such as power elites and interlocking boards of directors. Specifically, we combine the ideas
of congestion and capacity constraints from club theory (Buchanan, 1965, Cornes, 1996,
Demange and Wooders, 2005) with the ideas of multiple memberships and returns from links
from the theory of networks (Bala and Goyal, 2000, Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996, Bloch
and Dutta, 2012). Our analysis identifies returns from club connections and the key role
of bridging individuals as decisive factors in leading to exclusivity in memberships. Over
and above this, we show that changes in marginal returns form the strength of connections
– convex vs concave – determines whether the network of clubs is ‘cliquish’ (and possibly
disjoint) or sparse and connected.
In a recent paper, Fershtman and Persitz (2018) propose a model of clubs and networks.
At a general level, there are similarities – both papers study a club memberships model – but
the motivation of the two papers is different and as a result, the models and main insights
are very different. Their interest is in studying social networks among individuals, while
our interest is in understanding the forces that lead to power elites. In their model, a link
between two individuals arises out of common membership of a club and its strength is
inversely related to the size of the club. They allow for benefits that flow through paths in
the network of individuals. By contrast, in our model, individuals care about returns from a
club: these returns depend on the size of the club and its connection with other clubs. These
differences in modelling, in turn, lead to very different results. Their primary insight is that
there is a trade-off between the size of clubs, the depreciation of indirect connections and the
membership fee. By contrast, our main result is about how positive returns from overlapping
membership leads to the partition of individuals into an excluded set and a group of insiders.
And we derive a mapping between the curvature of these returns and the architecture of the
club networks. These results have no parallel in their work.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 specifies the model. We explain
our main results in Section 3 and we examine extensions of our model in Section 4. All
proofs can be found in the Appendix.
3.2 The Model
There is a set of individuals I = {i1, ..., in} and a set of clubs C = {c1, ...,cm}. Use i to
denote a typical individual and c to denote a typical club. Individuals join clubs to become
members. The club membership structure is represented by a matrix a = (aic)i∈I,c∈C where
aic ∈ {0,1} shows whether individual i is a member of club c. Let A be the set of feasible
club membership structures, we know A⊂ {0,1}n×m.
We define a few notions based on a club membership structure a.
The degree of individual i given a club membership structure a measures the number of
clubs individual i joins:
di(a) = ∑
c∈C
aic
The membership size of club c given a club membership structure a captures the number
of individuals that join c:
sc(a) =∑
i∈I
aic
The membership overlap between a club c and a club c′ given a club membership
structure a represents the number of individuals that join both c and c′:
occ′(a) =∑
i∈I
aicaic′
We make the following assumptions based on a club membership structure a.
Assumption 1. A link between two clubs c and c′ is created if they have membership overlap,
and the link strength is non-decreasing in the membership overlap. We assume a link
formation function gcc′ : A 7→ R for club c and c′ that takes the form:
gcc′(a) = h(occ′(a)) (3.1)
where function h(x) satisfies h(0) = 0 and h′(x)≥ 0.
Assumption 2. A club provides goods and services and its productivity depends on its
membership size and its aggregate link strength with other clubs. We assume a production
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function πc : A 7→ R for club c that takes the form:
πc(a) = F(sc(a))+ ∑
c′ ̸=c
gcc′(a) (3.2)
where for function F(x), we assume that F(0) = 0 and that there is a positive integer S such
that the marginal benefit of membership size on productivity ∆F(x) = F(x+ 1)−F(x) is
positive when x ≤ S−1 and negative when x ≥ S, so S is the membership size that would
maximize the productivity of a club if the aggregate link strength factor is not present. The
assumption that club productivity is first rising and then decreasing in membership size is
standard in club theory literature.
Note that under Assumption 2, admitting an individual as a new member affects the
productivity of a club in two ways. First, the membership size grows. Second, depending on
what other clubs the individual joins, the club creates or strengthens links with other clubs.
We call the latter effect connection externality.
Assumption 3. An individual enjoys benefits from clubs she joins and pays costs for club
memberships. We assume a utility function ui : A 7→ R for individual i that takes the form:
ui(a) = ∑
c∈C
aicπc(a)−κ(di(a)) (3.3)
where for function κ(x), we assume that κ(0) = 0 and that the marginal club membership
cost ∆κ(x) = κ(x+1)−κ(x) is non-negative and non-decreasing in x.
A club membership model can be represented by a tuple (I,C,A,g,π,u) where I and C
specifies the individuals and clubs in the model respectively, A specifies the set of feasible
club membership structures, g = (gcc′)c,c′∈C summarizes the link formation functions for
pairs of clubs, π = (πc)c∈C summarizes the production functions for clubs, and u = (ui)i∈I
summarizes the utility functions for individuals.
We define the efficient club membership structure of a club membership model as a club
membership structure a that maximizes the aggregate utility of individuals. Formally,
Definition 3.1. A club membership structure a ∈ A is efficient if there is no club membership
structure a′ ∈ A such that
∑
i∈I
ui(a′)>∑
i∈I
ui(a)
We define the stable club membership structure of a club membership model as a club
membership structure a that satisfies (i) no individual i can increase her utility by quitting any
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clubs she is currently in, (ii) no club c can enhance its productivity by exiling any members
it currently has, and (iii) no pair of individual i and club c can both benefit from a joint
deviation where i is allowed to quit any clubs she is in, c is allowed to exile any members it
has and i can join c. Formally,
Definition 3.2. A club membership structure a ∈ A is stable if
(i) ∀i ∈ I: there is no a′ ∈ A with
a′ic ≤ aic ∀c ∈C
a′i′c = ai′c ∀i′ ̸= i,c ∈C
such that
ui(a′)> ui(a)
(ii) ∀c ∈C: there is no a′ ∈ A with
a′ic ≤ aic ∀i ∈ I
a′ic′ = aic′ ∀c′ ̸= c, i ∈ I
such that
πc(a′)> πc(a)
(iii) ∀(i,c) ∈ I×C: there is no a′ ∈ A with
a′ic′ ≤ aic′ ∀c′ ̸= c
a′i′c ≤ ai′c ∀i′ ̸= i
a′i′c′ = ai′c′ ∀i′ ̸= i,c′ ̸= c
such that
ui(a′)> ui(a)
πc(a′)> πc(a)
We now give a few specifications for a club membership model.
The capacity constraints model refers to a club membership model (I,C,A,g,π,u)
where A = {0,1}n×m, Assumptions 2 and 3 are satisfied, and
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(i)
F(x) =
 f (x) when x≤ Sf (S)−M1(x−S) when x > S
where f (0) = 0, f ′(x)> 0, 1 < S < n, and M1 is a number that is sufficiently large such that
when a club has at least S members, any rise in its membership size reduces its productivity
sufficiently so that no club should admit more than S members, and
(ii)
κ(x) =
0 when x≤ DM2(x−D) when x > D
where 1 < D < m and M2 is a number sufficiently large such that when an individual joins
at least D clubs, any rise in her degree reduces her utility sufficiently so that no individual
should join more than D clubs.
By focusing on the capacity constraints model, we essentially impose a constraint S
on the number of members a club can admit and a constraint D on the number of clubs an
individual can join. Note that since there are n individuals in the model, nD measures the
aggregate membership availability (from the side of individuals), and since there are m clubs
in the model, mS measures the aggregate club capacity (from the side of clubs).
The model with constant returns from membership overlap is one in which Assump-
tion 1 is satisfied and h′(x) = α with α > 0.
The model with zero returns from membership overlap is one in which Assumption 1
is satisfied and h′(x) = 0. This is equivalent to assuming gcc′(a) = 0 for all c,c′ ∈C and for
all a ∈ A and hence is a model where there is no connection externality.
In our main results section, we characterize the efficient and the stable club membership
structures for the capacity constraints model with constant returns from membership overlap
and with zero returns from membership overlap respectively. By comparing the results under
the two settings, we explore the role of connection externality in a club membership structure.
After that, we extend our analysis to richer setups. First, instead of assuming constant or
zero returns from membership overlap, we discuss how increasing returns from membership
overlap and decreasing returns from membership overlap would affect club membership
structures. Second, moving away from the capacity constraints model, we investigate a
smooth club membership model where individuals and clubs can make flexible decisions on
how many clubs to join and how many members to admit.
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3.3 Main Results
In this section, we first characterize the efficient and the stable club membership struc-
tures for the capacity constraints model with constant returns from membership overlap.
We show that when aggregate membership availability exceeds aggregate club capacity
(nD > mS), a club membership structure is efficient when all clubs are full with S members
and all but one individuals are separated into two groups, those from one join D clubs while
those from another join no clubs.3 And when aggregate club capacity exceeds aggregate
membership availability (mS > nD), a club membership structure is efficient when all individ-
uals are fully affiliated with D clubs and all but one clubs are separated into two groups, those
from one admit S members while those from another admit no clubs.4 So, in an efficient club
membership structure, club memberships concentrate either in a group of individuals or in a
group of clubs.
For stability, we have a similar finding. We partition individuals into four groups based
on their degree and the productivity of the clubs they join, and we partition clubs into three
groups based on their productivity which is determined by their membership size and the
degree of their members. We find that in a stable club membership structure, most individuals
belong either to the first individual group where they join D most productive clubs or to the
last individual group where they join no clubs, and most clubs belong either to the first club
group where they admit S highest-degree members or to the last club group where they admit
no members. Since the individuals and clubs in the first group obtain the highest possible
utility and productivity in the model while individuals and clubs in the last group obtain zero
utility and productivity, there can be large welfare gaps in a stable club membership structure.
We then characterize the efficient and the stable club membership structures for the
capacity constraints model with zero returns from membership overlap. We show that
any club membership structure that is efficient or stable under the constant returns from
membership overlap assumption is also efficient or stable under the zero returns from
membership overlap assumption, but not vice versa. In particular, consider the case when
aggregate membership availability exceeds aggregate club capacity, if there is zero returns
from membership overlap, then a club membership structure where all clubs are full and club
memberships are equally allocated to all individuals is both efficient and stable. This even
structure is not efficient nor stable when there is constant returns from membership overlap.
So, our finding that efficiency and stability imply concentrated club memberships and
welfare gaps is due to the connection externality.
We now formally state our results.
3 There can be one individual who joins some but less than D clubs due to the discrete nature of our model.
4 Again, there can be one club that admits some but less than S members due to the discreteness of our set-up.
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We use the standard notation of ⌊xy⌋ to represent the floor of x divided by y and the
notation of x mod y to represent the reminder of x divided by y.
Proposition 3.1. Consider the capacity constraint model with constant returns from mem-
bership overlap. If nD≥ mS, then a club membership structure a ∈ A is efficient if and only
if all clubs have S members, and there are ⌊mSD ⌋ individuals that join D clubs, one individual
that joins (mS) mod D clubs, and the remaining individuals join no clubs. If mS≥ nD, then
a club membership structure a ∈ A is efficient if and only if all individuals join D clubs, and
there are ⌊nDS ⌋ clubs that admit D members, one club that admits (nD) mod S members, and
the remaining clubs admit no members.
Proposition 3.1 tells us that when nD ≥ mS, we maximize aggregate utility by fully
filling all clubs and concentrating club memberships to a group of individuals, and when
mS ≥ nD, we maximize aggregate utility by exhausting membership availability of all
individuals and concentrating club memberships to a group of clubs.
The intuition behind Proposition 3.1 is simple. First, we know that within the capacity
constraints, the productivity of a club always rises with its membership size and the utility of
an individual always rises with its degree, so an efficient club membership structure must
use up all club capacity by filling all clubs with S members when nD≥ mS and use up all
membership availability by letting all individuals join D clubs when mS ≥ nD. The next
question is what individuals should clubs admit and what clubs should individuals join. With
constant returns from membership overlap, if an individual joins more clubs, she creates
greater membership overlap and raises the productivity of clubs and hence the utility of
individuals more. Therefore, efficiency is achieved when club memberships concentrate on a
group of individuals so that they have large degrees. Given that clubs produce local public
goods whose value and range of beneficiary both rise with its membership size, efficiency is
achieved when club memberships concentrate on a group of clubs so that they have large
membership size.
We depict three efficient structures when nD ≥ mS in Example 3.1 and one efficient
structure when mS≥ nD in Example 3.2.
Example 3.1. Consider the capacity constraints model with 12 individuals and 6 clubs
where individuals can join up to 3 clubs and clubs can admit up to 4 members (n = 12,
D = 3, m = 6 and S = 4). Assume constant returns from membership overlap, the three club
membership structures depicted in Figure 3.1 are all efficient:
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Figure 3.1 Three efficient club membership structures with constant
returns from membership overlap (nD≥ mS)
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The three graphs in Figure 3.1 can be read in the following way. On the left-hand side
of each graph, we have the 12 individuals. Each individual has three nodes representing her
membership availability. If the odd is solid, it indicates a club membership for the individual.
If the node is empty, it indicates an unused membership availability. On the right-hand side
of the graph, we have the 6 clubs. Each club has four nodes representing its club capacity.
Each solid node with the name of an individual indicates that the club admits that individual
and each empty node (which we do not see in this example) indicates an unused club capacity.
There are links between clubs, the thickness of which captures the link strength induced by
the club membership structure.
In all three club membership structures in Figure 3.1, we can see all clubs are full
with 4 members, and 8 out of the 12 individuals use up their membership availability while
the other 4 individuals join no clubs. The difference between the three club membership
structures lies in their induced club network. The middle structure leads to a club network
with strongly connected cliques, the bottom structure leads to a club network with weakly
connected complete graph, and the top structure leads to something in between. We will
discuss this difference in our extension section.
Example 3.2. Consider the capacity constraints model with 5 individuals and 6 clubs where
individuals can join up to 3 clubs and clubs can admit up to 4 members (n = 5, D = 3,
m = 6 and S = 4). Assume constant returns from membership overlap, the club membership
structure depicted in Figure 3.2 is efficient:
In this club membership structure, we can see all individuals are fully affiliated with 3
club memberships, the first 3 clubs are full with 4 members, club c4 has 3 members, and the
last 2 clubs have no members. Club memberships are concentrated to clubs c1 to c4.
For the stability characterization when there is constant returns from membership
overlap, we first derive the highest productivity a club can achieve in the model and define
a way to partition individuals and clubs based on it. We then characterize the stable club
membership structure with that partition.
Let π∗ be the highest productivity a club can achieve. In the capacity constraint model
with constant returns from membership overlap, the productivity of a club c under a club
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Figure 3.2 An efficient club membership structures with constant
returns from membership overlap and (mS≥ nD)
membership structure a is
πc(a) =F(sc(a))+ ∑
c′ ̸=c
gcc′(a)
=α ∑
c′ ̸=c
∑
i∈I
aicaic′+F(sc(a))
=

α ∑
i∈I
aic(di(a)−1)+ f (sc(a)) when sc(a)≤ S
α ∑
i∈I
aic(di(a)−1)+ f (S)−M1(sc(a)−S) when sc(a)> S
(3.4)
From expression (3.4), it is easy to see that here
π∗ = αS(D−1)+ f (S)
and a club achieves π∗ when it admits S members, all of whom join D clubs.
We define the following individual degree-club productivity partition for a club mem-
bership structure a. Individuals are categorized into four groups, where the first group I1(a)
consists of individuals who join D clubs and all clubs they join achieve productivity π∗, the
second group I2(a) consists of individuals who join D clubs and the productivity of some
clubs they join is less than π∗, the third group I3(a) consists of individuals who join some
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but less than D clubs, and the fourth group I4(a) consists of individuals who join no clubs:
I1(a) = {i ∈ I : di(a) = D and ∀c ∈C with aic = 1,πc(a) = π∗}
I2(a) = {i ∈ I : di(a) = D and ∃c ∈C with aic = 1 s.t. πc(a)< π∗}
I3(a) = {i ∈ I : 0 < di(a)< D}
I4(a) = {i ∈ I : di(a) = 0}
Observe that in a club membership structure a where all individuals join at most D
clubs, the set of individuals I can be partitioned into the four groups I1(a), I2(a), I3(a), and
I4(a). Also note that if i ∈ I1(a), then ui(a) = Dπ∗ which is the highest utility an individual
can obtain. And if i ∈ I4(a), then ui(a) = 0.
Clubs are categorized into three groups, where the first group C1(a) consists of clubs
with productivity π∗, the second group C2(a) consists of clubs with positive productivity that
is less than π∗, and the third group C3(a) consists of clubs with zero productivity:
C1(a) = {c ∈C : πc(a) = π∗}
C2(a) = {c ∈C : 1 < πc(a)< π∗}
C3(a) = {c ∈C : πc(a) = 0}
Observe that in a club membership structure a where all clubs admits at most S members,
the set of clubs C can be partitioned into the three groups C1(a), C2(a), and C3(a).
By definition of the individual degree-club productivity partition, we can see if an
individual is in I1(a), she joins D clubs in C1(a); if a club is in C1(a), it admits S members
that belong to I1(a) or I2(a); and if a club is in C3(a), it admits no members.
We are now ready to characterize the stable club membership structures.
Proposition 3.2. Consider the capacity constraints model with constant returns from mem-
bership overlap, a club membership structure a ∈ A is stable if and only if:
(i) ∀i ∈ I,c ∈C: di(a)≤ D, sc(a)≤ S, and (di(a)−D)(sc(a)−S) = 0,
(ii) ∀i ∈ I2(a),c,c′ ∈C2(a): if aic > aic′ , then πc(a)> πc′(a),
(iii) ∀i, i′ ∈ I3(a): if di(a)≥ di′(a), then aic ≥ ai′c ∀c ∈C,
(iv) ∀c,c′ ∈C2(a): if πc(a)≥ πc′(a), then aic ≥ aic′ ∀i ∈ I2(a) and aic ≤ aic′ ∀i ∈ I3(a).
Proposition 3.2 tells us that a club membership structure is stable if and only if the
following conditions are satisfied. First, since we are considering the capacity constraint
model, all individuals join at most D clubs and all clubs admit at most S members. Also,
there cannot exist a pair of individual and club where the individual is not fully affiliated
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with D clubs and the club is not full with S members, because otherwise they would both
benefit if the individual joins the club. Then, we have some club membership requirements
for individuals and clubs that belong to different groups. By definition of the individual
degree-club productivity partition, we already know the club joining pattern of individuals
in I1(a) and I4(a) and the member admission pattern of clubs in C1(a) and C3(a). The
proposition specifies how individuals in I2(a) and I3(a) join clubs and how clubs in C2(a)
admit members in a stable club membership structure.
First, for any individual i in I2(a), we know she joins D clubs and some clubs she joins
do not achieve productivity π∗. So she must join some clubs from C2(a). Our proposition
says that the clubs i joins in C2(a) must be the most productive clubs in C2(a), because
otherwise i would want to join a club in C2(a) with higher productivity instead and the club
would also be willing to substitute another member with i given the high degree of i.
Second, for any two individuals i and i′ in I3(a), we know they join some but less than
D clubs. Our proposition says that if i joins at least as many clubs as i′, then i joins all the
clubs i′ is in. Suppose this is not the case and there is a club c that admits i′ but not i, then i
would want to join this club since she has not used up her membership availability, and c
would want to substitute i′ with i since i would have a higher degree than i′ with her new
membership in c and creates larger connection externality for c.
Finally, for any two clubs c and c′ in C2(a), since they do not achieve productivity π∗,
they do not have members from I1(a) and can only have members from I2(a) and I3(a). Our
proposition says that if c is at least as productive as c′, then c has all the members c′ has
from I2(a) and c′ has all the members c has from I3(a). The reason that c should have all
the members c′ has from I2(a) is that if not, the individual from I2(a) that is in c′ but not c
would want to quit c′ and join c which would have a higher productivity with her join. The
reason why c′ should have all the members c has from I3(a) is that individuals in I3(a) want
to join any clubs that are willing to admit then since they have not used up their membership
availability and that c must have a stricter selection criteria for members from I3(a) than c′
since c has more members from I2(a) and thus fewer spots for members from I3(a).
The above reasoning explains how we prove the necessity of the four conditions (i), (ii),
(iii), and (iv). We illustrate in the proof that the four conditions also guarantee a stable club
membership structure.
Example 3.3 depicts a stable club membership structure when there is constant returns
from membership overlap.
Example 3.3. Consider the same capacity constraints model as in Example 3.1 where there
are 12 individuals and 6 clubs where individuals can join up to 3 clubs and clubs can
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admit up to 4 members (n = 12, D = 3, m = 6 and S = 4). Assume constant returns from
membership overlap, the club membership structure depicted in Figure 3.3 is stable:
Figure 3.3 A stable club membership structure with constant returns
from membership overlap (nD≥ mS)
In this example, we have I1(a) = {i1, i2, i3, i4}, I2(a) = {i5, i6, i7}, I3(a) = {i8, i9},
I4(a) = {i10, i11, i12}, C1(a) = {c1,c2,c3,c4}, C2(a) = {c5,c6}, and C3(a) = /0.
An important implication of Proposition 3.2 is that we can derive lower bounds for the
size of the first and last individual group I1(a)∪ I4(a) and the size of the first and last club
group C1(a)∪C3(a) for a stable club membership structure a.
Corollary 3.1. Consider the capacity constraint model with constant returns from member-
ship overlap, if a club membership structure a ∈ A is stable, then
|I1(a)∪ I4(a)| ≥ n−2S+1
|C1(a)∪C3(a)| ≥ m−D
We derive the corollary by restricting the cardinality of I2(a), I3(a) and C2(a). First,
since all individuals in I2(a) join some clubs in C2(a) and the clubs they join always have
higher utility than the clubs they do not join according to condition (ii) of Proposition 3.2,
the most productive club in C2(a) admits all individuals in I2(a). This most productive club
cannot admit D members from I2(a) since it would achieve productivity π∗ and belong to
C1(a) if it does. So |I2(a)| ≤ S− 1. Second, we know from the definition of C1(a) and
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C3(a) that individuals in I3(a) can only join clubs in C2(a). According to condition (iv) of
Proposition 3.2, if we find the least productive club in C2(a), the set of its members from
I3(a) is a superset of members other clubs have from I3(a). Given the capacity constraint, we
know |I2(a)| ≤ S. Finally, we derive the upper bound for C2(a). When set I3(a) is not empty,
according to condition (i) of Proposition 3.2, all clubs in C2(a) have S members. Since
clubs in C2(a) do not achieve π∗, they must admit members from I3(a). Then, according to
condition (iii) of Proposition 3.2, the individual with highest degree in I3(a) joins all clubs in
C2(a), so C2(a)≤D−1. When set I3(a) is empty, all members clubs in C2(a) have are from
I2(a). According to condition (iv) of Proposition 3.2, a member the least productive club in
C2(a) has is also a member in other clubs in C2(a). Since an individual cannot join more
than D clubs, C2(a)≤ D. With the upper bound for I2(a), I3(a) and C2(a), it is obvious how
we arrive at the lower bound for |I1(a)∪ I4(a)| and |C1(a)∪C3(a)|.
We know that individuals from I1(a) join D clubs and earn highest utility possible in the
model while individuals from I4(a) join no clubs and earns zero utility and that clubs from
C1(a) admit S members and achieve highest utility possible in the model while clubs from
C3(a) admit no members and have zero productivity. So, in a large society where n >> 2S
and m >> D, the corollary tells us that individuals and clubs can be divided to two extreme
groups with distinct activeness and welfare level.
Now we turn to the model with zero returns from membership overlap. Proposition 3.3
characterizes the efficient club membership structure.
Proposition 3.3. Consider the capacity constraints model with zero returns from membership
overlap. If nD ≥ mS, then a club membership structure a ∈ A is efficient if and only if all
clubs have S members. If mS≥ nD, then a club membership structure a ∈ A is efficient if and
only if all individuals join D clubs, and there are ⌊nDS ⌋ clubs that admit D members, one club
that admits (nD) mod S members, and the remaining clubs admit no members.
Compare Proposition 3.3 with Proposition 3.1. We can see that when mS ≥ nD, the
efficiency characterization is the same under constant returns from membership overlap and
under zero returns from membership overlap. This is because the intuition we explained
for Proposition 3.1 that individuals should use up their membership availability and club
memberships should concentrate on a group of clubs since the productivity and the range of
beneficiary of a club both rise with its membership size still holds when there is zero returns
from membership overlap. However, when nD≥ mS, the condition for efficiency when there
is zero returns from membership overlap is weaker than the corresponding condition when
there is constant returns from membership overlap. This is because we still want to use
up club capacity but the force that drives clubs to admit high-degree members for greater
connection externality is absent.
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Moving to stability, our characterization for the model with zero returns from member-
ship overlap still builds upon the individual degree-club productivity partition. Note that
now for a club to achieve π∗, it only needs to admit S members. So if a club c is in C1(a), it
admits S members from I1(a), I2(a) or I3(a). This is a relaxation of our previous requirement
that a club in C1(a) should admit S members from I1(a) or I2(a) for the case when there is
constant returns from membership overlap.
Proposition 3.4 characterizes the stable club membership structures and further illustrates
that stability under zero returns from membership overlap is less demanding than stability
under constant returns from membership overlap.
Proposition 3.4. Consider the capacity constraints model with zero returns from membership
overlap, a club membership structure a ∈ A is stable if and only if:
(i) ∀i ∈ I,c ∈C: di(a)≤ D, sc(a)≤ S, and (di(a)−D)(sc(a)−S) = 0,
(ii) ∀i ∈ I2(a),c,c′ ∈C2(a): if aic > aic′ , then πc(a)> πc′(a).
Compare Proposition 3.4 with Proposition 3.2, we can see that the conditions for stability
when there is zero returns from membership overlap is a subset of the conditions for stability
when there is constant returns from membership overlap. So if a club membership structure
is stable under constant returns from membership overlap, it must also be stable under zero
returns from membership overlap.
We have shown that for both efficiency and stability, the model with zero returns from
membership overlap admits a wider range of club membership structures than the model
with constant returns from membership overlap. In fact, there can be club membership
structures that are very different from any efficient or stable club membership structure under
constant returns from membership overlap but are efficient and stable under zero returns
from membership overlap. We show this with Example 3.4.
Example 3.4. Consider the same capacity constraints model as in Example 3.1 where there
are 12 individuals and 6 clubs where individuals can join up to 3 clubs and clubs can admit
up to 4 members (n = 12, D = 3, m = 6 and S = 4). Assume zero returns from membership
overlap, the club membership structure depicted in Figure 3.4 is efficient and stable:
In this club membership structure, all clubs are full with 4 members. This is the same as
what we have in Example 3.1 and Example 3.3 where we demonstrate three efficient club
membership structures and one stable club membership structure when there is constant
returns from membership overlap. However, all club memberships are allocated equally to
all individuals and all individuals have the same utility. This departs from the exclusiveness
and the welfare gap we show for efficient and stability when there is constant returns from
membership overlap.
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Figure 3.4 An efficient and stable club membership structure with zero
returns from membership overlap and (nD≥ mD)
3.4 Extensions
3.4.1 Increasing/Decreasing Returns from Membership Overlap
Proposition 3.1-3.2 separates individuals into well connected and unconnected but are
relatively permissive in terms of club networks (see Figure 3.1-3.2). In this section, we show
with an example how the curvature of return from membership overlap would have prominent
effects on the efficient and stable club memberships.
We say a club membership model (I,C,A,g,π,u) has increasing returns from mem-
bership overlap if Assumption 1 is satisfied and h′′(x) > 0. We say a club membership
model (I,C,A,g,π,u) has decreasing returns from membership overlap if Assumption 1 is
satisfied and h′′(x)< 0.
We use the following example to discuss the impact of having increasing or decreasing
returns from membership overlap.
Example 3.5. Consider the same capacity constraints model as in Example 3.1 where there
are 12 individuals and 6 clubs where where individuals can join up to 3 clubs and clubs can
admit up to 4 members (n = 12, D = 3, m = 6 and S = 4).
When there is increasing returns from membership overlap, the club membership struc-
ture depicted in Figure 3.5 is efficient, and it is the unique efficient club membership structure
in the sense that an efficient club membership structure must have clubs admit members in
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Figure 3.5 The unique efficient club membership structure with increasing
returns from membership overlap (nD≥ mS)
a way so that each three clubs for a clique with the strongest links possible. Observe that
the club membership structure in Figure 3.5 is the same as the club membership structure
depicted in the middle graph of Figure 3.1, so this structure is also efficient under constant
returns from membership overlap. But the other two club membership structures in Figure
3.1 are not efficient when there is increasing returns from membership overlap. We can see
that the increasing returns from membership overlap encourage clubs to build stronger links
with fewer clubs and refines the set of efficient club membership structures in this direction.
When there is decreasing returns from membership overlap, the club membership
structure depicted in Figure 3.6 is efficient, and it is the unique efficient club membership
structure in the sense that an efficient club membership structure must have clubs admit
members in a way so that all clubs are linked to each other and the strength of links are
almost the same (the difference in the membership overlap between any pairs of clubs is not
greater than one). Observe that the club membership structure in Figure 3.5 is the same as
the club membership structure depicted in the bottom graph of Figure 3.5, so this structure
is also efficient under constant returns from membership overlap. But the other two club
membership structures in Figure 3.1 are not efficient when there is decreasing returns from
membership overlap. We can see that the decreasing returns from membership overlap
encourage clubs to build weaker links with more clubs and refines the set of efficient club
membership structures in this direction.
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Figure 3.6 The unique efficient club membership structure with decreasing
returns from membership overlap (nD≥ mS)
We have a similar finding for stability. While all the three club membership structures
in Figure 3.1 are also stable under constant returns from membership overlap, when there is
increasing returns from membership overlap, the structure in Figure 3.5 is the only stable
one out of the three, and when there is decreasing returns from membership overlap, the
structure in Figure 3.6 is the only stable one out of the three.
3.4.2 The Smooth Club Membership Model
In the capacity constraints model, an individual wants to join as many clubs as possible
but faces a constraint on her degree, and a club wants to admit as many members as possible
but has a constraint on its membership size. In a more general setting, individuals and clubs
make flexible club joining and member admission decisions by comparing the marginal
benefit and the marginal cost that change smoothly with their degree and membership size.
We show that Propositions 3.1-3.2 on efficiency and stability of club membership structures
are robust to this generalization
Consider a smooth club membership model that refers to a model (I,C,A,g,π,u)where
Assumptions 2 and 3 are satisfied, A = {0,1}n×m, and
(i) the marginal effect of club size on productivity ∆F(x) = F(x+1)−F(x) is dropping
in club size:
d∆F(x)
dx
< 0
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and that ∆F(n−1) is sufficiently negative such that a club should never admit all n individu-
als.
(ii) the marginal club joining cost ∆κ(x) is rising at an increasing rate:
d∆κ(x)
dx
> 0
d2∆κ(x)
dx2
> 0
and that ∆κ(1) is sufficiently small such that an individual should always join multiple clubs
and ∆κ(m−1) is sufficiently large such that an individual should never join all m clubs.
We have the following results for this model with constant returns from membership
overlap.
For efficiency, let s∗1, d
∗
1 be the solution to the maximization problem (3.5) and s
∗
2, d
∗
2 be
the solution to the maximization problem (3.6):
max
d∈{1,2,...,m},s∈{1,2,...,n}
(αsd−αs+F(s)− κ(d)
d
)s (3.5)
max
d∈{1,2,...,m},s∈{1,2,...,n}
(αsd−αs+F(s)− κ(d)
d
)d (3.6)
Remark 3.1. Consider the smooth club membership model with constant returns from
membership overlap. If nd∗1 ≥ms∗1 and d∗1 divides ms∗1, then a club membership structure a is
efficient if and only if all clubs admits s∗1 members, and there are
ms∗1
d∗1
individuals that join d∗1
clubs and the remaining individuals join no clubs. If ms∗2 ≥ nd∗2 and s∗2 divides nd∗2 , then a
club membership structure a is efficient if and only if all individuals join d∗2 clubs, and there
are nd
∗
2
s∗2
clubs that admit s∗2 members and the remaining clubs admit no members.
The above remark demonstrates that in certain non-trivial cases, efficiency indicates the
concentration of club membership to one group of individuals/clubs and the exclusion to club
activities of the other group. This is consistent with our finding for the capacity constraints
model.
For stability, define two functions sˆ(d) and πˆ(d) where sˆ(d) is the solution to and πˆ(d)
is the outcome of the following maximizing problem:
max
s∈R
F(s)+αs(d−1)
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In the smooth club membership model with constant returns from membership overlap,
the productivity of a club is
πc(a) =F(sc(a))+α ∑
c′ ̸=c
occ′(a)
=F(sc(a))+α∑
i∈I
aic(di(a)−1)
So, if all members of a club c have degree d, then
πc(a) =F(sc(a))+αsc(a)(d−1)
Therefore, sˆ(d) captures the optimal membership size for a club when all its members
have degree d, and πˆ(d) captures the highest productivity of a club when all its members
have degree d. For simplicity, we assume sˆ(d) ∈ Z when d ∈ Z.
Consider the following two conditions on d:∆κ(d)> πˆ(d)+α(d+1)∆κ(d−1)< πˆ(d)+α(d−1) (3.7)
Note that for a club, if all its members have degree d and it achieves productivity πˆ(d),
then it has no incentive to admit more members with degree d and it has no incentive to exile
any existing members.
For an individual with degree d, we show in the appendix that πˆ(d)+α(d+1) is the
maximum additional benefit she can obtain by joining another club that has all its members
with degree d and achieves productivity πˆ(d), and πˆ(d)+α(d−1) is the reduction in the
benefit she suffers by quitting a club that has all its members with degree d and achieves
productivity πˆ(d). We also know for an individual with degree d, ∆κ(d) and ∆κ(d−1) are
the marginal cost she pays by joining another club and the marginal cost she saves by quitting
a club respectively. So, if the two conditions in (3.7) hold, for an individual with degree d,
she has no incentive to join or quit a club that has sˆ(dˆ) members with degree dˆ.
Therefore, an integer solution dˆ to the two inequities in (3.7) and the associated sˆ = sˆ(dˆ)
suggest a stable club membership structure for a group of individuals and clubs where all
individuals in the group join dˆ clubs in the group and all clubs in the group admit sˆ individuals
in the group.
Let {dˆ1, dˆ2, ..., dˆk} with dˆ1 > dˆ2 > ... > dˆk be the set of positive integers that satisfy the
inequities in (3.7) and let {sˆ1, sˆ2, ..., sˆk}= {sˆ(dˆ1), sˆ(dˆ2), ..., sˆ(dˆk)}. For a club membership
structure a, we define the following k+1 layers of individuals and clubs.
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For j ∈ {1,2, ...,k}, layer j contains the following subset of individuals and clubs:
Iˆ j(a) = {i ∈ I : di(a) = dˆ j}
Cˆ j(a) = {c ∈C : sc(a) = sˆ j}
For j = k+1, layer j contains the following subset of individuals and clubs:
Iˆ j(a) = {i ∈ I : di(a) = 0}
Cˆ j(a) = {c ∈C : sc(a) = 0}
Remark 3.2. Consider the smooth club membership model with constant returns from
membership overlap, a club membership structure a is stable if
(i)
k+1⋃
j=1
Iˆ j(a) = I and
k+1⋃
j=1
Cˆ j(a) =C,
(ii) |Iˆk+1(a)|× |Cˆk+1(a)|= 0,
(iii) ∀i ∈ Iˆ j(a),c ∈ Cˆ j′(a): if j ̸= j′, then aic = 0.
The above remark illustrates a type of stable club membership structures where indi-
viduals and clubs are separated into several layers. In each layer, individuals join the same
number of clubs and clubs admit the same number of members, and all club memberships
are between individuals and clubs within the layer.
Note that in a stable club membership structure demonstrated above, individuals/clubs
in the same layer will obtain the same utility/productivity and individuals/clubs in different
layers will generically obtain different utility/productivity. So, in a stable club membership
structure characterized by Remark 3.2, individuals and clubs are separated into a few groups
with distinct club membership pattern and welfare level. This is consistent with our finding
for the capacity constraints model.
3.5 Discussion
In Section 3.4, we examine two extensions of our model. The analysis provides a sense
of how our results would remain robust or change, but is partial. We are working on getting
complete analytical solutions. There are also other ways to extend the model. For example,
we assume that the productivity of a club rise in its aggregate link strength with other clubs
without taking into account the characteristics of clubs it has links with. We can extend our
analysis by assuming that the benefit from a link depends on the membership size or the
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productivity of the club on the other side of the link. We aim to explore this issue in the
future.
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Appendix 3.A Proofs
Proof for Proposition 3.1
In the capacity constraints model, we know that if a ∈ A is efficient, we must have
∀i ∈ I,c ∈C : di(a)≤ D,sc(a)≤ S
The aggregate utility of individuals given a club membership structure a is
U(a) =∑
i∈I
ui(a)
=∑
i∈I
∑
c∈C
aic
(
f (sc(a))+ ∑
c′ ̸=c
gcc′(a)
)
=∑
i∈I
∑
c∈C
aic
(
f (sc(a))+α ∑
c′ ̸=c
occ′(a)
)
=∑
i∈I
∑
c∈C
aic
(
f (sc(a))+α ∑
c′ ̸=c
∑
i′∈I
ai′cai′c′
)
= ∑
i∈I,c∈C
aic f (sc(a))+α ∑
i∈I,c∈C,c′ ̸=c,i′∈I
aicai′cai′c′
=∑
c∈C
f (sc(a))∑
i∈I
aic+α ∑
c∈C,c′ ̸=c,i′∈I
ai′cai′c′∑
i∈I
aic
=∑
c∈C
f (sc(a))sc(a)+α ∑
c∈C,c′ ̸=c,i′∈I
ai′cai′c′sc(a)
=∑
c∈C
sc(a) f (sc(a))+α ∑
c∈C,i′∈I
sc(a)ai′c ∑
c′ ̸=c
ai′c′
=∑
c∈C
sc(a) f (sc(a))+α ∑
c∈C,i′∈I
sc(a)ai′c(di′(a)−ai′c)
=

∑
c∈C
sc(a) f (sc(a))+α ∑
c∈C,i′∈I
sc(a)ai′c(di′(a)−1) when ai′c = 0
∑
c∈C
sc(a) f (sc(a))+α ∑
c∈C,i′∈I
sc(a)ai′c(di′(a)−1) when ai′c = 1
=∑
c∈C
sc(a) f (sc(a))+α ∑
c∈C,i′∈I
sc(a)ai′c(di′(a)−1)
=∑
c∈C
sc(a) f (sc(a))+α ∑
c∈C,i∈I
aicsc(a)(di(a)−1) (3.8)
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We now prove our efficiency characterization for the situation when nD≥ mS. From
equation (3.8), we can get
dU(a)
dsc(a)
= f (sc(a))+ sc(a) f ′(sc(a))+α∑
i∈I
aic(di(a)−1)
We know di(a) ∈ {0,1, ...,m}. When di(a) ≥ 1, we have aic(di(a)− 1) ≥ 0. When
di(a) = 0, it must be aic = 0 and therefore aic(di(a)−1) = 0. So we have
α∑
i∈I
aic(di(a)−1)≥ 0
Also, when sc(a)≥ 0, we have f (sc(a))≥ 0 and sc(a) f ′(sc(a))≥ 0. When sc(a)> 0,
we have f (sc(a))> 0 and sc(a) f ′(sc(a))> 0. So
dU(a)
dsc(a)
≥ 0 when sc(a)≥ 0
dU(a)
dsc(a)
> 0 when sc(a)> 0
Since 0≤ sc(a)≤ S,
U(a)≤ ∑
c∈C
S f (S)+α ∑
c∈C,i∈I
aicS(di(a)−1)
where the equality can be reached if and only if ∀c ∈C : sc(a) = S.
Since there are m clubs, we have
U(a)≤mS f (S)+αS∑
i∈I
(di(a)−1)∑
c∈C
aic
=mS f (S)+αS∑
i∈I
(di(a)−1)di(a)
We now look st the problem of
max
(di(a))i∈I
∑
i∈I
(di(a)−1)di(a)
Note that when nD≥ mS, the aggregate number of club membership is constrained by
mS, i.e. ∑
i∈I
di(a)≤ mS≤ nD. Also, in the capacity constraints model, we have ∀i ∈ I : 0≤
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di(a)≤ D. So we have the following constraints for the maximizing problem above:
∑
i∈I
di(a)≤ mS≤ nD
∀i ∈ I : 0≤ di(a)≤ D
We show that this constrained maximizing problem has the following solution (di(a)∗)i∈I .
When (mS) mod D ̸= 1, there are ⌊mSD ⌋ individuals with di(a)∗ = D, one individual with
di(a)∗ = (mS) mod D, and the remaining individuals with di(a)∗ = 0. When (mS) mod D =
1, there are ⌊mSD ⌋ individuals with di(a)∗ = D, one individual with di(a)∗ = 1 or di(a)∗ = 0,
and the remaining individuals with di(a)∗ = 0. We also show that the outcome of the
maximization problem is
⌊mS
D
⌋(D−1)D+((mS) mod D−1)((mS) mod D)
The proof of the above statement can be found at the end of this subsection.
Hence
∑
i∈I
(di(a)−1)di(a)≤ ⌊mSD ⌋(D−1)D+((mS) mod D−1)((mS) mod D)
where the equality can be reached if and only if (di(a))i∈I=(di(a)∗)i∈I .
Note that when (mS) mod D = 1, if there are ⌊mSD ⌋ individuals with di(a)∗ = D, one
individual with di(a)∗ = 0, and the remaining individuals with di(a)∗ = 0,
∑
i∈I
di(a) = ⌊mSD ⌋D
= mS− (mS) mod D
= mS−1
and we can not have ∀c ∈C : sc(a) = S.
So
U(a)≤mS f (S)+αS∑
i∈I
(di(a)−1)∑
c∈C
aic
=mS f (S)+αS⌊mS
D
⌋(D−1)D+((mS) mod D−1)((mS) mod D)
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where the equality can be reached if and only if ∀c ∈ C : sc(a) = S, and there are ⌊mSD ⌋
individuals with di(a) = D, one individual with di(a) = (mS) mod D, and the remaining
individuals with di(a) = 0.
When nD≥ mS, there exists a club membership structure a where ∀c ∈C : sc(a) = S,
and there are ⌊mSD ⌋ individuals with di(a) =D, one individual with di(a) = (mS) mod D, and
the remaining individuals with di(a) = 0. This can be obtained by letting individuals join
clubs in sequence. Make each individual join D clubs that has the smallest membership size
at her turn before moving to the next individual. Stop when all clubs have S members.
We have proved that in the capacity constraint model with constant returns from mem-
bership overlap. If nD≥ mS, then a club membership structure a ∈ A is efficient if and only
if all clubs have S members, and there are ⌊mSD ⌋ individuals that join D clubs, one individual
that joins (mS) mod D clubs, and the remaining individuals join no clubs.
We now prove our efficiency characterization for the situation when mS ≥ nD. From
equation (3.8), we can get
dU(a)
ddi(a)
= α ∑
c∈C
aicsc(a)≥ 0
When di(a)> 0, there must exist i ∈ I,c ∈C with aic > 0 and sc(a)> 0. So
dU(a)
ddi(a)
≥ 0 when di(a)≥ 0
dU(a)
ddi(a)
> 0 when di(a)> 0
Since 0≤ di(a)≤ S,
U(a)≤ ∑
c∈C
sc(a) f (sc(a))+α ∑
c∈C,i∈I
aicsc(a)(D−1)
= ∑
c∈C
sc(a) f (sc(a))+α ∑
c∈C
sc(a)(D−1)∑
i∈I
aic
= ∑
c∈C
sc(a)( f (sc(a))+α(D−1)sc(a))
where the equality can be reached if and only if ∀i ∈ I : di(a) = S.
We now look st the problem of
max
(sc(a))c∈C
∑
c∈C
sc(a)( f (sc(a))+α(D−1)sc(a))
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Note that when mS≥ nD, the aggregate number of club membership is constrained by
nD, i.e. ∑
i∈I
sc(a)≤ nD≤Ms. Also, in the capacity constraints model, we have ∀c ∈C : 0≤
sc(a)≤ S. So we have the following constraints for the maximizing problem above:
∑
c∈C
sc(a)≤ nD≤ mS
∀c ∈C : 0≤ sc(a)≤ S
We show that this constrained maximizing problem has the following solution (sc(a)∗)c∈C.
There are ⌊nDS ⌋ clubs with sc(a)∗ = S, one club with sc(a)∗ = (nD) mod S, and the remaining
clubs with sc(a)∗ = 0. We also show that the outcome of the maximization problem is
⌊nD
S
⌋S[ f (S)+α(D−1)S]+ (nD) mod S[ f ((nD) mod S)+α(D−1)(nD) mod S]
The proof of the above statement can be found at the end of this subsection.
Hence
∑
c∈C
sc(a)( f (sc(a))+α(D−1)sc(a))
≤⌊nD
S
⌋S[ f (S)+α(D−1)S]+ (nD) mod S[ f ((nD) mod S)+α(D−1)(nD) mod S]
where the equality can be reached if and only if (sc(a))c∈C=(sc(a)∗)c∈C.
So
U(a)≤ ⌊nD
S
⌋S[ f (S)+α(D−1)S]+ (nD) mod S[ f ((nD) mod S)+α(D−1)(nD) mod S]
where the equality can be reached if and only if ∀i ∈ I : di(a) = D, and there are ⌊nDS ⌋
clubs with sc(a)∗ = S, one club with sc(a)∗ = (nD) mod S, and the remaining clubs with
sc(a)∗ = 0.
When mS≥ nD, there exists a club membership structure a where ∀i∈ I : di(a) =D, and
there are ⌊nDS ⌋ clubs with sc(a)∗ = S, one club with sc(a)∗ = (nD) mod S, and the remaining
clubs with sc(a)∗ = 0. This can be obtained by letting clubs admit individuals in sequence.
Make each club admit S individuals that has the smallest degree its turn before moving to the
next club. Stop when all individuals have degree D.
We have proved that in the capacity constraint model with constant returns from mem-
bership overlap. If mS≥ nD, then a club membership structure a ∈ A is efficient if and only
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if all individuals join D clubs, and there are ⌊nDS ⌋ clubs that admit D members, one club that
admits (nD) mod S members, and the remaining clubs admit no members.
Now, we prove our previous statement that for the problem of
max
(di(a))i∈I
∑
i∈I
(di(a)−1)di(a)
s.t. ∑
i∈I
di(a)≤ mS≤ nD
and ∀i ∈ I : 0≤ di(a)≤ D
its solution takes (di(a)∗)i∈I takes the following form. When (mS) mod D ̸= 1, there are ⌊mSD ⌋
individuals with di(a)∗ = D, one individual with di(a)∗ = (mS) mod D, and the remaining
individuals with di(a)∗= 0. When (mS) mod D= 1, there are ⌊mSD ⌋ individuals with di(a)∗=
D, one individual with di(a)∗= 1 or di(a)∗= 0, and the remaining individuals with di(a)∗= 0.
And its outcome is
⌊mS
D
⌋(D−1)D+((mS) mod D−1)((mS) mod D)
We prove in three steps. First, we show in a solution (di(a)∗)i∈I to the problem, there can
only be one individual i with di(a)∗ /∈ {0,D}. Second, we show that a solution (di(a)∗)i∈I
to the problem must satisfy ∑
i∈I
di(a)∗ ≥ mS− 1. Finally, if ∑
i∈I
di(a) = mS, combine our
requirement for (di(a)∗)i∈I in step 1, if (di(a))i∈I is the solution to the problem, we know
there are ⌊mSD ⌋ individuals with di(a) = D, one individual with di(a) = (mS) mod D, and the
remaining individuals with di(a) = 0 and we have
∑
i∈I
(di(a)−1)di(a) = ⌊mSD ⌋(D−1)D+((mS) mod D−1)((mS) mod D)
if ∑
i∈I
di(a) = mS− 1, combine our requirement for (di(a)∗)i∈I in step 1, if (di(a))i∈I
is the solution to the problem, we know there are ⌊mS−1D ⌋ individuals with di(a) = D, one
individual with di(a) = (mS−1) mod D, and the remaining individuals with di(a) = 0 and
we have
∑
i∈I
(di(a)−1)di(a) = ⌊mS−1D ⌋(D−1)D+((mS−1) mod D−1)((mS−1) mod D)
Since when (mS) mod D ̸= 1,
⌊mS
D
⌋(D−1)D+((mS) mod D−1)((mS) mod D)> ⌊mS−1
D
⌋(D−1)D+((mS−1) mod D−1)((mS−1) mod D)
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So ∑
i∈I
di(a)∗ = mS, there are ⌊mSD ⌋ individuals with di(a)∗ = D, one individual with
di(a)∗ = (mS) mod D, and the remaining individuals with di(a)∗ = 0.
When (mS) mod D ̸= 1, we have
⌊mS
D
⌋(D−1)D+((mS) mod D−1)((mS) mod D)= ⌊mS−1
D
⌋(D−1)D+((mS−1) mod D−1)((mS−1) mod D)
So ∑
i∈I
di(a)∗ = mS or ∑
i∈I
di(a)∗ = mS−1, there are ⌊mSD ⌋ individuals with di(a)∗ = D,
one individual with di(a)∗ = 1 or di(a)∗ = 0, and the remaining individuals with di(a)∗ = 0.
We now elaborate on the first two steps.
Step 1: Suppose ∃i′ ∈ I, i′′ ̸= i with 0 < di′(a)∗ < D and 0 < di′′(a)∗ < D. Let di′(a)∗ >
di′′(a)∗. Construct a (di(a)′)i∈I where di′(a)′ = di′(a)∗+ 1 ≤ D, di′′(a)′ = di′′(a)∗− 1 ≥ 0,
and ∀i ̸= i′, i′′: di(a)′ = di(a)∗. (di(a)′)i∈I satisfies all the constraints of the maximization
problem. We have
∑
i∈I
(d′i(a)−1)di(a) =(di′(a)′−1)di′(a)′+(di′′(a)′−1)di′′(a)′+ ∑
i̸=i′,i′′
(d∗i (a)−1)di(a)∗
=(di′(a)
∗)(di′(a)∗+1)+(di′′(a)∗−2)(di′′(a)∗−1)+ ∑
i̸=i′,i′′
(d∗i (a)−1)di(a)∗
=(di′(a)
∗−1)di′(a)∗+2di′(a)∗+(di′′(a)∗−1)di′′(a)∗−2(di′′(a)∗−1)
+ ∑
i ̸=i′,i′′
(d∗i (a)−1)di(a)∗
=(di′(a)
∗−1)di′(a)∗+(di′′(a)∗−1)di′′(a)∗+ ∑
i ̸=i′,i′′
(d∗i (a)−1)di(a)∗
+2(di′(a)
∗−di′′(a)∗+1)
>(di′(a)
∗−1)di′(a)∗+(di′′(a)∗−1)di′′(a)∗+ ∑
i ̸=i′,i′′
(d∗i (a)−1)di(a)∗
=∑
i∈I
(d∗i (a)−1)di(a)∗
so (di(a)∗)i∈I cannot be the solution to the optimization problem.
Step 2: Suppose ∑
i∈I
di(a)∗ < mS−1, we know ∃i′ ∈ I with di′(a)∗ < D.
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If di′(a)∗ < D− 1, construct a (di(a)′)i∈I where di′(a)′ = di′(a)∗+ 2 ≤ D and ∀i ̸= i′:
di(a)′ = di(a)∗. (di(a)′)i∈I satisfies all the constraints of the maximization problem. We have
∑
i∈I
(d′i(a)−1)di(a) =(di′(a)′−1)di′(a)′+∑
i̸=i′
(d∗i (a)−1)di(a)∗
=(di′(a)
∗+1)(di′(a)∗+2)+∑
i ̸=i′
(d∗i (a)−1)di(a)∗
>(di′(a)
∗−1)di′(a)∗+∑
i̸=i′
(d∗i (a)−1)di(a)∗
=∑
i∈I
(d∗i (a)−1)di(a)∗
so (di(a)∗)i∈I cannot be the solution to the optimization problem.
If di′(a)∗ = D− 1, construct a (di(a)′)i∈I where di′(a)′ = di′(a)∗+ 1 ≤ D and ∀i ̸= i′:
di(a)′ = di(a)∗. (di(a)′)i∈I satisfies all the constraints of the maximization problem. We have
∑
i∈I
(d′i(a)−1)di(a) =(di′(a)′−1)di′(a)′+∑
i ̸=i′
(d∗i (a)−1)di(a)∗
=(di′(a)
∗)(di′(a)∗+1)+∑
i ̸=i′
(d∗i (a)−1)di(a)∗
>(di′(a)
∗−1)di′(a)∗+∑
i ̸=i′
(d∗i (a)−1)di(a)∗
=∑
i∈I
(d∗i (a)−1)di(a)∗
so (di(a)∗)i∈I cannot be the solution to the optimization problem.
We can follow the same argument to prove our previous statement that for the problem
of
max
(sc(a))c∈C
∑
c∈C
sc(a)( f (sc(a))+α(D−1)sc(a))
s.t. ∑
c∈C
sc(a)≤ nD≤ mS
and ∀c ∈C : 0≤ sc(a)≤ S
its solution takes (sc(a)∗)c∈C takes the following form. There are ⌊nDS ⌋ clubs with sc(a)∗ = S,
one club with sc(a)∗ = (nD) mod S, and the remaining clubs with sc(a)∗ = 0. And its
outcome is
⌊nD
S
⌋S[ f (S)+α(D−1)S]+ (nD) mod S[ f ((nD) mod S)+α(D−1)(nD) mod S]
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Proof for Proposition 3.2
We start by making note of two Lemmas which we will frequently use later.
First, for the capacity constraints model with constant returns from membership overlap,
we know all individuals join at most D clubs and all clubs admit at most S members. As
individuals and clubs always prefer larger degree and larger membership size before they
meet their constraints, there are no incentives for individuals to quit clubs and for clubs to
exile members, unless they want to make a substitution. So,
Lemma 3.1. Consider the capacity constraints model with constant returns from membership
overlap, a club membership structure a ∈ A is stable if and only if:
(i) ∀i ∈ I,c ∈C: di(a)≤ D, sc(a)≤ S, and (di(a)−D)(sc(a)−S) = 0,
(ii) ∀i ∈ I,c ∈C: if aic = 0, there is no a′ ∈ A, c′ ̸= c, i′ ̸= i with
a′ic = 1
a′ic′ ≤ aic′
a′i′c ≤ ai′c
∀c′′ ̸= c,c′ :a′ic′′ = aic′′
∀i′′ ̸= i, i′ :a′i′′c = ai′′c
∀i′′ ̸= i,c′′ ̸= c :a′i′′c′′ = ai′′c′′
such that
ui(a′)> ui(a)
πc(a′)> πc(a)
The first condition says that all individuals join at most D clubs and all clubs admit at
most S member and that there cannot exist a pair of individual and club where the individual
is not fully affiliated with D memberships and the club is not full with S members, because
otherwise they would both benefit if the individual joins the club. The second conditions say
that there is no pair of individual i and club c that would both benefit when i joins c. When i
joins c, i would want to quit at most one other club c′ and c would want to exile at most one
existing member i′.
Second, we show how the utility of an individual i change and how the productivity of a
club c change when they move from a club membership structure a to a′ described condition
(ii) of Lemma 3.1.
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Lemma 3.2. In the capacity constraints model with constant returns from membership
overlap, consider a club membership structure a and a′. If aic = 0 and
a′ic = 1
a′ic′ ≤ aic′
a′i′c ≤ ai′c
∀c′′ ̸= c,c′ :a′ic′′ = aic′′
∀i′′ ̸= i, i′ :a′i′′c = ai′′c
∀i′′ ̸= i,c′′ ̸= c :a′i′′c′′ = ai′′c′′
then:
If a′i′c = ai′c, πc(a
′)> πc(a) if and only if sc(a)< S,
If a′i′c < ai′c, πc(a
′)> πc(a) if and only if di(a′)> di′(a),
If a′ic′ = aic′ , ui(a
′)> ui(a) if and only if di(a)< D,
If a′ic′ < aic′ , ui(a
′)> ui(a) if and only if πc(a′)< πc′(a).
Lemma 3.2 can be proved in the following way.
In the capacity constraint model with constant returns from membership overlap, the
productivity of a club c is:
πc(a) =F(sc(a))+ ∑
c′ ̸=c
gcc′(a)
=α ∑
c′ ̸=c
∑
i∈I
aicaic′+F(sc(a))
=α∑
i∈I
aic(di(a)−1)+F(sc(a))
So
πc(a) = F(sc(a))+αaic(di(a)−1)+αai′c(di′(a)−1)+α ∑
i′′ ̸=i,i′
ai′′c(di′′(a)−1)
πc(a′) = F(sc(a′))+αa′ic(di(a
′)−1)+αa′i′c(di′(a′)−1)+α ∑
i′′ ̸=i,i′
a′i′′c(di′′(a
′)−1)
Since for individuals i′′ ̸= i, i′, their club memberships are the same under a and a′, we
have
α ∑
i′′ ̸=i,i′
ai′′c(di′′(a)−1) = α ∑
i′′ ̸=i,i′
a′i′′c(di′′(a
′)−1)
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and so
πc(a′)−πc(a) =F(sc(a′))−F(sc(a))
+α
[
a′ic(di(a
′)−1)+a′i′c(di′(a′)−1)−aic(di(a)−1)−ai′c(di′(a)−1)
]
If a′i′c = ai′c, i.e. club c does not exile i
′, then sc(a′) = sc(a)+1 and di′(a′) = di′(a),
πc(a′)−πc(a) = F(sc(a)+1)−F(sc(a))+αa′ic(di(a′)−1)
> 0 when sc(a)< S< 0 when sc(a)≥ S
So πc(a′)> πc(a) if and only if sc(a)< S.
If a′i′c < ai′c, i.e. club c exiles i
′, then sc(a′) = sc(a),
πc(a′)−πc(a) = α
[
di(a′)−di′(a)
]> 0 when di(a′)> di′(a)≤ 0 when di(a′)≤ di′(a)
So πc(a′)> πc(a) if and only if di(a′)> di′(a),
In the capacity constraint model, the utility of individual i is:
ui(a) = aicπc(a)+aic′πc′(a)+ ∑
c′′ ̸=c,c′
aic′′πc′′(a)−κ(di(a))
ui(a′) = a′icπc(a)+a
′
ic′πc′(a)+ ∑
c′′ ̸=c,c′
a′ic′′πc′′(a
′)−κ(di(a′))
Since for clubs c′′ ̸= c,c′, their membership structure are the same under a and a′, we
have
∑
c′′ ̸=c,c′
aic′′πc′′(a) = ∑
c′′ ̸=c,c′
a′ic′′πc′′(a
′)
and so
ui(a′)−ui(a) =−
[
κ(di(a′))−κ(di(a))
]
+a′icπc(a)+a
′
ic′πc′(a)−aicπc(a)−aic′πc′(a)
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If a′ic′ = aic′ , i.e. individual i does not quit c
′, then di(a′) = di(a)+1 and πc′(a′) = πc′(a),
ui(a′)−ui(a) =− [κ(di(a)+1)−κ(di(a))]+πc(a)
> 0 when di(a)< D< 0 when di(a)≥ D
So ui(a′)> ui(a) if and only if di(a)< D.
If a′ic′ < aic′ , i.e. individual i quits c
′, then di(a′) = di(a)1,
ui(a′)−ui(a) = πc(a)−πc′(a′)
> 0 when πc(a)> πc′(a′)≤ 0 when πc(a)≤ πc′(a′)
So ui(a′)> ui(a) if and only if πc(a)> πc′(a′).
We have now finished our preparation and start to prove Proposition 3.2.
With Lemma 3.1, we can prove Proposition 3.2 by showing that in the capacity constrains
model with constant returns from membership overlap, a club membership structure a ∈ A
satisfies
(i) ∀i ∈ I,c ∈C: di(a)≤ D, sc(a)≤ S, and (di(a)−D)(sc(a)−S) = 0,
(ii) ∀i ∈ I,c ∈C: if aic = 0, there is no a′ ∈ A, c′ ̸= c, i′ ̸= i with
a′ic = 1
a′ic′ ≤ aic′
a′i′c ≤ ai′c
∀c′′ ̸= c,c′ :a′ic′′ = aic′′
∀i′′ ̸= i, i′ :a′i′′c = ai′′c
∀i′′ ̸= i,c′′ ̸= c :a′i′′c′′ = ai′′c′′
such that
ui(a′)> ui(a)
πc(a′)> πc(a)
if and only if a satisfies
(a) ∀i ∈ I,c ∈C: di(a)≤ D, sc(a)≤ S, and (di(a)−D)(sc(a)−S) = 0,
(b) ∀i ∈ I2(a),c,c′ ∈C2(a): if aic > aic′ , then πc(a)> πc′(a),
(c) ∀i, i′ ∈ I3(a): if di(a)≥ di′(a), then aic ≥ ai′c ∀c ∈C,
(d) ∀c,c′ ∈C2(a): if πc(a)≥ πc′(a), then aic ≥ aic′ ∀i ∈ I2(a) and aic ≤ aic′ ∀i ∈ I3(a).
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We start with the ‘if’ part. If (a) holds, (i) obviously also holds. So we show (ii) holds
when (a), (b), (c) and (d) hold.
With (a), we have ∀i ∈ I: di(a)≤ D and we know ∀i ∈ I: di(a)≥ D by definition. So
I1(a)∪ I2(a)∪ I3(a)∪ I4(a) = I
Again, with (a), we have ∀c ∈C: 0≤ sc(a)≤ S, and hence ∀c ∈C: 0≤ πc(a)≤ π∗. So
C1(a)∪C2(a)∪C3(a) =C
We show that if (a), (b), (c) and (d) hold, then ∀x ∈ {1,2,3,4},y ∈ {1,2,3}: ∀i ∈
Ix(a),c ∈Cy(a): if aic = 0, there is no a′ ∈ A, c′ ̸= c, i′ ̸= i with
a′ic = 1
a′ic′ ≤ aic′
a′i′c ≤ ai′c
∀c′′ ̸= c,c′ :a′ic′′ = aic′′
∀i′′ ̸= i, i′ :a′i′′c = ai′′c
∀i′′ ̸= i,c′′ ̸= c :a′i′′c′′ = ai′′c′′
such that
ui(a′)> ui(a)
πc(a′)> πc(a)
When i ∈ I1(a), since di(a) = D and πc(a) = π∗ for all c ∈C with aic = 1.
ui(a) = Dπ∗
We know that ∀a′ ∈ A, i ∈ I:
ui(a′)≤ Dπ∗
since when di(a′)≤ D,
ui(a′) = ∑
c∈C
a′icπc(a
′)≤ Dπ∗
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and when di(a′)> D,
ui(a′) = ∑
c∈C
a′icπc(a
′)−M2(di(a′)−D)< 0
given M2 is sufficiently large.
So ∀a′ ∈ A: ui(a) =Dπ∗ ≥ ui(a′). Therefore, when x= 1,∀y ∈ {1,2,3}: ∀i ∈ Ix(a),c ∈
Cy(a): if aic = 0, there is no a′ ∈ A, c′ ̸= c, i′ ̸= i with
a′ic = 1
a′ic′ ≤ aic′
a′i′c ≤ ai′c
∀c′′ ̸= c,c′ :a′ic′′ = aic′′
∀i′′ ̸= i, i′ :a′i′′c = ai′′c
∀i′′ ̸= i,c′′ ̸= c :a′i′′c′′ = ai′′c′′
such that
ui(a′)> ui(a)
πc(a′)> πc(a)
When i ∈ I4(a), we know di(a) = 0. With condition (a) that says (di(a)−D)(sc(a)−
S) = 0 ∀i ∈ I,c ∈C, we know ∀c ∈C: sc(a) = S if there exists i ∈ I4(a).
For i ∈ I4(a),c ∈C, when aic = 0, suppose there is an a′ ∈ A, i′ ̸= i with
a′ic = 1
a′i′c ≤ ai′c
∀i′′ ̸= i, i′ :a′i′′c = ai′′c
such that
πc(a′)> πc(a)
Since a′ic = 1, aic = 0, and ∀i′′ ̸= i, i′ : a′i′′c = ai′′c, if a′i′c = ai′c, given sc(a) = S, we
know from Lemma 3.2 that πc(a′) ≤ πc(a). If a′i′c < ai′c, we know from Lemma 3.2 that
πc(a′)> πc(a) only if di(a′)> di′(a), which cannot be true since di(a′)≤ 1≤ di′(a).
112
Therefore, when x= 4,∀y∈ {1,2,3}: ∀i∈ Ix(a),c∈Cy(a): if aic = 0, there is no a′ ∈ A,
c′ ̸= c, i′ ̸= i with
a′ic = 1
a′ic′ ≤ aic′
a′i′c ≤ ai′c
∀c′′ ̸= c,c′ :a′ic′′ = aic′′
∀i′′ ̸= i, i′ :a′i′′c = ai′′c
∀i′′ ̸= i,c′′ ̸= c :a′i′′c′′ = ai′′c′′
such that
ui(a′)> ui(a)
πc(a′)> πc(a)
When c ∈C1(a), since πc(a) = π∗, we know by definition of π∗ that ∀a′ ∈ A: πc(a) =
π∗ ≥ πc(a′). Therefore, when y = 1,∀x ∈ {1,2,3,4}: ∀i ∈ Ix(a),c ∈Cy(a): if aic = 0, there
is no a′ ∈ A, c′ ̸= c, i′ ̸= i with
a′ic = 1
a′ic′ ≤ aic′
a′i′c ≤ ai′c
∀c′′ ̸= c,c′ :a′ic′′ = aic′′
∀i′′ ̸= i, i′ :a′i′′c = ai′′c
∀i′′ ̸= i,c′′ ̸= c :a′i′′c′′ = ai′′c′′
such that
ui(a′)> ui(a)
πc(a′)> πc(a)
When c ∈ C3(a), we know πc(a) = 0 and sc(a) = 0. With condition (a) that says
(di(a)−D)(sc(a)−S) = 0 ∀i ∈ I,c ∈C, we know ∀i ∈ I: di(a) = D if there exists c ∈C3(a).
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For i ∈ I,c ∈C3(a), when aic = 0, suppose there is an a′ ∈ A, i′ ̸= i with
a′ic = 1
a′ic′ ≤ aic′
∀c′′ ̸= c,c′ :a′ic′′ = aic′′
such that
ui(a′)> ui(a)
Since a′ic = 1, aic = 0, and ∀c′′ ̸= c,c′ : a′ic′′ = aic′′ , if a′ic′ = aic′ , given di(a) = D, we
know from Lemma 3.2 that ui(a′) ≤ ui(a). If a′ic′ < aic′ , we know from Lemma 3.2 that
ui(a′)> ui(a) only if πc(a′)> πc′(a), which cannot be true since di(a′)≤ f (1)≤ πc′(a).
Therefore, when y = 3,∀x ∈ {1,2,3,4}: ∀i ∈ Ix(a),c ∈ Cy(a): if aic = 0, there is no
a′ ∈ A, c′ ̸= c, i′ ̸= i with
a′ic = 1
a′ic′ ≤ aic′
a′i′c ≤ ai′c
∀c′′ ̸= c,c′ :a′ic′′ = aic′′
∀i′′ ̸= i, i′ :a′i′′c = ai′′c
∀i′′ ̸= i,c′′ ̸= c :a′i′′c′′ = ai′′c′′
such that
ui(a′)> ui(a)
πc(a′)> πc(a)
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Now we only need to show that ∀x ∈ {2,3},y ∈ {2}: ∀i ∈ Ix(a),c ∈Cy(a): if aic = 0,
there is no a′ ∈ A, c′ ̸= c, i′ ̸= i with
a′ic = 1
a′ic′ ≤ aic′
a′i′c ≤ ai′c
∀c′′ ̸= c,c′ :a′ic′′ = aic′′
∀i′′ ̸= i, i′ :a′i′′c = ai′′c
∀i′′ ̸= i,c′′ ̸= c :a′i′′c′′ = ai′′c′′
such that
ui(a′)> ui(a)
πc(a′)> πc(a)
When i∈ I2(a),c∈C2(a) and aic = 0. Since i∈ I2(a), di(a) =D. If a′ic′ = aic′ , we know
from Lemma 3.2 that ui(a′)≤ ui(a).
If a′ic′ < aic′ , then aic′ = 1. We know c
′ /∈C3(a) since C3(a) consists of clubs that have
no members in a. If c′ ∈C1(a), then πc(a′)≤ πc′(a) = π∗. We know from Lemma 3.2 that
ui(a′)≤ ui(a).
If c′ ∈C2(a), since aic = 0, aic′ = 1, we know from condition (b) that πc′(a) > πc(a).
Since πc′(a)> πc(a), we know from condition (d) that ∀i ∈ I2(a): aic′ ≥ aic and ∀i ∈ I3(a):
aic′ ≤ aic.
We know that ∀c,c′ ∈C2(a): aic = 1 only if i ∈ I2(a)∪ I3(a). Given that πc′(a)> πc(a),
there must exists i ∈ I2(a) where aic′ = 1 and aic = 0, otherwise ∀i ∈ I2(a)∪ I3(a): aic′ ≤ aic,
violating πc′(a)> πc(a).
So now we know
∀i ∈ I2(a) :aic′ ≥ aic (3.9)
∃i ∈ I2(a) s.t. aic′ > aic (3.10)
∀i ∈ I3(a) :aic′ ≤ aic (3.11)
If ∀i ∈ I3(a) : aic′ = aic, then sc(a)< sc′(a)≤ S. We know f orallc ∈C2(a):
πc(a) = f (sc(a))+α(D−1) ∑
i∈I2(a)
aic+ ∑
i∈I3(a)
aic(di(a)−1)
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so
πc(a′) = f (sc(a′))+α(D−1) ∑
i∈I2(a)
a′ic+ ∑
i∈I3(a)
a′ic(di(a
′)−1)
≤ f (sc′(a))+α(D−1) ∑
i∈I2(a)
aic′+ ∑
i∈I3(a)
aic′(di(a)−1)
=πc′(a)
We know from Lemma 3.2 that ui(a′)≤ ui(a).
If ∃i′′ ∈ I3(a) : ai′′c′ < ai′′c, so ai′′c′ = 0. We must have sc′ = S, otherwise (di′′(a)−
D)(sc′−S) ̸= 0, violating condition (a). Also, we mush have
∀i′′′ ∈ I with ai′′′c = 1 : di′′′(a)> di′′(a)
otherwise condition (c) is violated.
Hence we have
πc′(a) = f (S)+α(D−1)S− ∑
i∈I3(a)
aic′(D−di(a))
and
πc(a′)≤ f (S)+α(D−1)S− ∑
i∈I3(a)
a′ic(D−di(a′))
≤ f (S)+α(D−1)S− ∑
i∈I3(a),i̸=i′′
aic(D−di(a))
≤ πc′(a)
We know from Lemma 3.2 that ui(a′)≤ ui(a).
Hence when x = 2, y = 2, ∀i ∈ Ix(a),c ∈Cy(a): if aic = 0, there is no a′ ∈ A, c′ ̸= c,
i′ ̸= i with
a′ic = 1
a′ic′ ≤ aic′
a′i′c ≤ ai′c
∀c′′ ̸= c,c′ :a′ic′′ = aic′′
∀i′′ ̸= i, i′ :a′i′′c = ai′′c
∀i′′ ̸= i,c′′ ̸= c :a′i′′c′′ = ai′′c′′
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such that
ui(a′)> ui(a)
πc(a′)> πc(a)
When i ∈ I3(a),c ∈C2(a) and aic = 0. We know di(a) < D, so we must have ∀c ∈C:
sc = S, otherwise (di(a)−D)(sc− S) ̸= 0, violating condition (a). If a′i′c = ai′c, we know
from Lemma 3.2 that πc(a′)≤ πc(a).
If a′i′c < ai′c, so ai′c = 1, we have di(a) < di′(a), otherwise we should have aic ≥ ai′c
according to condition (c), violating aic = 0 < ai′c = 1. So di(a′)≤ di(a)+1≤ di′(a). We
know from Lemma 3.2 that πc(a′)≤ πc(a).
Hence when x = 3, y = 2, ∀i ∈ Ix(a),c ∈Cy(a): if aic = 0, there is no a′ ∈ A, c′ ̸= c,
i′ ̸= i with
a′ic = 1
a′ic′ ≤ aic′
a′i′c ≤ ai′c
∀c′′ ̸= c,c′ :a′ic′′ = aic′′
∀i′′ ̸= i, i′ :a′i′′c = ai′′c
∀i′′ ̸= i,c′′ ̸= c :a′i′′c′′ = ai′′c′′
such that
ui(a′)> ui(a)
πc(a′)> πc(a)
We have finished the ’if’ part. For the ‘only if’ part. If (i) holds, (a) obviously also hold.
So we show (b), (c), (d) holds when (i) and (ii) hold.
Suppose (i) and (ii) hold, but (b) does not hold, then there exists i ∈ I2(a),c,c′ ∈C2(a)
with aic > aic′ and πc(a)≤ πc′(a). Note that since c′ ∈C2(a), either sc′(a)< S or ∃i′ ∈ I3(A)
with ai′c′ = 1.
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If sc′(a)< S, consider the following deviation from a to a′ for i and c′.
a′ic′ = 1
a′ic < aic
a′i′c′ = ai′c′
∀c′′ ̸= c,c′ :a′ic′′ = aic′′
∀i′′ ̸= i, i′ :a′i′′c′ = ai′′c′
∀i′′ ̸= i,c′′ ̸= c′ :a′i′′c′′ = ai′′c′′
According to Lemma 3.2, pic′(a′) > pic′(a). Also according to Lemma 3.2, ui(a) >
ui(a′) since πc′(a′)> πc′(a)≥ πc(a). Condition (ii) is violated.
If ∃i′ ∈ I3(A) with ai′c′ = 1, consider the following deviation from a to a′ for i and c′.
a′ic′ = 1
a′ic < aic
a′i′c < ai′c
∀c′′ ̸= c,c′ :a′ic′′ = aic′′
∀i′′ ̸= i, i′ :a′i′′c = ai′′c
∀i′′ ̸= i,c′′ ̸= c :a′i′′c′′ = ai′′c′′
Since di(a′) = D > di′(a), according to Lemma 3.2, pic′(a′)> pic′(a). Also according
to Lemma 3.2, ui(a)> ui(a′) since pic′(a′)> pic′(a)≥ πc(a). Condition (ii) is violated.
So, if (i) and (ii) hold, (b) holds.
Suppose (i) and (ii) hold, but (c) does not hold, then there exists i, i′ ∈ I3(a),c ∈C with
di(a)≥ di′(a) and aic < ai′c. Consider the following deviation from a to a′ for i and c.
a′ic = 1
a′ic′ = aic′
a′i′c < ai′c
∀c′′ ̸= c,c′ :a′ic′′ = aic′′
∀i′′ ̸= i, i′ :a′i′′c = ai′′c
∀i′′ ̸= i,c′′ ̸= c :a′i′′c′′ = ai′′c′′
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Since i ∈ I3(a), we know di(a)< D. According to Lemma 3.2, we have ui(a)> ui(a′).
Also, we know di(a′) = di(a)+1> di′(a), according to Lemma 3.2, we have pic(a′)> pic(a).
Condition (ii) is violated.
So, if (i) and (ii) hold, (c) holds.
Suppose (i) and (ii) hold, but (d) does not hold, then there exists c,c′ ∈C2(a), i ∈ I2(a)
with πc(a)≥ πc′(a) and aic < aic′ or there exists c,c′ ∈C2(a), i ∈ I3(a) with πc(a)≥ πc′(a)
and aic > aic′ .
If there exists c,c′ ∈C2(a), i ∈ I2(a) with πc(a)≥ πc′(a) and aic < aic′ . Note that since
c ∈C2(a), either sc < S or ∃i′ ∈ I3(A) with ai′c = 1.
When sc < S, consider the following deviation from a to a′ for i and c.
a′ic′ = 1
a′ic < aic
a′i′c = ai′c
∀c′′ ̸= c,c′ :a′ic′′ = aic′′
∀i′′ ̸= i, i′ :a′i′′c = ai′′c
∀i′′ ̸= i,c′′ ̸= c :a′i′′c′′ = ai′′c′′
According to Lemma 3.2, pic(a′)> pic(a). Also according to Lemma 3.2, ui(a)> ui(a′)
since pic(a′)> pic(a)≥ πc′(a). Condition (ii) is violated.
When ∃i′ ∈ I3(A) with ai′c = 1, consider the following deviation from a to a′ for i and c.
a′ic′ = 1
a′ic < aic
a′i′c < ai′c
∀c′′ ̸= c,c′ :a′ic′′ = aic′′
∀i′′ ̸= i, i′ :a′i′′c = ai′′c
∀i′′ ̸= i,c′′ ̸= c :a′i′′c′′ = ai′′c′′
Since di(a′) = D > di′(a), according to Lemma 3.2, pic(a′)> pic(a). Also according
to Lemma 3.2, ui(a)> ui(a′) since pic(a′)> pic(a)≥ πc′(a). Condition (ii) is violated.
So there does not exist c,c′ ∈C2(a), i ∈ I2(a) with πc(a)≥ πc′(a) and aic < aic′ .
If there exists c,c′ ∈C2(a), i ∈ I3(a) with πc(a)≥ πc′(a) and aic > aic′ . Since di(a)< D,
we know sc(a) = sc′(a) = S, otherwise (di(a)−D)(sc(a)− S) ̸= 0 or (di(a)−D)(sc′(a)−
S) ̸= 0, condition (i) is violated. Then since c′ ∈C2(a), ∃i′ ∈ I3(a) with ai′c′ = 1.
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Suppose ∃i′ ∈ I3(a) with ai′c′ = 1 and di′(a)≤ di(a), according to condition (c), which
we have shown must hold when (i) and (ii) hold, we have aic′ ≥ ai′c′ . This contradicts with
aic′ = 0 and ai′c′ = 1.
Suppose ∀i′ ∈ I3(a) with ai′c′ = 1, we have di′(a) > di(a), according to condition (c),
which we have shown must hold when (i) and (ii) hold, we have ai′c ≥ aic = 1. Combine
this with our previous finding that ∀i′ ∈ I2(a): ai′c ≥ ai′c′ and our assumption that aic = 1,
aic′ = 0. The membership size of club c is greater than the membership size of c′, violating
sc(a) = sc′(a) = S.
So there does not exist c,c′ ∈C2(a), i ∈ I3(a) with πc(a)≥ πc′(a) and aic > aic′ .
Hence, if (i) and (ii) hold, (d) holds.
We have finished the ‘only if’ part.
Proof for Corollary 3.1
From Proposition 3.2, we know that in the capacity constraints model with constant
returns from membership overlap, if a club membership structure a is stable, then
(i) ∀i ∈ I,c ∈C: di(a)≤ D, sc(a)≤ S, and (di(a)−D)(sc(a)−S) = 0,
(ii) ∀i ∈ I2(a),c,c′ ∈C2(a): if aic > aic′ , then πc(a)> πc′(a),
(iii) ∀i, i′ ∈ I3(a): if di(a)≥ di′(a), then aic ≥ ai′c ∀c ∈C,
(iv) ∀c,c′ ∈C2(a): if πc(a)≥ πc′(a), then aic ≥ aic′ ∀i ∈ I2(a) and aic ≤ aic′ ∀i ∈ I3(a).
We first show that |I2(a)| ≤ S−1.
We know ∀i ∈ I2(a): there exists c′ ∈C2(a) such that aic′ = 1, otherwise i ∈ I1(a) since
aic = 1 only if c ∈C1(a).
Let c ∈C2 be the club with the highest productivity in C2(a):
∀c′ ∈C2(a) : πc(a)≥ πc′(a)
Given (iv), we know
∀i ∈ I2(a),c′ ∈C2(a) : aic ≥ aic′
so
∀i ∈ I2(a) : aic = 1
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and therefore
|I2(a)|= ∑
i∈I2(a)
1 = ∑
i∈I2(a)
aic < sc(a)≤ S
|I2(a)| ≤ S−1
We then show that |I3(a)| ≤ S.
We know ∀i ∈ I3(a): there exists c′ ∈C2(a) such that aic′ = 1, since there does not exist
c ∈C1(a)∪C3(a) such that aic = 1 by definition.
Let c ∈C2 be the club with the lowest productivity in C2(a):
∀c′ ∈C2(a) : πc(a)≤ πc′(a)
Given (iv), we know
∀i ∈ I3(a),c′ ∈C2(a) : aic ≥ aic′
so
∀i ∈ I3(a) : aic = 1
and therefore
|I2(a)|= ∑
i∈I2(a)
1 = ∑
i∈I3(a)
aic ≤ sc(a)≤ S
Finally, we show that |C2(a)| ≤ D.
If I3(a) = /0, let c ∈C2 be the club with the lowest productivity in C2(a). Given (iv), we
know
∀i ∈ I2(a),c′ ∈C2(a) : aic ≤ aic′
We know there exists i ∈ I2 such that aic = 1, otherwise c has no members and belong
to C3(a) since I3(a) = /0. So there exists i ∈ I2 such that
∀c′ ∈C2(a) : aic′ ≥ aic = 1
therefore
|C2(a)|= ∑
c∈C2(a)
1 = ∑
c∈C2(a)
aic ≤ di(a)≤ D
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If I3(a) ̸= /0, then ∀c ∈C2(a): sc(a) = S, otherwise there exists i ∈ I3(a),c ∈C2(a) such
that (di(a)−D)(sc(a)−S) ̸= 0.
Hence ∀c ∈C2(a): there exists i′ ∈ I3(a) such that ai′c = 1, otherwise c ∈C1(a) since it
has S members from I1(a)∪ I2(a).
Let i ∈ I3(a) be the individual with the highest degree in I3(a):
∀i′ ∈ I3(a) : di(a)≥ di′(a)
Given (iii), we know
∀c ∈C2(a) : aic ≥ ai′c
so
∀c ∈C2(a) : aic = 1
and therefore
|C2(a)|= ∑
c∈C2(a)
1 = ∑
c∈C2(a)
aic ≤ di(a)< D
So |C2(a)| ≤ D.
Proof for Proposition 3.3
In the capacity constraint model with no returns from membership overlap, we know
that if a ∈ A is efficient, we must have
∀i ∈ I,c ∈C : di(a)≤ D,sc(a)≤ S
and the aggregate utility of individuals given a club membership structure a is
U(a) =∑
i∈I
ui(a)
=∑
i∈I
∑
c∈C
aic f (sc(a))
=∑
c∈C
f (sc(a))∑
i∈I
aic
=∑
c∈C
f (sc(a))sc(a)
When nD≥ mS, we can achieve ∀c ∈C: sc(a) = S by letting individuals join clubs in
any sequence. In each turn, let an individual join the club with the lowest membership size.
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Stop when all clubs have S members. So
U(a)≤ m f (S)S
where the equality can be reached if and only if ∀c ∈C : sc(a) = S.
We have proved that in the capacity constraint model with no returns from membership
overlap. If nD ≥ mS, then a club membership structure a ∈ A is efficient if and only if all
clubs have S members.
When mS≥ nD, we look at the constrained maximizing problem of
max
(sc(a))c∈C
∑
c∈C
f (sc(a))sc(a) s.t. ∑
c∈C
sc(a)≤ nD≤ mS
and ∀c ∈C : 0≤ sc(a)≤ S
It is easy to see that the solution (sc(a)∗)c∈C takes the following form. There are ⌊nDS ⌋
clubs with sc(a)∗ = S, one club with sc(a)∗ = (nD) mod S, and the remaining clubs with
sc(a)∗ = 0. And its outcome is
⌊nD
S
⌋S f (S)+(nD) mod S f ((nD) mod S)
So
U(a)≤ ⌊nD
S
⌋S f (S)+(nD) mod S f ((nD) mod S)
where the equality can be reached if and only if there are ⌊nDS ⌋ clubs with sc(a) = S, one club
with sc(a) = (nD) mod S, and the remaining clubs with sc(a) = 0. Also, note to achieve the
above (sc(a))c∈C, we must have ∀i ∈ I : di(a) = D.
We have proved that in the capacity constraint model with no returns from membership
overlap. If mS ≥ nD, then a club membership structure a ∈ A is efficient if and only if all
individuals join D clubs, and there are ⌊nDS ⌋ clubs that admit D members, one club that
admits (nD) mod S members, and the remaining clubs admit no members.
Proof for Proposition 3.4
In the same spirit of Lemma 3.1, for the capacity constraints model with zero returns
from membership overlap, we know all individuals join at most D clubs and all clubs admit at
most S members. As individuals and clubs always prefer larger degree and larger membership
size before they meet their constraints, there is no incentives for individuals to quit clubs and
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for clubs to exile members, unless they want to make an substitution. So, a club membership
structure a ∈ A is stable if and only if:
(i) ∀i ∈ I,c ∈C: di(a)≤ D, sc(a)≤ S, and (di(a)−D)(sc(a)−S) = 0,
(ii) ∀i ∈ I,c ∈C: if aic = 0, there is no a′ ∈ A, c′ ̸= c, i′ ̸= i with
a′ic = 1
a′ic′ ≤ aic′
a′i′c ≤ ai′c
∀c′′ ̸= c,c′ :a′ic′′ = aic′′
∀i′′ ̸= i, i′ :a′i′′c = ai′′c
∀i′′ ̸= i,c′′ ̸= c :a′i′′c′′ = ai′′c′′
such that
ui(a′)> ui(a)
πc(a′)> πc(a)
We prove Proposition 3.4 by showing that in the capacity constrains model with zero
returns from membership overlap, a club membership structure a ∈ A satisfies
(i) ∀i ∈ I,c ∈C: di(a)≤ D, sc(a)≤ S, and (di(a)−D)(sc(a)−S) = 0,
(ii) ∀i ∈ I,c ∈C: if aic = 0, there is no a′ ∈ A, c′ ̸= c, i′ ̸= i with
a′ic = 1
a′ic′ ≤ aic′
a′i′c ≤ ai′c
∀c′′ ̸= c,c′ :a′ic′′ = aic′′
∀i′′ ̸= i, i′ :a′i′′c = ai′′c
∀i′′ ̸= i,c′′ ̸= c :a′i′′c′′ = ai′′c′′
such that
ui(a′)> ui(a)
πc(a′)> πc(a)
if and only if a satisfies
(a) ∀i ∈ I,c ∈C: di(a)≤ D, sc(a)≤ S, and (di(a)−D)(sc(a)−S) = 0,
124
(b) ∀i ∈ I2(a),c,c′ ∈C2(a): if aic > aic′ , then πc(a)> πc′(a),
We start with the ‘if’ part. If (a) holds, (i) obviously also hold. So we show (ii) holds
when (a) and (b) hold.
With (a), we have ∀i ∈ I: di(a)≤ D and we know ∀i ∈ I: di(a)≥ D by definition. So
I1(a)∪ I2(a)∪ I3(a)∪ I4(a) = I
Again, with (a), we have ∀c ∈C: 0≤ sc(a)≤ S, and hence ∀c ∈C: 0≤ πc(a)≤ π∗. So
C1(a)∪C2(a)∪C3(a) =C
We show that if (a) and (b) hold, then ∀x∈ {1,2,3,4},y∈ {1,2,3}: ∀i∈ Ix(a),c∈Cy(a):
if aic = 0, there is no a′ ∈ A, c′ ̸= c, i′ ̸= i with
a′ic = 1
a′ic′ ≤ aic′
a′i′c ≤ ai′c
∀c′′ ̸= c,c′ :a′ic′′ = aic′′
∀i′′ ̸= i, i′ :a′i′′c = ai′′c
∀i′′ ̸= i,c′′ ̸= c :a′i′′c′′ = ai′′c′′
such that
ui(a′)> ui(a)
πc(a′)> πc(a)
When i ∈ I1(a), since di(a) = D and πc(a) = π∗ for all c ∈C with aic = 1.
ui(a) = Dπ∗
We know that ∀a′ ∈ A, i ∈ I:
ui(a′)≤ Dπ∗
since when di(a′)≤ D,
ui(a′) = ∑
c∈C
a′icπc(a
′)≤ Dπ∗
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and when di(a′)> D,
ui(a′) = ∑
c∈C
a′icπc(a
′)−M2(di(a′)−D)< 0
given M2 is sufficiently large.
So ∀a′ ∈ A: ui(a) =Dπ∗ ≥ ui(a′). Therefore, when x= 1,∀y ∈ {1,2,3}: ∀i ∈ Ix(a),c ∈
Cy(a): if aic = 0, there is no a′ ∈ A, c′ ̸= c, i′ ̸= i with
a′ic = 1
a′ic′ ≤ aic′
a′i′c ≤ ai′c
∀c′′ ̸= c,c′ :a′ic′′ = aic′′
∀i′′ ̸= i, i′ :a′i′′c = ai′′c
∀i′′ ̸= i,c′′ ̸= c :a′i′′c′′ = ai′′c′′
such that
ui(a′)> ui(a)
πc(a′)> πc(a)
When i ∈ I3(a)∪ I4(a), we know di(a) < D. With condition (a) that says (di(a)−
D)(sc(a)−S) = 0 ∀i ∈ I,c ∈C, we know ∀c ∈C: sc(a) = S if there exists i ∈ I3∪ I4(a).
In the capacity constraints model with zero returns from membership overlap, we know
πc(a) = F(sc(a)) =
 f (sc(a)) if sc(a)≤ Sf (S)−M1(sc(a)−S) if sc(a)> S
Since ∀c ∈C: sc(a) = S, we have ∀c ∈C,a′ ∈ A: πc(a) = f (S) = π∗ ≥ πc(a′).
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Therefore, ∀x ∈ {3,4},y ∈ {1,2,3}: ∀i ∈ Ix(a),c ∈Cy(a): if aic = 0, there is no a′ ∈ A,
c′ ̸= c, i′ ̸= i with
a′ic = 1
a′ic′ ≤ aic′
a′i′c ≤ ai′c
∀c′′ ̸= c,c′ :a′ic′′ = aic′′
∀i′′ ̸= i, i′ :a′i′′c = ai′′c
∀i′′ ̸= i,c′′ ̸= c :a′i′′c′′ = ai′′c′′
such that
ui(a′)> ui(a)
πc(a′)> πc(a)
When c ∈C1(a), since πc(a) = π∗, we know by definition of π∗ that ∀a′ ∈ A: πc(a) =
π∗ ≥ πc(a′). Therefore, when y = 1,∀x ∈ {1,2,3,4}: ∀i ∈ Ix(a),c ∈Cy(a): if aic = 0, there
is no a′ ∈ A, c′ ̸= c, i′ ̸= i with
a′ic = 1
a′ic′ ≤ aic′
a′i′c ≤ ai′c
∀c′′ ̸= c,c′ :a′ic′′ = aic′′
∀i′′ ̸= i, i′ :a′i′′c = ai′′c
∀i′′ ̸= i,c′′ ̸= c :a′i′′c′′ = ai′′c′′
such that
ui(a′)> ui(a)
πc(a′)> πc(a)
When c ∈ C3(a), we know πc(a) = 0 and sc(a) = 0. With condition (a) that says
(di(a)−D)(sc(a)−S) = 0 ∀i ∈ I,c ∈C, we know ∀i ∈ I: di(a) = D if there exists c ∈C3(a).
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For i ∈ I,c ∈C3(a), when aic = 0, suppose there is an a′ ∈ A, i′ ̸= i with
a′ic = 1
a′ic′ ≤ aic′
∀c′′ ̸= c,c′ :a′ic′′ = aic′′
such that
ui(a′)> ui(a)
We know a′ic = 1, aic = 0, and ∀c′′ ̸= c,c′ : a′ic′′ = aic′′ . So, if a′ic′ = aic′ , di(a′) =
di(a)+1 = D+1,
ui(a′) = ∑
c∈C
a′icπc(a
′)−M2 < ∑
c∈C
aicπc(a) = ui(a)
given M2 is sufficiently large, violating ui(a′)> ui(a).
If a′ic′ < aic′ , di(a
′) = di(a) = D,
ui(a′) =πc(a′)+ ∑
c′′ ̸=c,c′
a′ic′′πc(a
′)
= f (1)+ ∑
c′′ ̸=c,c′
a′ic′′πc(a
′)
Since the membership structure for c′′ ̸= c,c′ is the same under a and a′, ,
ui(a′) = f (1)+ ∑
c′′ ̸=c,c′
aic′′πc(a)
≤πc′(a)+ ∑
c′′ ̸=c,c′
aic′′πc(a) = ui(a)
violating ui(a′)> ui(a).
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Therefore, when y = 3,∀x ∈ {1,2,3,4}: ∀i ∈ Ix(a),c ∈ Cy(a): if aic = 0, there is no
a′ ∈ A, c′ ̸= c, i′ ̸= i with
a′ic = 1
a′ic′ ≤ aic′
a′i′c ≤ ai′c
∀c′′ ̸= c,c′ :a′ic′′ = aic′′
∀i′′ ̸= i, i′ :a′i′′c = ai′′c
∀i′′ ̸= i,c′′ ̸= c :a′i′′c′′ = ai′′c′′
such that
ui(a′)> ui(a)
πc(a′)> πc(a)
Now we only need to show that when x= 2,y= 2, ∀i∈ Ix(a),c∈Cy(a): if aic = 0, there
is no a′ ∈ A, c′ ̸= c, i′ ̸= i with
a′ic = 1
a′ic′ ≤ aic′
a′i′c ≤ ai′c
∀c′′ ̸= c,c′ :a′ic′′ = aic′′
∀i′′ ̸= i, i′ :a′i′′c = ai′′c
∀i′′ ̸= i,c′′ ̸= c :a′i′′c′′ = ai′′c′′
such that
ui(a′)> ui(a)
πc(a′)> πc(a)
When i ∈ I2(a),c ∈C2(a) and aic = 0. Since i ∈ I2(a), di(a) =D. If a′ic′ = aic′ , di(a′) =
di(a)+1 = D+1,
ui(a′) = ∑
c∈C
a′icπc(a
′)−M2 < ∑
c∈C
aicπc(a) = ui(a)
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given M2 is sufficiently large, violating ui(a′)> ui(a).
If a′ic′ < aic′ , we know c
′ /∈C3(a) since C3(a) consists of clubs that have no members in
a.
Suppose c′ ∈C1(a),
ui(a′) =πc(a′)+ ∑
c′′ ̸=c,c′
aic′′πc(a)
≤π∗+ ∑
c′′ ̸=c,c′
aic′′πc(a)
=πc′(a)+ ∑
c′′ ̸=c,c′
aic′′πc(a) = ui(a)
violating ui(a′)> ui(a).
Suppose c′ ∈C2(a), since aic = 0, aic′ = 1, we know from condition (b) that πc′(a)>
πc(a), so
f (sc(a)) = πc(a)< pic′(a) = f (sc′(a))
sc(a)< sc′(a)
sc(a′)≤ sc′(a)
pic′(a)≥ πc′(a)
and hence
ui(a′) =πc(a′)+ ∑
c′′ ̸=c,c′
a′ic′′πc(a)
≤πc′(a)+ ∑
c′′ ̸=c,c′
aic′′πc(a) = ui(a)
given the membership structure for c′′ ̸= c,c′ is the same under a and a′. ui(a′) ≤ ui(a)
violates ui(a′)> ui(a).
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So, when x = 2,y = 2, ∀i ∈ Ix(a),c ∈Cy(a): if aic = 0, there is no a′ ∈ A, c′ ̸= c, i′ ̸= i
with
a′ic = 1
a′ic′ ≤ aic′
a′i′c ≤ ai′c
∀c′′ ̸= c,c′ :a′ic′′ = aic′′
∀i′′ ̸= i, i′ :a′i′′c = ai′′c
∀i′′ ̸= i,c′′ ̸= c :a′i′′c′′ = ai′′c′′
such that
ui(a′)> ui(a)
πc(a′)> πc(a)
We have finished the ’if’ part. For the ‘only if’ part. If (i) holds, (a) obviously also
holds. So we show (b) holds when (i) and (ii) hold.
Suppose (i) and (ii) hold, but (b) does not hold, then there exists i ∈ I2(a),c,c′ ∈C2(a)
with aic > aic′ and πc(a) ≤ πc′(a). Note that since c′ ∈ C2(a), sc′(a) < S. Consider the
following deviation from a to a′ for i and c′.
a′ic′ = 1
a′ic < aic
a′i′c′ = ai′c′
∀c′′ ̸= c,c′ :a′ic′′ = aic′′
∀i′′ ̸= i, i′ :a′i′′c′ = ai′′c′
∀i′′ ̸= i,c′′ ̸= c′ :a′i′′c′′ = ai′′c′′
So sc′(a′) = sc′(a)+1≤ S, and hence πc′(a′)> πc′(a)≥ πc(a).
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ui(a′) =πc(a′)+ ∑
c′′ ̸=c,c′
a′ic′′πc(a
′)
>πc(a)+ ∑
c′′ ̸=c,c′
a′ic′′πc(a
′)
=πc(a)+ ∑
c′′ ̸=c,c′
aic′′πc(a′) = ui(a)
since the membership structure for c′′ ̸= c,c′ is the same under a and a′.
So, if (i) and (ii) hold, (b) holds.
We have finished the ‘only if’ part.
Proof for Remark 3.1
In the smooth club membership model with constant returns from membership overlap,
the aggregate utility of individuals given a club membership structure a is
U(a) =∑
i∈I
ui(a)
=∑
i∈I
[
∑
c∈C
aic
(
F(sc(a))+ ∑
c′ ̸=c
gcc′(a)
)
−κ(di(a))
]
= ∑
i∈I,c∈C
aic f (sc(a))+α ∑
i∈I,c∈C,c′ ̸=c
occ′(a)−∑
i∈I
κ(di(a))
= ∑
i∈I,c∈C
aic f (sc(a))+α ∑
c∈C,i∈I
aicsc(a)(di(a)−1)−∑
i∈I
κ(di(a))
= ∑
i∈I,c∈C
aic f (sc(a))+α ∑
c∈C,i∈I
aicsc(a)(di(a)−1)−∑
i∈I
di(a)
κ(di(a))
di(a)
= ∑
i∈I,c∈C
aic f (sc(a))+α ∑
c∈C,i∈I
aicsc(a)(di(a)−1)− ∑
i∈I,c∈C
aic
κ(di(a))
di(a)
= ∑
i∈I,c∈C
aic
[
f (sc(a))+αsc(a)(di(a)−1)− κ(di(a))di(a)
]
= ∑
i∈I,c∈C
aic
[
αsc(a)di(a)−αsc(a)+ f (sc(a))− κ(di(a))di(a)
]
We first prove our efficiency characterization for the situation when nd∗1 ≥ ms∗1 and d∗1
divides ms∗1.
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Let d∗1(s) be the solution to
max
d∈{1,2,...,m}
αsd−αs+ f (s)− κ(d)
d
we have
aic
[
αsc(a)di(a)−αsc(a)+ f (sc(a))− κ(di(a))di(a)
]
≤aic
[
αsc(a)d∗1(sc(a))−αsc(a)+ f (sc(a))−
κ(d∗1(sc(a)))
d∗1(sc(a))
]
where the equality is reached if and only ∀i ∈ I,c ∈C with aic = 1: di(a) = d∗1(sc(a)).
So,
U(a)≤ ∑
i∈I,c∈C
aic
[
αsc(a)d∗1(sc(a))−αsc(a)+ f (sc(a))−
κ(d∗1(sc(a)))
d∗1(sc(a))
]
=∑
c∈C
[
αsc(a)d∗1(sc(a))−αsc(a)+ f (sc(a))−
κ(d∗1(sc(a)))
d∗1(sc(a))
]
∑
i∈I
aic
=∑
c∈C
[
αsc(a)d∗1(sc(a))−αsc(a)+ f (sc(a))−
κ(d∗1(sc(a)))
d∗1(sc(a))
]
sc(a)
Let s∗1 be the solution to
max
s∈{1,2,...,n}
[
αsd∗1(s)−αs+ f (s)−
κ(d∗1(s))
d∗1(s)
]
s
we have[
αsc(a)d∗1(sc(a))−αsc(a)+ f (sc(a))−
κ(d∗1(sc(a)))
d∗1(sc(a))
]
sc(a)≤
[
αs∗1d
∗
1(s
∗
1)−αs∗1+ f (s∗1)−
κ(d∗1(s
∗
1))
d∗1(s
∗
1)
]
s∗1
where the equality is reached if and only ∀c ∈C: sc(a) = s∗1.
So,
U(a)≤
[
αs∗1d
∗
1(s
∗
1)−αs∗1+ f (s∗1)−
κ(d∗1(s
∗
1))
d∗1(s
∗
1)
]
s∗1
where the equality is reached if and only ∀i ∈ I,c ∈C: sc(a) = s∗1 and di(a) = d∗1 = d∗1(s∗1)
when aic = 1.
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Note that by definition of d∗1(s) and s
∗
1, d
∗
1 = d
∗
1(s
∗
1) and s
∗
1 are the solution to
max
d∈{1,2,...,m},s∈{1,2,...,n}
(αsd−αs+F(s)− κ(d)
d
)s (3.12)
When nd∗1 ≥ ms∗1 and d∗1 divides ms∗1, there exists a club membership structure a ∈ A
where ∀i ∈ I,c ∈C: sc(a) = s∗1 and di(a) = d∗1 when aic = 1. This can be obtained by letting
individuals join clubs in sequence. Make each individual join d∗1 clubs that has the smallest
membership size at her turn before moving to the next individual. Stop when all clubs have
s∗1 members. There will be
ms∗1
d∗1
individuals who join clubs.
We have proved that in the smooth club membership model with constant returns from
membership overlap. If nd∗1 ≥ ms∗1 and d∗1 divides ms∗1, then a club membership structure a
is efficient if and only if all clubs admits s∗1 members, and there are
ms∗1
d∗1
individuals that join
d∗1 clubs and the remaining individuals join no clubs.
We now prove our efficiency characterization for the situation when ms∗2 ≥ nd∗2 and s∗2
divides nd∗2 .
Let s∗2(d) be the solution to
max
s∈{1,2,...,n}
αsd−αs+ f (s)− κ(d)
d
we have
aic
[
αsc(a)di(a)−αsc(a)+ f (sc(a))− κ(di(a))di(a)
]
≤aic
[
αs∗2(di(a))di(a)−αs∗2(d)+ f (s∗2(di(a)))−
κ(di(a))
di(a)
]
where the equality is reached if and only ∀i ∈ I,c ∈C with aic = 1: sc(a) = s∗2(di(a)).
So,
U(a)≤ ∑
i∈I,c∈C
aic
[
αs∗2(di(a))di(a)−αs∗2(di(a))+ f (s∗2(di(a)))−
κ(di(a))
di(a)
]
=∑
i∈I
[
αs∗2(di(a))di(a)−αs∗2(di(a))+ f (s∗2(di(a)))−
κ(di(a))
di(a)
]
∑
c∈C
aic
=∑
i∈I
[
αs∗2(di(a))di(a)−αs∗2(di(a))+ f (s∗2(di(a)))−
κ(di(a))
di(a)
]
di(a)
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Let d∗2 be the solution to
max
d∈{1,2,...,m}
[
αs∗2(d)d−αs∗2(d)+ f (s∗2(d))−
κ(d)
d
]
d
we have [
αs∗2(di(a))di(a)−αs∗2(di(a))+ f (s∗2(di(a)))−
κ(di(a))
di(a)
]
di(a)
≤
[
αs∗2(d
∗
2)d
∗
2 −αs∗2(d∗2)+ f (s∗2(d∗2))−
κ(d∗2)
d∗2
]
d∗2
where the equality is reached if and only ∀i ∈ I: di(a) = d∗2 .
So,
U(a)≤
[
αs∗2(d
∗
2)d
∗
2 −αs∗2(d∗2)+ f (s∗2(d∗2))−
κ(d∗2)
d∗2
]
d∗2
where the equality is reached if and only ∀i ∈ I,c ∈C: di(a) = d∗2 and sc(a) = s∗2 = s∗2(d∗2)
when aic = 1.
Note that by definition of d∗2 and s
∗
2(d), d
∗
2 and s
∗
2 = s
∗
2(d
∗
2) are the solution to
max
d∈{1,2,...,m},s∈{1,2,...,n}
(αsd−αs+F(s)− κ(d)
d
)d (3.13)
When ms∗2 ≥ nd∗2 and s∗2 divides nd∗2 , there exists a club membership structure a ∈ A
where ∀i ∈ I,c ∈C: di(a) = d∗2 and sc(a) = s∗2 when aic = 1. This can be obtained by letting
clubs admit individuals in sequence. Make each club admit s∗2 individuals that has the smallest
degree its turn before moving to the next club. Stop when all individuals have degree d∗2 .
There will be nd
∗
2
s∗2
clubs that have members.
We have proved that in the smooth club membership model with constant returns from
membership overlap. If ms∗2 ≥ nd∗2 and s∗2 divides nd∗2 , then a club membership structure a
is efficient if and only if all individuals join d∗2 clubs, and there are
nd∗2
s∗2
clubs that admit s∗2
members and the remaining clubs admit no members.
Proof for Remark 3.2
To prove remark 2, we know that when a club membership structure a satisfies
(a)
k+1⋃
j=1
Iˆ j(a) = I and
k+1⋃
j=1
Cˆ j(a) =C,
(b) |Iˆk+1(a)|× |Cˆk+1(a)|= 0,
(c) ∀i ∈ Iˆ j(a),c ∈ Cˆ j′(a): if j ̸= j′, then aic = 0.
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then
(i) ∀i ∈ I: there is no a′ ∈ A with
a′ic ≤ aic ∀c ∈C
a′i′c = ai′c ∀i′ ̸= i,c ∈C
such that
ui(a′)> ui(a)
(ii) ∀c ∈C: there is no a′ ∈ A with
a′ic ≤ aic ∀i ∈ I
a′ic′ = aic′ ∀c′ ̸= c, i ∈ I
such that
πc(a′)> πc(a)
(iii) ∀i ∈ I,c ∈C: there is no a′ ∈ A with
a′ic′ ≤ aic′ ∀c′ ̸= c
a′i′c ≤ ai′c ∀i′ ̸= i
a′i′c′ = ai′c′ ∀i′ ̸= i,c′ ̸= c
such that
ui(a′)> ui(a)
πc(a′)> πc(a)
First we show that if (a), (b) and (c) hold, then (i) is true, i.e., no individual has an
incentive to quit any set of clubs. Note that since
k+1⋃
j=1
Iˆ j(a) = I, and di(a) = 0 when i∈ Iˆk+1(a),
we only need to show ∀i ∈ Iˆ j(a), j ∈ {1,2, ...,k}, i has no incentive to quit any clubs.
If i ∈ Iˆ j(a), we know
ui(a) = dˆ jπˆ(dˆ j)−κ(dˆ j)
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Consider a′ ∈ A with
a′ic ≤ aic ∀c ∈C
a′i′c = ai′c ∀i′ ̸= i,c ∈C
where ∑c∈C(aic−a′ic) = x, so x captures the number of clubs i quits by moving from a to a′.
So di(a′) = di(a)− x.
We know
πc(a′) = F(sc(a′))+αa′ic(di(a
′)−1)+α∑
i′ ̸=i
a′i′c(di′(a
′)−1)
= F(sc(a′))+αa′ic(di(a)− x−1)+α∑
i′ ̸=i
a′i′c(di′(a
′)−1)
since the membership structure for i′ ̸= i is the same under a and a′,
πc(a) = F(sc(a′))+αa′ic(di(a)− x−1)+α∑
i′ ̸=i
ai′c(di′(a)−1)
If aic = a′ic = 1, then sc(a′) = sc(a) and
πc(a) = F(sc(a))+αaic(di(a)−1)+α∑
i′ ̸=i
ai′c(di′(a)−1)−αx
= πc(a)−αx
So, in a′, the utility of i is
ui(a′) = ∑
c∈C
a′icπc(a
′)−κ(dˆ j− x)
= ∑
c∈C
a′ic(πˆ(dˆ
j)−αx)−κ(dˆ j− x)
= (dˆ j− x)(πˆ(dˆ j)−αx)−κ(dˆ j− x)
We know that the utility of i in a is
ui(a) = dˆ jπˆ(dˆ j)−κ(dˆ j)
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So
ui(a)−ui(a′) =dˆ jπˆ(dˆ j)−κ(dˆ j)−
[
(dˆ j− x)(πˆ(dˆ j)−αx)−κ(dˆ j− x)]
=dˆ jπˆ(dˆ j)− dˆ jπˆ(dˆ j)+ xdˆ jπˆ(dˆ j)+ xα dˆ j− xα− [κ(dˆ j)−κ(dˆ j− x)]
=x
[
dˆ jπˆ(dˆ j)+α(dˆ j−1)]− [κ(dˆ j)−κ(dˆ j−1)+ ...+κ(dˆ j− (x−1))−κ(dˆ j− x)]
=dˆ jπˆ(dˆ j)+α(dˆ j−1)−∆κ(dˆ j−1)
+ dˆ jπˆ(dˆ j)+α(dˆ j−1)−∆κ(dˆ j−2)
+ ...
+ dˆ jπˆ(dˆ j)+α(dˆ j−1)−∆κ(dˆ j− x)
Since dˆ jπˆ(dˆ j)+α(dˆ j−1)> ∆κ(dˆ j−1)> ∆κ(dˆ j−2)> ... > ∆κ(dˆ j− x),
ui(a)−ui(a′)> 0
when x > 0. So, ∀i ∈ I: there is no a′ ∈ A with
a′ic ≤ aic ∀c ∈C
a′i′c = ai′c ∀i′ ̸= i,c ∈C
such that
ui(a′)> ui(a)
Then we show that if (a), (b) and (c) hold, then (ii) is true, i.e., no club has an incentive
to exile any set of members.
Since
k+1⋃
j=1
Cˆ j(a) =C and and sc(a) = 0 when c ∈ Cˆk+1(a), we only need to show ∀c ∈
cˆ j(a), j ∈ {1,2, ...,k}, c has no incentive to exile any members.
If c ∈ cˆ j(a), c admits sˆ j members with degree dˆ j. Since
sˆ j = sˆ j(dˆ j) = argmax
s∈R
F(s)+αs(dˆ j−1)
c has the optimal membership size and would not want to exile any member.
Finally, we show that if (a), (b) and (c) hold, then (iii) is true.
Since
k+1⋃
j=1
Iˆ j(a) = I and
k+1⋃
j=1
Cˆ j(a) = C and given that ∆κ(x) is increasing and ∆F(x)
is decreasing, we only need to show that ∀x ∈ {1,2, ...,k+ 1},y ∈ {1,2, ...,k+ 1}: ∀i ∈
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Iˆx(a),c ∈ Cˆy(a): if aic = 0, there is no a′ ∈ A, c′ ̸= c, i′ ̸= i with
a′ic = 1
a′ic′ ≤ aic′
a′i′c ≤ ai′c
∀c′′ ̸= c,c′ :a′ic′′ = aic′′
∀i′′ ̸= i, i′ :a′i′′c = ai′′c
∀i′′ ̸= i,c′′ ̸= c :a′i′′c′′ = ai′′c′′
such that
ui(a′)> ui(a)
πc(a′)> πc(a)
First, consider the incentive of a joint deviation from i and c in the same layer. Since
|Iˆk+1(a)|× |Cˆk+1(a)|= 0, we know there does not exist a pair of i and c where i ∈ Iˆk+1(a)
and c ∈ Cˆk+1(a). So consider i ∈ Iˆ j(a),c ∈ Cˆ j(a), j ∈ {1,2, ...,k}.
If a′ic′ < aic′ , we have di(a
′) = di(a) = dˆ j. Since c ∈ Cˆ j(a), we know c admits sˆ j
members with degree dˆ j. Since
sˆ j = sˆ j(dˆ j) = argmax
s∈R
F(s)+αs(dˆ j−1)
c would not benefit by admitting individual i or replacing a member i′ with i.
If a′ic′ = aic′ , we have di(a
′) = di(a)+1 = dˆ j +1. Under this case, we first look at how
the productivity of c changes.
When a′i′c = ai′c, sc(a
′) = sc(a)+1 = sˆ j +1,
πc(a′) =F(sc(a′))+αa′ic(di(a
′)−1)+α ∑
i′′ ̸=i
a′i′′c(di′′(a
′)−1)
=F(sˆ j +1)+α dˆ j +α sˆ j(dˆ j−1)
=F(sˆ j)+α sˆ j(dˆ j−1)+∆F(sˆ j)α(dˆ j−1)+α
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When a′i′c < ai′c, sc(a
′) = sc(a) = sˆ j,
πc(a′) =F(sc(a′))+αa′ic(di(a
′)−1)+α ∑
i′′ ̸=i,i′
a′i′′c(di′′(a
′)−1)
=F(sˆ j)+α dˆ j +α(sˆ j−1)(dˆ j−1)
=F(sˆ j)+α sˆ j(dˆ j−1)+α
=πc(a)+α
Since
sˆ j = sˆ j(dˆ j) = argmax
s∈R
F(s)+αs(dˆ j−1)
we know
∆F(sˆ j)α(dˆ j−1)≤ 0
so πc(a′)≤ πc(a)+α = πˆ(dˆ j)+α and the equality is reached when a′i′c < ai′c.
Then, still under the case of a′ic′ = aic′ which implies di(a
′) = di(a)+1 = dˆ j +1, we
look at how the productivity of c′′ ̸= c changes.
πc′′(a′) =F(sc′′(a′))+αaic′′(di(a′)−1)+α ∑
i′′ ̸=i
a′i′′c′′(di′′(a
′)−1)
=F(sc′′(a))+αaic′′(di(a)+1−1)+α ∑
i′′ ̸=i
ai′′c′′(di′′(a)−1)
=F(sc′′(a))+αaic′′(di(a)−1)+α ∑
i′′ ̸=i
ai′′c′′(di′′(a)−1)+αaic′′
=πc′′(a)+αaic′′
Now we look ar how the utility of i changes,
ui(a′) =a′icπc(a
′)+ ∑
c′′ ̸=c
a′ic′′πc′′(a
′)−κ(di(a′))
=πc(a′)+ ∑
c′′ ̸=c
a′ic′′(πc′′(a)+αaic′′)−κ(hatd j +1)
=πc(a′)+ dˆ j(πˆ(dˆ j))+α dˆ j−κ(hatd j)−∆κ(hatd j)
=ui(a)+πc(a′)+α dˆ j−∆κ(hatd j)
≤ui(a)+ πˆ(dˆ j)+α+α dˆ j−∆κ(hatd j)
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where the equality can be reached when a′i′c < ai′c.
Since
∆κ(hatd j)> πˆ(dˆ j)+α(dˆ j +1)
we have
ui(a′)< ui(a)
So i would not benefit by joining club c.
We have shown that ∀x ∈ {1,2, ...,k+1},y = x: ∀i ∈ Iˆx(a),c ∈ Cˆy(a): if aic = 0, there
is no a′ ∈ A, c′ ̸= c, i′ ̸= i with
a′ic = 1
a′ic′ ≤ aic′
a′i′c ≤ ai′c
∀c′′ ̸= c,c′ :a′ic′′ = aic′′
∀i′′ ̸= i, i′ :a′i′′c = ai′′c
∀i′′ ̸= i,c′′ ̸= c :a′i′′c′′ = ai′′c′′
such that
ui(a′)> ui(a)
πc(a′)> πc(a)
Now we consider the incentive of a joint deviation for i and c in different layers. Consider
i ∈ Iˆx(a),c ∈ Cˆy(a).
If x > y, so that the club is in a higher layer, then
di(a′)≤ di(a)+1≤ dˆy
we know c has sˆy members with degree dˆy. Since
sˆy = sˆy(dˆy) = argmax
s∈R
F(s)+αs(dˆy−1)
c would not benefit by admitting individual i or replacing a member i′ with i.
If y > x, so that the individual is in a higher layer, since i cannot benefit by joining a
club in the same layer, it cannot benefit by joining a club in a lower layer.
So if (a), (b) and (c) hold, then (iii) is true.
141

Bibliography
A. P. A. Calvo-Armengol, J. de Martí. Communication and influence. Theoretical Economics,
10(2):649–690, 2015.
D. Acemoglu, V. M. Carvalho, A. Ozdaglar, and A. Tahbaz-Salehi. The network origins of
aggregate fluctuations. Econometrica, 80(5):1977–2016, 2012.
M. Akbarpour, S. Malladi, and A. Saberi. Diffusion, seeding, and the value of network
information. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3062830, Nov. 2017.
N. Allouch. On the private provision of public goods on networks. Journal of Economic
Theory, 157:527–552, 2015.
G.-M. Angeletos and A. Pavan. Efficient use of information and social value of information.
Econometrica, 75(4):1103–1142, 2007.
K. J. Arrow, H. B. Chenery, B. S. Minhas, and R. M. Solow. Capital-labor substitution and
economic efficiency. The review of Economics and Statistics, pages 225–250, 1961.
O. Baetz. Social activity and network formation. Theoretical Economics, 10(2):315–340,
2015.
W. Baker, G. F. Davis, and M. Yoo. The small world of the american corporate elite,
1991-2001. Strategic Organization, 1, 2001.
V. Bala and S. Goyal. A noncooperative model of network formation. Econometrica, 68(5):
1181–1229, 2000.
C. Ballester, A. Calvó-Armengol, and Y. Zenou. Who’s Who in Networks. Wanted: The Key
Player. Econometrica, 74(5):1403–1417, 2006.
A. Banerjee, A. Chandrashekhar, E. Duflo, and M. O. Jackson. Gossip: Identifying central
individuals in a social network. Working Paper, MIT, 2016.
L. Baumann. A model of weighted network formation. 2017.
F. Bloch and B. Dutta. Communication networks with endogenous link strength. Games and
Economic Behavior, 66(1):39–56, 2009.
F. Bloch and B. Dutta. Formation of networks and coalitions. Handbook of social economics.
North Holland, Amsterdam, pages 305–318, 2011.
143
F. Bloch and B. Dutta. Formation of networks and coalitions. In J. B. A. Bisin and M. Jackson,
editors, Handbook of Social Economics. North Holland. Amsterdam, 2012.
T. Bottomore. Elites and Society. Second Edition. Routledge., London., 1993.
Y. Bramoulle and R. Kranton. Public goods in networks. Journal of Economic Theory, 135
(1):478–494, 2007.
Y. Bramoulle and R. Kranton. Games played on networks. In Y. Bramoullé, A. Galeotti, and
B. Rogers, editors, Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Networks. Oxford University
Press, 2016. ISBN 9780199948277.
Y. Bramoullé, R. Kranton, and M. d’Amours. Strategic interaction and networks. The
American Economic Review, 104(3):898–930, 2014.
J. M. Buchanan. An economic theory of clubs. Economica, 32:1–14, 1965.
D. Condorelli and A. Galeotti. Strategic models of intermediation networks. In Y. Bramoullé,
A. Galeotti, and B. Rogers, editors, Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Networks.
Oxford University Press, 2016. ISBN 9780199948277.
R. Cornes. The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge. UK, 1996.
R. A. Dahl. A critique of the ruling elite model. The American Political Science Review, 52
(2):463–469, 1958.
K. Dasaratha. Distributions of centrality on networks. CoRR, abs/1709.10402, 2017. URL
http://arxiv.org/abs/1709.10402.
G. Demange and M. Wooders. Group Formation in Economics: Networks, Clubs, and
Coalitions. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. UK., 2005.
J. Eeckhout. On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings. Economics Letters, 69(1):1–8,
2000.
M. Elliott. Inefficiencies in networked markets. American Economic Journal: Microeco-
nomics, 7(4):43–82, 2015.
F. Feri. Stochastic stability in networks with decay. Journal of Economic Theory, 135(1):
442–457, 2007.
C. Fershtman and D. Persitz. Social clubs and social networks. Telaviv University, Working
Paper, 2018.
N. E. Friedkin and E. C. Johnsen. Social Influence Networks and Opinion Change. Advances
in Group Processes, 16(1):1–29, 1999.
D. Gale and L. S. Shapley. College admissions and the stability of marriage. The American
Mathematical Monthly, 69(1):9–15, 1962.
A. Galeotti and S. Goyal. Influencing the influencers: A theory of strategic diffusion. The
Rand Journal of Economics, 40(3):509–532, 2009.
144
A. Galeotti and S. Goyal. The law of the few. American Economic Review, 100(4):1468–92,
2010.
A. Galeotti and L. P. Merlino. Endogenous job contact networks. International economic
review, 55(4):1201–1226, 2014.
A. Galeotti and B. W. Rogers. Strategic Immunization and Group Structure. American
Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 5(2):1–32, 2013.
A. Galeotti, S. Goyal, and J. Kamphorst. Network formation with heterogeneous players.
Games and Economic Behavior, 54(2):353–372, 2006.
D. Garlaschelli and M. I. Loffredo. Patterns of link reciprocity in directed networks. Physical
review letters, 93(26):268701, 2004.
B. Golub and M. O. Jackson. Naïve Learning in Social Networks and the Wisdom of Crowds.
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2(1):112–49, 2010. doi: 10.1257/mic.2.1.
112. URL http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mic.2.1.112.
B. Golub and C. Lever. The leverage of weak ties: How linking groups affects inequality.
Working paper, Harvard University, 2010.
B. Golub and E. Sadler. Learning in social networks, chapter 19, pages 504–542. Oxford
University Press, 2016.
S. Goyal. Networks and markets. Cambridge-INET Working Paper Series: wp1616, 2006.
S. Goyal. Connections: an introduction to the economics of networks. Princeton University
Press, 2007.
S. Goyal. Markets and networks. In M. P. B. Honore, A. Pakes and L. Samuelson, editors,
Advances in Economics: Eleventh World Congress of the Econometric Society. Cambridge
University Press, 2017.
S. Goyal and S. Joshi. Networks of collaboration in oligopoly. Games and Economic
behavior, 43(1):57–85, 2003.
S. Goyal and J. Moraga-Gonzalez. R&d networks. The Rand Journal of Economics, 32(4):
686–707, 2001.
S. Goyal and F. Vega-Redondo. Structural holes in social networks. Journal of Economic
Theory, 137(1):460–492, 2007.
S. Goyal, J.-L. Moraga, and M. van der Leij. Economics: An Emerging Small World. Journal
of Political Economy, 114(2):403–412, 2006.
M. Granovetter. Economic action and social structure: The problem of embeddedness.
American journal of sociology, pages 481–510, 1985.
M. Granovetter. Society and Economy: Framework and Principles. Harvard University
Press., Cambridge, Mass., 2017.
145
M. S. Granovetter. The strength of weak ties. American Journal of Sociology, 78(6):
1360–1380, 1973.
A. Griffith. Random assignment with non-random peers: A structural approach to counter-
factual treatment assessment. mimeo, 2017.
J. C. Harsanyi and R. Selten. A general theory of equilibrium selection in games. MIT Press
Books, 1, 1988.
P. J.-J. Herings, A. Mauleon, and V. Vannetelbosch. Farsightedly stable networks. Games
and Economic Behavior, 67(2):526–541, 2009.
B. Herskovic and J. Ramos. Acquiring information through peers. Mimeo., NYU, 2015.
T. Hiller. Peer effects in endogenous networks. Games and Economic Behavior, 105:349–367,
2017.
D. A. Hojman and A. Szeidl. Core and periphery in networks. Journal of Economic Theory,
139(1):295–309, 2008.
M. Jackson and A. Wolinsky. A stratgegic model of social and economic networks. Journal
of Economic Theory, 71(1):44–74, 1996.
M. Jackson, B. W. Rogers, and Y. Zenou. The Economic Consequences of Social-Network
Structure . Journal of Economic Literature, 55(1):49–95, 2017.
M. O. Jackson. Social and economic networks. Princeton university press, 2010.
M. O. Jackson and B. W. Rogers. Meeting strangers and friends of friends: How random are
social networks? The American economic review, 97(3):890–915, 2007.
M. O. Jackson and A. Van den Nouweland. Strongly stable networks. Games and Economic
Behavior, 51(2):420–444, 2005.
M. O. Jackson and Y. Zenou. Games on networks. In P. H. Young and S. Zamir, editors,
Handbook of the Game Theory with Economic Applications. Elsevier, 2015.
D. Kempe, J. Kleinberg, and E. Tardos. Maximizing the spread of influence through a social
network. In Proceedings 9th ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge
Discovery and Data Mining, 2003.
M. Kinateder and L. P. Merlino. Public goods in endogenous networks. American Economic
Journal: Microeconomics, 9(3):187–212, 2017.
B. Kogut. The Small Worlds of Corporate Governance. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2012.
M. D. König, C. J. Tessone, and Y. Zenou. Nestedness in networks: A theoretical model and
some applications. Theoretical Economics, 9(3):695–752, 2014.
L. Kovanen, J. Saramaki, and K. Kaski. Reciprocity of mobile phone calls. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1002.0763, 2010.
S. Malamud and M. Rostek. Decentralized exchange. Mimeo., 2016.
146
M. Manea. Models of bilateral trade in networks. In Y. Bramoullé, A. Galeotti, and B. Rogers,
editors, Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Networks. Oxford University Press, 2016.
ISBN 9780199948277.
J. D. Marti and Y. Zenou. Network games with incomplete information. http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2535427, 2014. CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10290 .
A. Mauleon and V. Vannetelbosch. Network formation games. 2016.
P. Milgrom and J. Roberts. Rationalizability, learning and equilibrium in games with strategic
complementarities. Econometrica, 58:1255–1277, 1990.
P. Milgrom and N. Stokey. Information, Trade and Common Knowledge. Journal of
Economic Theory, 26:17–27, 1982.
J. D. Montgomery. Social networks and labor-market outcomes: Toward an economic
analysis. The American economic review, 81(5):1408–1418, 1991.
S. Morris. Contagion. Review of Economic Studies, 67(1):57–78, jan 2000. doi: 10.1111/
1467-937x.00121. URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-937X.00121.
R. B. Myerson. Game theory: analysis of conflict. Harvard University, 1991.
M. E. Newman. Scientific collaboration networks. ii. shortest paths, weighted networks, and
centrality. Physical review E, 64(1):016132, 2001.
M. Niederle and L. Yariv. Decentralized matching with aligned preferences. Technical report,
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2009.
N. Olaizola and F. Valenciano. A unifying model of strategic network formation. International
Journal of Game Theory, pages 1–31, 2015.
F. H. Page Jr and M. Wooders. Club networks with multiple memberships and noncooperative
stability. Games and Economic Behavior, 70(1):12–20, 2010.
R. Parikh and P. Krasucki. Communication, Consensus, and Knowledge. Journal of Economic
Theory, 52:178–89, 1990.
Plato. The Republic. Everyman’s Library, New York., 1992.
B. Rogers. A strategic theory of network status. Unpublished manuscript, MEDS, North-
western University, 2008.
E. Rogers. Diffusion of Innovations. Third Edition. Free Press. New York, 1983.
A. E. Roth and M. Sotomayor. Two-sided matching. Handbook of game theory with economic
applications, 1:485–541, 1992.
R. Sethi and M. Yildiz. Communication with unknown perspectives. Econometrica, 84(6):
2029–2069, 2016.
T. Squartini, F. Picciolo, F. Ruzzenenti, and D. Garlaschelli. Reciprocity of weighted
networks. Scientific reports, 3:2729, 2013.
147
M. Useem. The Inner Circle. Oxford University Press, New York, 1984.
V. Vannetelbosch and A. Mauleon. Network formation games. In The Oxford Handbook of
the Economics of Networks. 2015.
E. Vaquera and G. Kao. Do you like me as much as i like you? friendship reciprocity and its
effects on school outcomes among adolescents. Social Science Research, 37(1):55–72,
2008.
C. Wright Mills. The Power Elite. Oxford University Press, Oxford., 1956.
S.-H. Yook, H. Jeong, A.-L. Barabasi, and Y. Tu. Weighted evolving networks. Physical
review letters, 86(25):5835, 2001.
Y. Zenou. Key players. In Y. Bramoullé, A. Galeotti, and B. Rogers, editors, Oxford Hand-
book of the Economics of Networks. Oxford University Press, 2016. ISBN 9780199948277.
148
